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Executive Summary
Trust funds (TFs)1 have become an increasingly im-
portant funding mechanism for development at 
the World Bank, to a degree that the World Bank 
has moved to mainstreaming the instrument and 
including it in its budgeting cycle under the TF re-
form agenda. Germany, albeit already an important 
shareholder of the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (IBRD) and an important 
donor to the International Development Association 
(IDA), has steadily increased its portfolio of TFs at 
the World Bank over the last years. Within the Ger-
man TF portfolio, major stakeholders are the Federal 
Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ) as well as its implementing organizations 
KfW Development Bank (KfW) and the Deutsche Ge-
sellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 
GmbH.
Given the increasing number of TFs, their impor-
tance for the World Bank and the number of German 
actors involved, there are several perceptions which 
have motivated the commissioning of the present 
study: (i) a lack of overview of the current status of 
the German portfolio as a whole and of the different 
types of TF arrangements; (ii) the apprehension that 
a growing portfolio might lead to fragmentation; (iii) 
as a result the hypothesis that there is potential for 
consolidation; and (iv) the concern that inefficiencies 
exist in the allocation, negotiation and management 
of TFs that can be removed. Based on the findings, 
Germany’s goal is a) to achieve a consolidated opin-
ion to the allocation of TFs at the World Bank and to 
strengthen Germany’s position in negotiations, b) to 
refine its position towards the TF reform agenda and 
c) to use the study as an informative background for 
entering into a strategic discussion with the World 
Bank on German TF contributions, akin to the Joint 
Donor TF Portfolio Reviews and Strategic World 
Bank-Donor Consultations already conducted by a 
number of other donors. 
The consulting company joyn-coop, commissioned 
by GIZ on behalf of BMZ, combined a portfolio re-
view with an analysis of the related Administrative 
Agreements (AAs) and an in-depth analysis of eight 
1 A trust fund  is a financing arrangement established with 
contributions from one or more external donor(s)/partners 
to a multilateral aid institution to support specific develop-
ment-related activities. 
selected cases. To this end, joyn-coop held interviews 
with stakeholders in the World Bank as well as the 
three German development institutions on their ex-
perience with TFs.
The overall and German trust fund portfolios:  
status quo and reform process
Since the millennium TFs have grown dynamically 
at the World Bank. At present, the TF volume has sur-
passed IDA contributions over the last replenishment 
periods since the 13th IDA replenishment period (2003-
2005). However, Germany has traditionally focused its 
support to the World Bank on IDA core contributions, 
which account for about 88% of its total funding routed 
through the World Bank. The remaining 12% have sup-
ported TFs supervised or executed by the World Bank. 
Depending on the type of TF, the World Bank assumes 
various roles in managing those funds. For Financial 
Intermediary Funds (FIFs), which typically support 
multi-donor global programs on global public goods 
issues, it provides financial trustee services and in se-
lected cases is involved in implementation. In other 
TFs, IBRD/IDA TFs and IFC (International Finance Cor-
poration) TFs, it also supervises or executes those funds 
under a considerable variety of possible governance 
mechanisms. The distribution between FIFs (69%), 
IBRD/IDA TFs (31%) and IFC TFs (<1%) in the German 
portfolio is in line with the overall distribution of TFs 
handled by the World Bank. A number of other donors 
channel more than 50% of their TF contributions into 
IBRD/IDA TFs and the smaller portion into FIFs. 
The present study concentrates on IBRD/IDA TFs, 
which are supervised or executed by the World Bank, 
excluding the small number of IFC TFs as well as FIFs. 
We find that in FY13, Germany accounted for about 
10% (or USD 937 million) of the overall IBRD/IDA TF 
portfolio and for 4% (or USD 167 million) of total an-
nual cash contributions. Germany almost exclusively 
supports multi-donor TFs, as opposed to single-do-
nor TFs. This differs from the overall distribution at 
the World Bank, where about 25% of all TFs are still 
supported by a single donor, although this share is 
declining. Germany has a clear focus on fragile states 
(79% in its portfolio, compared to 39% in the overall 
portfolio), and a regional focus on South Asia – not 
only due to the Afghanistan Reconstruction TF, which 
accounts for half of the German TF portfolio. Germa-
ny has a strong focus on TFs supporting interventions 
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at the country level or regional priorities (average 
amount of USD 26.9 million). In contrast, its support 
for TFs aimed at creating knowledge and disseminat-
ing new approaches for development is rather low in 
terms of amounts (average of USD 3.4 million).
When looking at the set-up process of TFs, we find 
that Germany participates foremost in the concep-
tualization during initial discussions of a proposed 
TF’s objective. The preparatory work of institutional 
due diligence and management approval are however 
Bank-internal processes that cannot be influenced or 
expedited by the German side. Following negotiations 
between World Bank teams and German stakeholders, 
a contractual agreement on roles and responsibilities 
of the trustee and contributing donor is formalized in 
the AA. A number of clauses in the AA are non-nego-
tiable. Nonetheless, our analysis of AAs reveals that 
contribution schedules, activities and objectives, as 
well as governance structures are key aspects of nego-
tiation. Here, German AAs have considerable variety. 
Albeit unlikely to be part of the AA document, Results 
Frameworks are an important discussion point in the 
set-up of TFs. They should be requested as part of the 
process but are living documents, which will continue 
to evolve during the TF lifecycle.
Governance arrangements: In terms of institutional 
structures, there are three major categories of TF in-
stitutional set-ups, depending on the number of gov-
ernance bodies (one tier to three tiers) and the scope 
of involvement of the donor in these bodies. Three 
major categories of governance structure can be dis-
tinguished. Within these categories up to 70 different 
combinations of governance bodies can however be 
found in practice. Germany mostly engages in two-ti-
er governance structures with a Steering Committee 
developing the strategic direction with donor inputs, 
and a TF Secretariat at the World Bank, which man-
ages day-to-day activities. Generally, the World Bank 
promotes a light version of governance arrangements. 
This particularly holds for Umbrella Facilities (UFs), 
large thematic TFs based on a World Bank sector strat-
egy that preclude donor earmarking. The World Bank 
argues that in addition to the TF governance bodies 
there is always a World Bank-internal governance sys-
tem for review and control.  
To ensure manageability of the growing number of 
TFs and different arrangements, the World Bank grad-
ually introduced steps to reform TF procedures. The 
reform agenda focuses on four pillars each of them 
being addressed over different time periods. These are 
(i) strategic alignment with the World Bank’s port-
folio, (ii) integration of TFs in business planning and 
budgeting process, (iii) cost recovery and efficiency, 
and (iv) oversight. The current reform phase focuses 
on alignment, which aims at making TFs a mecha-
nism to support the World Bank‘s own core agenda.  
Analysis of the German engagements in  
World Bank trust funds
The in-depth-portfolio analysis shows that Ger-
many does not contribute to fragmentation of the 
World Bank’s TF portfolio to a large degree if judged 
against the number of funds (49 TFs). However, the 
German portfolio in itself is fragmented in terms of 
the size of its contributions. It covers a large array 
of topics, with some heavily funded sectors such as 
fragile states and climate change but the majority of 
topics with rather insignificant contributions. 70% of 
TFs have contributions below USD 5 million and 40% 
even below USD 2 million. In contrast, only 12% of 
TFs in the overall World Bank portfolio have contri-
butions lower than USD 2 million and only 33% have 
contributions lower than USD 5 million. Most of the 
large contributions are held by KfW, and most of 
the small ones by GIZ. As a result, KfW holds 56% of 
the TFs and GIZ only 2% in terms of volume. The re-
maining 53% are held by BMZ. Interestingly, though, 
the budget line dedicated to TF funding („Funds in 
Trust“ - FiT) only accounts for 13% of the overall 
German portfolio.
In our case study interviews with German TF man-
agers and World Bank counterparts we found a num-
ber of common perceptions on best practices as well 
as some differing opinions. Both sides agreed that 
experience, institutional history and time invest-
ment are key for smooth set-up and management of 
TFs. German leverage in negotiations is highest when 
there is knowledge about bargaining options, cre-
ative use of formal and informal channels to push for 
objectives and a substantial amount of funding when 
opening a new TF. In the management of TFs, World 
Bank counterparts perceive Germany as particularly 
active at the technical and country levels. However, 
when it comes to strategic level discussions, Germa-
ny is perceived as a rather quiet donor, which uses 
informal channels less than other donors to push the 
agenda. World Bank interviewees also maintained 
that in addition to manpower and engagement, 
funding amounts play an important role for donor 
leverage in agenda setting. This is thought to be par-
ticularly true for large programmatic TFs for knowl-
edge creation, where country-level interaction is not 
as influential as in some country TFs. This contrasts 
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with the German perception that the contribution 
amount is rather secondary. Further leverage could 
be gained when Germany coordinated with other do-
nors to promote shared objectives. Finally, both sides 
argued that TFs are a successful instrument when as-
sessing our case studies with regard to the Paris Dec-
laration criteria2 as well as World Bank Independent 
Evaluation Group (IEG) criteria measuring suitability 
of TFs.3
Assessment of the German trust fund portfolio 
along guiding principles for multilateral policy
Combining the observations and portfolio analysis in 
an overall assessment of the German TF engagement 
along the three guiding principles for German multi-
lateral development policy, we derive four key chal-
lenges from our assessment: (i) fragmentation, (ii) lack 
of engagement, (iii) lack of strategic direction, and (iv) 
lack of centralized information.
With regard to the first principle for German multi-
lateral policy on „Effective cooperation with mul-
tilateral organizations in an efficient international 
development architecture“, we find that Germany’s 
portfolio is conducive to supporting both objectives 
and manageability of TFs at the World Bank, given 
its multi-donor TF approach and the manageable 
number of TFs. However, the German TF portfolio is 
spread over a large variety of topics and 70% of con-
tributions are rather small, as shown in chapter 3. We 
thus identify some potential to reduce fragmentation 
in the German TF portfolio.
The second principle on „Systematic and targeted 
agenda-setting at the international level” mate-
rializes in country level TFs. However, TFs used for 
knowledge creation and sharing in networks, which 
are mainly situated at headquarter-level, are partic-
ularly relevant for realizing this principle. There are 
topics such as climate change, which clearly stand out 
as a German priority, and case interviews revealed 
that Germany is perceived as a very knowledgeable 
and vocal partner. However, Germany is perceived as 
rather quiet on other topics, given a lack of backup in 
terms of funding and own human resource capaci-
ties. Sometimes, this lack of engagement is in contrast 
to its own official prioritization of those areas, and 
makes successful agenda-setting rather unlikely.
2 These are ownership, alignment, donor coordination, results 
focus, and mutual accountability.
3 These are additionality, relevance, and distinctiveness.
Finally, Germany accomplishes its third principle 
on „Pro-development interlocking of bilateral and 
multilateral aid” mostly at the country level. In par-
ticular, Germany uses country-level TFs mainly in 
fragile states, where it might be the only funding tool 
available or the least burdensome to governments 
with weak institutional capacity. However, Germany 
does not realize its full potential in knowledge-cre-
ating TFs for the reasons of lacking engagement and 
fragmentation. A more robust engagement in those 
TFs would support bi-multi interlocking through 
knowledge-sharing.
Key challenges: Both fragmentation and lack of en-
gagement may be related to our finding that there is 
no ex-ante collective decision-making process for TF 
contributions governed by a common strategy. The 
current BMZ decision-making process on TF contri-
butions at the overall portfolio level is characterized 
by different strategies of the individual sector and 
regional units. The situation is also exacerbated by a 
lack of centralized TF information. There is so far no 
institutional capturing of either the overall structure 
of the TF portfolio or of the processes including best 
practices and experiences in TF set-up and manage-
ment.
Opportunities to further develop the  
German trust fund portfolio
We recommend the following actions to address these 
key challenges. Our recommendations should thereby 
contribute to a greater awareness of German priorities 
pursued through TFs and a refined TF reform agenda 
position:
1. Macro-level TF engagement policy: To make 
its TF contributions more effective, Germany 
should follow a more strategic approach on TFs. 
Lacking such an approach, Germany is not like-
ly to realize its full potential in using TFs as a 
mechanism to advocate its own development 
priorities at the World Bank. First, it should be as-
sessed if TFs are indeed the right instrument for 
a particular topic or country or if the objectives 
can be better achieved by participation in World 
Bank decision-making bodies as shareholder (e.g. 
through special themes in IDA). Second, it should 
be assessed how Germany can best be involved 
in knowledge-creating TFs and in implementing 
TFs. The TF strategy should allow an informed 
decision for both types of TFs on the basis of the 
respective opportunities and corresponding Ger-
man strengths.
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2. TF consolidation: A strategic approach to TF allo-
cation will help further reduce fragmentation. To 
this end, there are also “low-hanging fruits”, par-
ticularly the closure of TFs in which neither the 
Bank nor Germany work anymore. Upon request 
by Germany, the World Bank will close down 
these TFs in the near future (7 TFs).
3. Micro-level TF engagement policy: To inform 
the strategy, but also in order to achieve a more 
effective and efficient engagement on the level 
of each individual TF, Germany should overcome 
the lack of centralized information on World 
Bank TFs and institutional history of all German 
institutions. First and foremost, all information 
on existing TFs must be gathered. The informa-
tion flow also includes gathering and disseminat-
ing best practices on engagement and fund par-
ticipation. German negotiators should be aware 
of their bargaining space and the fact that TF 
governance is not limited to participation in the 
Steering Committees but may take place in infor-
mal arenas.
4. TF reform position: Germany, as an important 
shareholder of the World Bank, should remain 
a vocal player in the ongoing TF reform debate. 
While each of the four pillars is relevant for 
making TFs an integral part of the World Bank, 
pillar 2 (budget integration and business process 
alignment of TFs) and pillar 4 (senior oversight) 
mainly reflect areas in which the Bank extends 
the scope of its own operational rules to TFs. 
Those pillars thus do not necessarily need active 
involvement of donors. Accordingly, we recom-
mend focusing on the two remaining pillars, 
alignment (pillar 1) and cost recovery (pillar 3). 
Together with other donors, Germany should 
find a balance between flexibility and alignment. 
A key issue of debate refers to Umbrella Facili-
ties advocated by World Bank management as a 
means to enhanced alignment of TFs with core 
activities. Alignment is an important means to 
curtail fragmentation, but Germany should be 
carefully tracking that flexibility does not get 
lost on the way towards increased standardiza-
tion, for example through collective fundraising. 
Germany should continue to promote Results 
Frameworks, possibly by referencing to them in 
the AAs. 
Outlook
While these actions will enable Germany to make 
more strategic use of TFs at the World Bank, to allo-
cate and manage TFs more effectively and efficiently, 
there are a few points that need to be kept in per-
spective. Germany, together with other shareholders, 
must ensure that managing TFs does not undermine 
IBRD/IDA core budgets. In this regard, it should mon-
itor the evolution of the overall resource base at the 
World Bank and periodically review progress on on-
going reforms. 
The TF reform is also interlinked with the corpo-
rate reform of the World Bank. While the traditional 
matrix structure consisting of regions and networks 
will evolve into a set of global practices, the exact pa-
rameters of the reform are still unclear. Against this 
background, it can only be speculated how the ability 
to raise TFs and their day-to-day management will be 
affected. Once the actual outcomes of the overall re-
form become apparent, the German TF agenda should 
be put in this context and nuances reconsidered. 
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1 Introduction 
The World Bank’s operational lending and know-
ledge activities are financed by a variety of funding 
instruments, the core instruments being funding for 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (IBRD) and the International Development 
Association (IDA). The use of the core IBRD and IDA 
funding is governed by the World Bank’s policies and 
overseen by its Board of Executive Directors. Since 
the late 1990s, donors have started to provide funding 
to the World Bank as trustee for activities that sup-
plement the IBRD/IDA financed loans. Most of these 
trust funds (TFs) are grants to recipient countries or 
used for knowledge creation. These funds were ini-
tially not subject to the same procedural use and over-
sight by World Bank governance mechanisms.
Since the millennium TFs have grown dynamically at 
the World Bank.4 This growth reflects an overall trend 
in Official Development Assistance (ODA) towards so-
called multi-bi aid.5 Absorbing one quarter of multi-bi 
aid, the World Bank is the second largest recipient of 
4 TFs have been used since the early 1960s (e.g., World Bank 
2012a). However, TFs have become popular among donors 
only since the mid-1990s because they were championed as 
a flexible instrument to promote bilateral initiatives with 
World Bank staff.
5 If a donor channels ODA earmarked for a sector, theme, 
country, or region through a multilateral institution, such 
ODA is referred to as non-core multilateral ODA or multi-bi 
aid.
this type of aid after the United Nations (66%).6  Even 
though there has been a 10% decrease in the number of 
IBRD/IDA TFs during the last two years down to about 
700 accounts, reflecting consolidation efforts by donors 
and the World Bank, the importance of TFs has further 
increased in terms of volume (see diagram 1).  
This is especially true for Financial Intermediary 
Funds (FIFs), which typically support multi-donor 
global programs on global public goods issues and 
where the World Bank provides primarily financial 
trustee services and in selected cases is involved in 
implementation. 
At present, the TF volume has surpassed IDA contri-
butions over the last replenishment periods since the 
13th IDA replenishment period (2003-2005).7 At the 
end of FY13, the World Bank held about USD 30 bil-
lion in trust. Against this background, the World Bank 
has decided to make TFs a mainstream instrument in 
addition to IBRD and IDA funding. This decision is re-
flected in the ongoing TF reform process: Since the be-
ginning of the millennium, the World Bank has made 
an effort to gradually align TFs with its core funding 
regarding the applicability of World Bank policies. 
Measures taken include safeguard policies and proce-
dural aspects such as an institutional review and the 
6 OECD (2012), Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2013).
7 IEG (2011).
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integration into regional activity portfolios. The dis-
cussion is now moving from the mechanics of a rather 
marginal instrument to the full strategic and budget 
integration of TFs as a mainstream instrument in the 
World Bank portfolio.
Germany’s share of funds contributed to TFs super-
vised or executed by the World Bank is smaller than 
that of other large donors – i.e., 12% of total funding 
are contributions to IBRD/IDA and IFC TFs whereas 
88% are contributions to IDA core funding.8 In com-
parison, the United Kingdom’s Department for In-
ternational Development (DFID) channels 25% of its 
contributions into IBRD/IDA TFs. Besides Germany, 
also Austria, Belgium, France, and Switzerland do not 
make extensive use of TFs in relation to core funding. 
Given their relatively small contributions, most of 
those donors have not formulated an overarching TF 
engagement strategy. Donors which use TFs to a larger 
extent and to complement their core contributions to 
the World Bank as well as their bilateral aid activities 
include inter alia the UK, the Netherlands and Swe-
den.9
8 FIFs are not considered here as the World Bank only provides 
financial trustee services. However, if they were considered, 
break-down of German contributions to World Bank FY04-
FY13 would be IDA core: 61%, FIF: 31%, IBRD/IDA TF 7%, IFC 
TF: 0.1%, see World Bank (2014).
9 World Bank (2014).
Even with a smaller share of overall TF funding to 
the World Bank, Germany has recognized the overall 
growth of TFs and the move to make them an inte-
gral part of the mainstream set of instruments at the 
World Bank. Currently, there is no overall German 
strategy with regard to TF contributions by the Fed-
eral Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (BMZ) or the implementing agencies KfW De-
velopment Bank (KfW) and the Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). Therefore, 
Germany needs to develop a position towards the TF 
reform agenda in order to engage more actively in the 
reform process. Furthermore, Germany needs to re-
fine its TF portfolio in consistency with its position to 
ensure the efficient allocation and effectiveness of its 
TF contributions. 
Therefore, the GIZ sector project “Development Eco-
nomics” has been asked by BMZ division 411 “World 
Bank Group, IMF, debt relief” to undertake an anal-
ysis of the German TF portfolio at the World Bank. 
GIZ commissioned the consulting company joyn-
coop to conduct the review and to produce a report, 
which is to serve as the basis for internal discussions 
and strategic consultations with the World Bank. The 
review has been undertaken in close collaboration 
with World Bank’s Global Partnership and TF Oper-
ations department (CFPTO). The department simul-
taneously conducted a TF portfolio analysis for Ger-
many according to standard methodology applied 
also to the TF portfolios of other donors. 
Diagram 2: Process of the study
Source: joyn-coop.
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The joyn-coop team used a mix of quantitative and 
qualitative methods. These included an analysis of 
the overall German TF portfolio based on World 
Bank internal SAP data, a summary assessment of 
the German Administrative Agreements (AAs)10  and 
a detailed qualitative evaluation of eight selected TF 
contributions. As part of the analysis, the team con-
ducted 28 interviews with the German TF managers 
at BMZ, GIZ and KfW as well as with the respective 
counterparts at World Bank (see list of interviewees 
in Annex 1). In addition, joyn-coop conducted 25 in-
terviews with key stakeholders in these institutions 
on legal, finance and other fundamental questions. 
Diagram 2 summarizes the process of the review. 
This report summarizes all findings. Chapter 2 pres-
ents an overview of TFs at the World Bank by catego-
ry and contrasts this with the German TF portfolio 
at the World Bank. In addition, it shows the set-up 
process of TFs and describes possible governance ar-
rangements of TFs. It concludes with an overview of 
the ongoing TF reform process. Chapter 3 analyzes 
the German engagement in World Bank TFs portfolio 
in more detail and describes the motives for engage-
ment of the key institutions (BMZ, GIZ, KfW). It also 
outlines the experience with World Bank-internal 
processes and governance arrangements based on an 
in-depth analysis of selected TF-case studies. Chap-
ter 4 gives a summary assessment of the World Bank 
and German TF portfolio and outlines key challeng-
es for the latter. Against this background chapter 5 
discusses opportunities for consolidation of the Ger-
man TF portfolio and develops initial thoughts on a 
TF engagement strategy for Germany as a donor. It 
also makes recommendations for German positions 
on the TF reform agenda. Chapter 6 provides a sum-
mary of open questions and issues for future discus-
sion.
10 We analyzed all 36 of the 49 AAs that were available.

2 The overall and German trust fund portfolios 
at the World Bank: status quo and reform 
process
This chapter provides an overview of TFs at the World 
Bank by category and compares it with the German TF 
portfolio at the World Bank. In addition, it outlines the 
setup process of TFs at the World Bank and describes 
governance arrangements of TFs, also comparing the 
range of options with those in German AAs. Finally, 
the ongoing TF reform process at the World Bank is 
discussed as it has significant implications for the gov-
ernance of TFs.
2.1 Introduction to trust funds
A TF (TF) is a financing arrangement established with 
contributions from one or more external donor(s)/part-
ners, and in some cases, from the World Bank Group, 
to support development-related activities. It thereby 
establishes a tripartite relationship between at least one 
donor, the World Bank as trustee of funds, and a set of 
(probably yet unspecified) beneficiaries.11 All TFs have a 
legal basis as the donor(s) and the World Bank conclude 
an AA, specifying the rights and duties of the trustee in 
managing the donor contributions. An additional op-
tional legal instrument at the level of trust-funded proj-
ects is the Grant Agreement (GA) between the World 
Bank and the recipient countries, which regulates the 
conditions of disbursement of activities in the partner 
countries. In all TFs, the World Bank as trustee pro-
vides a range of financial and administrative services. 
However, in some funds (i.e., IBRD/IDA TFs), the World 
Bank also has an implementing role. Hence, role and 
accountabilities vary depending on the type of TF.
The main sources of finance for TFs are the member 
countries of the IBRD, most of them donors to IDA for 
concessional development finance. Donors also include 
other multilateral organizations, non-governmental 
organizations, foundations, and other private organi-
zations. While TFs may involve arrangements with a 
single donor, known as single-donor TFs (SDTFs), in-
creasingly TF arrangements are with several donors, 
known as multi-donor TFs (MDTFs). In addition, IBRD 
contributes to the funding of some TFs from its sur-
plus or net income. Recipients may be governmental, 
non-governmental, or other external entities. World 
11 Bantekas (2012).
Bank implementing units may receive funds from one 
of the World Bank’s own grant financing mechanisms 
(e.g., the Development Grant Facility). 
Based on implementation roles, the World Bank clas-
sifies TFs into two major categories: (i) Financial Inter-
mediary Funds (FIFs), (ii) IBRD/IDA and IFC TFs. 
In FIFs, the World Bank only provides financial trustee 
services to the international community in support of 
its work on issues of global importance, without hav-
ing any implementing role from the outset. If routed 
through FIFs, donor contributions are implemented by 
multilateral aid institutions (MAIs), not necessarily the 
World Bank. If the World Bank supervises or executes 
activities under global programs, it receives FIF contri-
butions into IBRD/IDA TFs or IFC TFs. For example, in 
the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the World Bank 
along with a number of UN agencies takes an opera-
tional role for individual activities under the FIF. Other 
important FIFs are the Global Fund to Fight Aids and 
Malaria (GFATM) and the Climate Investment Funds 
(CIFs), which together account for 80% of the growth of 
FIFs between FY08-12.12 
For IBRD/IDA TFs and IFC TFs, the World Bank is the 
sole implementation agency. In particular, IBRD/IDA 
TFs are the main funding mechanism for the World 
Bank’s country-level assistance and its own work pro-
gram for knowledge services. IFC TFs on the other hand 
are used to pay for financial advisory services and pri-
vate-sector development (see box 1).
In total, the World Bank held about USD 30 billion in 
trust at the end of FY13. Almost two thirds of this ac-
count for FIFs and the remainder for IBRD/IDA TFs 
(about USD 10 billion) and IFC TFs (about USD 800 mil-
lion).13 Annual contributions to FIFs amount to roughly 
USD 7 billion with USD 4 billion going to IBRD/IDA 
TFs. In FY13, Germany accounted for about 10% (or 
USD 937 million) of the overall IBRD/IDA TF portfolio 
and 4% (or USD 167 million) of total annual cash con-
tributions. 
12 World Bank (2012a): 11.
13 World Bank (2013b): 6.
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Box 1: IFC trust funds
IFC TFs are separately managed by the IFC, the private-sector investment branch of the World Bank Group. 
They support advisory services and scale up IFC investments. Advisory services promote private-sector 
development along four objectives a) access to finance, b) improving the investment climate, c) facilitating 
public-private partnerships, and d) promoting sustainable business. In FY12, about 80% of all IFC advisory 
services were financed through IFC TFs.
Funds held in trust peaked at USD 966 million in FY12, but settled at USD 787 million in FY13. Annual cash 
contributions to IFC TFs are at around USD 300 million. As to disbursements, the main targets of IFC TFs in 
FY12 included the IFC Private Enterprise Partnership for Sub-Saharan Africa, the Europe-Central Asia Advi-
sory Program, and the IFC Private Enterprise Partnership for the Middle East and North Africa. Overall, IFC 
TFs financed 630 projects in 105 countries in FY12. In the past five years, program expenditures increased 
by 50% to about USD 200 million, of which 65% were used on IDA countries and 17% on fragile states.
The most important sovereign donors to IFC TFs are the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Canada. 
Switzerland is also important when considering the relative importance of IFC TFs in the overall TF port-
folio. Germany only contributes negligible amounts of funds to IFC TFs. It currently participates in the 
following three funds:
1. TF071747: G-20 Inclusive Business Innovation Recognition Challenge Trust Fund through BMZ
2. TF071968: Environmental and Social Risk Management Program (ESRM) through GIZ
3. TF071994: Underpinning Stock-taking Exercise for the Dialogue Platform on Inclusive Green  
Investments through BMZ
 
Given the small German contribution to IFC TFs, the study concentrates on IBRD/IDA TFs in the following.
Source: World Bank (2013b); World Bank (2013c).
Diagram 3: Overview: Comparison trust fund portfolio structure
Source: joyn-coop based on World Bank, (2013b), World Bank (2013c), World Bank (2012b).
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The German portfolio of TFs handled by the World 
Bank is in line with the overall distribution of TFs 
(see diagram 3). In this regard, Germany is most sim-
ilar to donors like the United States, France, and Ja-
pan. Other donors such as the UK, the Netherlands, 
and Australia have channeled more than 50% of their 
TF contributions into IBRD/IDA TFs and the smaller 
portion into FIFs.
Partnerships are distinct from TFs, albeit the two 
concepts are mutually related (see box 2). The World 
Bank is involved in partnerships with donors, recipi-
ent countries, non-governmental organizations, and 
other international organizations. Many of these part-
nerships are supported through TFs. While the World 
Bank provides financial services, manages programs, 
and implements activities under TFs, it sometimes 
also serves as advisor and donor through one of its 
grant facilities in partnerships.14
2.2 Classification of IBRD/IDA trust funds
The following section focuses on IBRD/IDA TFs as 
these TFs are directly supervised or executed by the 
World Bank. IFC TFs are excluded from the analysis 
since Germany engages only in very few such funds 
(see box 1). Furthermore, IFC TFs have not been part of 
the World Bank’s TF reform agenda. 
IBRD/IDA TFs cover a broad array of purposes. The 
World Bank uses these funds to complement its core 
activities and to mobilize and direct concessional 
14 See e.g., World Bank (2013d).
Box 2: Partnerships
Partnerships refer to collaborative relationships between the World Bank and donors, recipient countries, 
non-governmental representatives, and other international organizations. Partnerships may have independent 
governance structures inside or outside the World Bank, such as a Secretariat, financial service provider, advisor, 
and implementation partner, and they may involve the World Bank as donor through one of its grant-making 
facilities. In fact, most partnerships are supported by a number of TFs under Global Partnership Programs.
Depending on whether or not the World Bank itself has an implementing role, it channels its receipts either into 
IBRD/IDA TFs or FIFs. Large programs are often Partnerships, as they involve various participants such as gov-
ernments, civil society and a large number of donors. They usually require a three-tier governance system due to 
the number of participants. The Steering Committee is the decision making body on the strategic level while the 
Management Committee allows for technical discussions.
Diagram 4: Illustrative partnership program structure
Source: World Bank (2013e): 14.
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resources to its strategic development priorities. In 
addition, the TFs serve to support partnerships with 
other development actors. Hence, TFs are „flexible 
arrangements that enable engagement in a wide ar-
ray of partnerships and help [the Bank] leverage [its] 
assistance at all levels“.15  “Level” refers to the type of 
account where the funds are registered. Donors always 
contribute to a “parent level” account, with “child lev-
el” accounts for individual pr ojects being financed 
from the parent-level TF. TFs involve a large variety of 
purposes and hence take a similarly large variety of 
forms. According to the official categorization of the 
World Bank, IBRD/IDA TFs can be classified along five 
criteria.
First and foremost, there are free-standing TFs and 
programmatic TFs. Free-standing TFs involve a  
single-stage allocation process where commitment 
of funds and disbursements to projects are simul-
taneous.16 Donors support specific activities jointly 
agreed upfront with the World Bank in the respec-
tive administration agreement. Free-standing TFs 
15 World Bank (2012a): 5.
16 World Bank (2012c): 7.
may either co-finance or complement existing 
World Bank operations. Co-financing17, which cap-
tures 60% of all TFs at the World Bank, means that 
the donor does not receive separate reporting on its 
contribution. Free-standing TFs for complementary 
activities mainly support technical assistance. 
In addition to free-standing TFs, there are program-
matic TFs which disburse their funds in a two-stage 
process. In a first stage, donors agree on a broad 
thematic framework. Thereafter, a Technical Com-
mittee chaired by the World Bank allocates funds 
to specific projects.18  In most programmatic TFs, a 
World Bank unit different from the unit that raises 
the funds carries out individual projects, following 
a call for proposals or direct allocation. 
17 Unlike in the German bilateral aid context, co-financing at 
the Bank implies the scaling up of an existing Bank project 
through TFs. This also implies that the usual project cycle, 
especially the need for Board approval, and the standard re-
porting apply to the project, regardless of its partial funding 
through TFs.
18 World Bank (2012c): 8.
Diagram 5: Overall IBRD/IDA trust fund portfolio structure at the World Bank as of FY12
Source: joyn-coop based on World Bank (2013b): 6.
Classication 
by Donor
Classication 
by Type
356* 
MDTFs
350* 
SDTFs
Parent-Level Child-Level
706 
IBRD/IDA
TF Accounts
75 Single-
Country 
TFs
355 
Thematic 
TFs (multi-
country) 
Classication 
by Execution
Classication 
by Recipient
Classication 
by Program
Parent-Level
* FY 08-13
245 
Freestanding 
TFs
430
Programmatic
TFs
14%
Bank-
executed 
TFs
86%
Recipient-
executed
TFs
55 Single-
Country 
Programs
184 
Thematic 
Programs
193 Single-
Country 
TFs
52 
Thematic 
TFs (multi-
country)
 9
As of FY12, the Bank managed 245 free-standing TFs 
(36%) and 430 programmatic TFs (64%). The share of 
programmatic TFs in Germany’s portfolio is even 
higher. This coincides with the dominance of MDTFs 
in the German portfolio. The German share of pro-
grammatic TFs has even increased over time due to 
the phasing-out of some free-standing TFs and the 
continued growth of programmatic funds. 
The second differentiation of TFs is a classification by 
the number of donors into MDTFs and SDTFs. MDTFs 
are instruments pooling contributions from multiple 
donors subject to the same legal agreement. While do-
nors cannot formally earmark specific activities un-
der MDTFs (no specification of use of funds is possible 
in MDTF AAs), donors may indicate disbursement 
preferences that the World Bank seeks to accommo-
date.19 It is important to note that MDTFs are a legal 
instrument chosen by the founding donors. They 
might initially be financed by a single donor based on 
the expectation that additional donors join at a later 
point in time. 
A SDTF is a funding mechanism that enables the 
World Bank and the donor to agree on customized 
provisions. SDTFs cannot be transformed into MDTFs 
19 World Bank (2012c): 8.
once established.20  Over the last years, the World 
Bank has gradually reduced the share of SDTFs in or-
der to reduce fragmentation, down from 90% in FY02, 
70% in FY07, to 50% in FY12.21
Germany almost exclusively engages in MDTFs (96%), 
and there is no further consolidation potential for 
its two SDTFs.22  The low German share of SDTFs 
contrasts with other donors, especially the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and the European Com-
mission, whose shares of SDTFs are as high as 40%.23 
Regarding MDTFs, Germany is foremost engaged in 
genuine MDTFs, as opposed to MDTFs that are estab-
lished as such an instrument but only have one con-
tributing donor.24 
20 Ibid.
21 World Bank (2012a): 9.
22 The donor-funded staffing program cannot legally be trans-
formed into a MDTF because it pays for German consultants 
in the World Bank. The other SDTF supporting ESMAP is an 
old TF that will terminate in FY14 (while the ESMAP MDTF 
continues to be operational).
23  A key explanation for the large share of SDTFs of these 
donors is their internal fiduciary reporting requirements, 
which often do not allow for MDTF contributions. This is 
particularly true for USAID.
24 While Germany is thus far the only donor to the TF Pro-
gram-for-Results Support (PforR), all other MDTFs indeed  
are funded jointly with other donors.
Diagram 6: Breakdown free-standing and programmatic trust funds
Source: joyn-coop based on World Bank (2013d).
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Third, there are two potential modalities of execution, 
namely recipient-executed TFs (RETFs) and Bank-ex-
ecuted TFs (BETFs). The execution modality can only 
be assessed at the child-level account because parent 
TFs may comprise RETFs, BETFs, or mixed-modality 
TFs. Indicative of the type of work the World Bank 
conducts, the share of RETFs is about 84%, the balance 
accruing to BETFs. The relative distribution in the 
German portfolio is similar to the overall distribution. 
RETFs finance projects implemented by recipients but 
appraised and supervised by the World Bank. They fi-
nance about 10% of all projects implemented by coun-
tries. BETFs complement the World Bank’s own bud-
get to deliver knowledge services or support the World 
Diagram 7: Breakdown multi-donor and single-donor trust funds
Source: joyn-coop based on World Bank (2013a), World Bank (2013b).
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Bank’s preparation and supervision of RETF-funded 
projects.25 Technically, BETFs also cover expenses on 
TF Secretariat services. BETFs account for about 25% 
of the World Bank‘s non-lending work.26
25 World Bank (2012a): 8.
26 RETFs and BETFs can be interpreted as two different types 
of TFs at the parent-level account, based on an appropriate 
aggregation of activity types financed through child-level 
accounts. For example, if more than half of all projects are 
Bank-executed, the overall TF is to be considered a BETF.
40% of IBRD/IDA RETFs support only five areas, no-
tably Afghanistan, the West Bank and Gaza, Ethiopia, 
Vietnam, and Indonesia. Two thirds of disbursements 
are made in IDA-eligible countries.27 In FY12, 28coun-
try-level activities of TFs focused on sectors such as 
public administration and law (28%), education (19%), 
and health and social services (16%). 
27 World Bank (2012a): 9.
28 Aid sectors are based on World Bank categories. Data using 
the (different) German categorization is not available.
Diagram 9: Comparison by the top five sectors (as defined by World Bank) 
Source: World Bank (2013b), World Bank (2013f).
Diagram 10: Comparison by region
Source: joyn-coop based on World Bank (2013b), World Bank (2013f).
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Conversely, Germany contributed a large per-
centage of its RETF portfolio to TFs investing into 
public administration – it is important to note, 
however, that this is due to the Afghanistan Recon-
struction TF, which accounts for more than 50% of 
the overall German IBRD/IDA TFs. When excluding 
the Afghanistan Reconstruction TF (ARTF), the sec-
tor balance is much more even. The most import-
ant trust-funded sectors include health and social 
services, transportation, and public administration 
(see diagram 9). 
In terms of target regions of RETFs, the German 
portfolio considerably differed from the overall 
World Bank portfolio. In particular, Germany more 
strongly focused its TF assistance on fragile states 
(79%) compared to the overall portfolio of TFs (39%) 
in the past 4 years. Moreover, it had a strong focus 
on South Asia, again due to the ARTF. In contrast, 
overall disbursements at the World Bank are more 
evenly distributed across regions, Africa receiving 
the lion share.
With regard to BETFs, the amount of funding con-
tributing to knowledge creation has doubled between 
2002 and 2010. In parallel, the share of BETFs support-
ing this work has increased substantially from 27% to 
40%. It is particularly prominent in impact evaluation, 
external learning and technical assistance. Given the 
main purpose of BETFs to deliver knowledge services, 
their use is important to the World Bank’s networks 
(see box 3). 
Fourth, a distinction by recipients yields single-coun-
try TFs and multi-country thematic TFs. There seems 
to be a strong relationship between the type of TF by 
disbursement account and whether or not it supports 
multiple countries. In fact, most free-standing TFs are 
single-country TFs (193 accounts out of 245 accounts), 
while programmatic TFs are mostly multi-country 
funds (355 accounts out of 430 accounts). Yet even the-
matic TFs are ultimately programmed at the country 
level, given the country-based intervention approach 
of the World Bank, complemented by some global 
knowledge services.
Fifth, TFs should be distinguished from trust-fund-
ed programs. In fact, there may be several TFs sup-
porting a single program. This is often the case when 
donors wish to make contributions to different win-
dows. Windows refer to subsets of activities support-
ed through the TF. Windowing, i.e. the allocation of 
funds to a specific subset of activities within a TF, is 
not equivalent to project earmarking, which refers to 
the formal involvement of donors in the selection or 
the execution of individual projects.29
29 Earmarking on individual projects is not possible according 
to World Bank rules. However, historical practice shows 
that some donors running their own umbrella programs at 
the Bank reserve themselves the right to vet proposals, to 
co-decide on projects funded, and to co-edit reports. Another 
term (unofficially used) for windowing is “soft earmarking”, 
indicating that the Bank maintains its operational breath-
ing space even though donors have indicated a particular 
thematic preference.
Diagram 11: An overview of core knowledge activities
Source: World Bank (2013b): 32.
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Box 3: Knowledge-creating trust funds versus implementing trust funds
Knowledge-creating TFs and implementing TFs have different purposes and therefore represent different 
levels of influence for donors at the World Bank (see table 1). The distinction is not entirely congruent with the 
classification into RETFs versus BETFs, because knowledge-creating TFs are not primarily aimed at supporting 
country activities (while some BETFs do). Hence, knowledge-creating TFs are almost exclusively anchored in the 
networks of the World Bank, for example the climate-related research within the Social Development Network 
(SDN) (see diagram 12).
Table 1: Comparison of knowledge-creating trust funds and implementing trust funds
Aspects Knowledge-creating TF Implementing TF
Purpose of a TF Instrument of networks, aim at 
knowledge creation and sharing
Instrument of regions, supporting cli-
ents at the country level through op-
erational work
Primary use RETF/BETF Builds mainly on BETFs Usually builds on RETFs
Secondary use RETF / BETF RETFs used for local knowledge 
creation through piloting a new 
approach in a project 
BETFs mostly used to complement 
operational work with specific country 
knowledge (e.g. sector studies)
Significance of TFs 56% of all knowledge work is 
BETF financed, the rest BB
10% of operational work is RETF fi-
nanced, the rest BB
Donor goals Agenda setting in multilateral fo-
rum; benefit from networks
Support to interventions in country or 
regional priorities
Source: joyn-coop analysis based on interviews, World Bank (2012a). 
Diagram 12: Funding to networks: Bank-executed trust funds versus World Bank budget 
           (FY08-10 totals)
Source: IEG (2011).
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The concept of windows is not officially used by the 
World Bank. The same applies to the distinction be-
tween knowledge-creating TFs and implementing 
TFs, which was a recurrent theme during interviews 
at the World Bank (see box 3). Although it is not an 
official category and therefore not in the initial typol-
ogy, it is key to understand how Germany is currently 
positioning itself in agenda setting.
2.3 Trust fund setup and implementation 
process
There is no established procedure through which do-
nors and the World Bank come to an agreement on 
initiating a TF. Most TFs are jointly initiated by donors 
and World Bank staff, based on commonly identified 
needs, whereas in other TFs, either the World Bank or 
the donor has a more pronounced interest in estab-
lishing it. World Bank staff also has to follow Bank 
operational rules in deciding whether or not to accept 
a TF.30 Assuming that the formal criteria for accepting 
TFs are met, the typical setup process is as shown in 
diagram 13.
30 Bank procedures are governed by the Bank’s Operational 
and Bank policies. Operational Policy (OP) 14.40 refers to the 
procedures and rules applicable to TFs. Most importantly, 
OP 14.40 stipulates that the Bank does accept TFs only if 
they “support activities not traditionally financed under the 
administrative budget” and if they do not present a conflict 
of interest. The Bank does not accept earmarked funds (at the 
level of individual projects), and it also requires cost-effective 
arrangements (OP 14.40).
In an initial phase, donor(s) and the World Bank dis-
cuss the purpose of the proposed TF and the appropri-
ate governance structure to achieve this purpose. Fol-
lowing informal agreement, the relevant department 
in the World Bank prepares a TF concept document 
and shares this draft with the donor(s).31 Ultimately, 
the TF concept document must be signed off by either 
the responsible Director or the Vice President within 
the World Bank, depending on the parameters of the 
program. 
The next step is the clearance process of the internal 
TF proposal, which involves the central units CFP-
TO, Legal Department Concessional Finance (LEG-
CF), and Controlling (CTR). The donor is not actively 
engaged in this phase. CFPTO reviews the proposal 
against the TF acceptance criteria. In particular, the 
TF must imply an added value to existing funding 
mechanisms, and the World Bank commits itself only 
if it has a comparative advantage, especially in the 
case of IBRD/IDA TFs, or if it does not expose itself to 
unmanageable risks, notably in the case of FIFs. Due 
diligence is carried out by LEGCF. CTR establishes the 
relevant accounts in which the World Bank receives 
the relevant donor contributions. 
Internal approval takes about three months, and the 
World Bank usually does not communicate progress 
to donors. Once the proposal is approved internally, 
31 For the donor, it is important to know that the concept doc-
ument is finalized by World Bank only after signature of the 
AA and might considerably change.
Diagram 13: Process of setting up a trust fund
Source: joyn-coop based on World Bank (2012c).
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the World Bank and each donor sign an Administra-
tion Agreement (AA). Following agreement on the AA, 
the Bank must send a written letter to call the funds 
from (the) donor(s), according to the tranches stipulat-
ed in the relevant AA.32 
Following the establishment of the TF and the re-
ceipt of donor contributions, different TF types 
trigger different procedures regarding the World 
Bank-internal allocation of funds to projects. In 
free-standing TFs, funds are directly allocated to 
pre-specified project activities, without the need to 
review project proposals through a Technical Com-
mittee. In programmatic TFs, the TF Secretariat 
typically issues a call for proposals under which pro-
spective fund users can apply for financial support 
to their activities. In other cases, donors and the 
World Bank have agreed on fixed shares of fund-
ing being allocated to the regional Vice Presidential 
Units (VPUs). The regional VPUs then make the allo-
cation to specific projects based on their own alloca-
tion mechanism, typically calls for proposals.
The internal child TF level project preparation 
and implementation process is similar for all TFs. 
Task team leaders must seek approval of their proj-
ects from senior management. Depending on the 
risk rating and the size of the grant, trust-funded 
projects must be signed off at least by the relevant 
Director, in some cases by the Vice President. In 
particular, trust-funded projects with a size above 
USD 5 million must go through the Vice President, 
whereas smaller projects are to be signed off by the 
Director. In exceptional cases, for example when the 
World Bank itself is a donor to a project through its 
grant-making facilities, or when the project is part-
ly financed by core funds, the project must pass the 
Executive Board. 
There are only slight differences in the project 
preparation cycle depending on execution modality. 
For RETFs, task team leaders seeking funding from 
TFs prepare a project document that sets out the 
economic justification, the Results Framework (RF), 
social and environmental aspects, and fiduciary and 
implementation arrangements. On this basis, as in 
the case of core-funded projects, a Grant Agreement 
32 The Bank may even receive donor contributions when the 
TF is not yet legally established in the accounts of the Bank. 
Technically, this is done by a Donor Balance Account, from 
which resources may be transferred to TFs at a later point 
in time. This is hence a solution to respond to disbursement 
pressures at the end of the year.
is signed with the recipient outlining conditions for 
disbursement and use of the funds.33 
For BETFs, the task team leader prepares an activity 
concept note, along with terms of reference in cases 
where staff and consultants are hired to do the work 
under trust-funded operations. All staff appoint-
ments are conducted according to general human 
resource policies of the World Bank. Contracts for 
consultants are handled by the General Services De-
partment of the World Bank and follow its internal 
procurement rules. A TTL supervises all activities 
implemented by the recipient and those of consul-
tants under BETFs. World Bank policies fully apply 
in both cases.
2.4 Trust fund governance arrangements 
The following section addresses the range of gover-
nance arrangements that donors can negotiate with 
the World Bank when establishing a TF. The agree-
ment is then formalized in an AA. Based on a review 
of World Bank-internal documents and an analysis 
of German AAs, the aim is to identify the main pa-
rameters to be negotiated between the donor(s) and 
the World Bank along with the relevant leverage to 
negotiate individual solutions. 
The AA is the key legal document governing the re-
lationship between the donor and the World Bank in 
managing a TF. The standard AA consists of a main 
part as well as three annexes on (i) program objec-
tives, related activities, and expected results; (ii) 
standard provisions governing the management of 
entrusted funds; and (iii) the set of decision-making 
bodies. According to the World Bank, only Annexes 
1 and 3 are negotiable, whereas standard provisions 
apply in Annex 2. However, our analysis shows that 
there are nuances in the application of those stan-
dard provisions, which indicates that there may be 
bargaining space, should the circumstances require 
so (see the AA analysis in annex 2). In the follow-
ing, we proceed with the key choices related to TF 
governance structures. For a complete overview of 
bargaining options along all annexes please refer to 
table 2 at the end of the chapter.
33 Funds, which are provided from a TF to a recipient or to the 
Bank to implement specific activities are normally provided 
as grants, i.e. without repayment obligations. If the recipient 
is not the Bank itself, the recipient agrees to implement the 
grant activities through the signing of a Grant Agreement. A 
„donor‘s contribution“ consists of a disbursable grant amount 
and a cost recovery fee applied by the Bank for TF adminis-
tration.
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2.4.1 The institutional structure of a  
trust fund 
First and foremost, the donor(s) and the World Bank 
agree on the set of institutional bodies governing 
the TF, which is included in Annex 3 of the AA. The 
institutional structure of a TF largely follows its pur-
pose. For example, a co-financing arrangement with a 
single donor does not need a full-fledged governance 
structure but only requires an accountability mech-
anism for financial reporting. In contrast, a part-
nership facility with several implementing agencies 
requires a more sophisticated governance structure. 
What is true for all TFs is that they have at least some 
degree of external governance (i.e., the donor), which 
may pose a challenge to World Bank in terms of con-
sistent strategic directions. This is because TFs shift 
the locus of decision-making outside the Executive 
Board to rather independent Steering Committees, 
which may have their own agenda and their own in-
stitutional rules. Notably, partnership facilities, FIFs, 
and large programmatic TFs are most detached from 
the World Bank and its formal decision-making pro-
cess. Three major categories of governance structures 
can be distinguished. Within these categories up to 
70 different combinations of governance bodies can 
however be found in practice.
The single-tier governance structure is typical of 
free-standing TFs. Those TFs in most cases only have 
an administrative team that manages the program, 
coordinates project implementation, approves grants, 
and ensures adequate reporting to the donor(s). Since 
the donors bandwagon on an existing World Bank 
project, no Steering Committee is needed. Examples 
of the single-tier model include the co-financing TFs, 
which currently present 42% of the German RETF dis-
bursements (or roughly 35% of the portfolio’s overall 
disbursements).
The two-tier governance structure occurs in pro-
grammatic TFs. In addition to the administrative unit, 
those TFs have a governing body. It consists of donor 
representatives and defines overall objectives, conducts 
performance reviews, and allocates resources into the 
windows of the financing facility. The governing body 
typically delegates some of its tasks to a Technical 
Committee, which previews project proposals on the 
Diagram 14: Observed governance structures in IBRD/IDA trust fund programs
Source: joyn-coop based on World Bank (2014): 28-29.
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basis of program criteria and gives recommendations 
on fundable projects. Technical committees usually 
consist of World Bank staff from relevant sectors, but 
in some cases donors have a say through their own ex-
perts participate in the review committee.34 
The three-tier model adds a management commit-
tee to the two-tier structure. This may be necessary 
in country-based programs that have a large number 
of participating donors that want to participate in 
the strategic level discussions, in Global Partnerships 
or when there are several implementing agencies - 
because the allocation of funds to specific projects 
should be based on the comparative advantage of each 
implementing agency that must then mutually coor-
dinate their activities. A key example is the ARTF. It 
is a partnership facility, whose activities on post-con-
flict reconstruction are carried out by one of the mul-
tilateral development banks or local implementing 
agencies. The management committee, chaired by the 
World Bank, coordinates the work of the implement-
ing agencies, prepares the work program and budget 
allocation, including the approval of grants. It also 
prepares the content for Steering Committee or con-
sultative group meetings. 
In summary, governance structures largely depend on 
the program purpose and to a lesser degree on nego-
tiation. Germany mostly contributes to two-tier TFs, 
followed by single-tier TFs, and three-tier TFs. This 
reflects the German emphasis on MDTFs and compre-
hensive country-level programs, both of which tend 
to have at least two tiers rather than a single tier.35
2.4.2 Specific governance clauses as set out 
in the Administrative Agreements
Having agreed on the institutional structure of a TF, 
the donor(s) and the World Bank negotiate a number 
34 For instance, this is the case in the Governance Partnership 
Facility (GPF), where projects are reviewed jointly by World 
Bank staff and representatives from the United Kingdom 
and the Netherlands. In some corporate TFs, such as the 
Japanese Social Development Fund (JSDF) and the Korea TF 
for Economic and Peace-building Transitions (KST), donor 
officials must vet proposals before they can be supported 
through the TF. Those cases do not reflect standard practice 
of donor participation at the World Bank. They may reflect 
the desire of the Bank to not alienate an important donor, to 
increase the attractiveness of TFs for new donors, or where 
the participation of donor officials in core Bank tasks would 
really add value due to their specific expertise.
35 This conclusion is based on a legal appraisal of the AAs. In 
practice, some of the TFs actually have a more complex gov-
ernance structure that may also evolve over time, e.g. GPE, or 
HDSP.
of specific conditions governing the TF. In the fol-
lowing, we present the principal bargaining options 
on each of those specific conditions, provided that 
they can indeed be negotiated. To assess the degree of 
flexibility on the part of the World Bank, we consider 
World Bank operational rules and the provisions in 
the standard AA, as well as the variability of negotiat-
ed clauses in the available German AAs. Our analysis 
covered the following criteria:
• contract duration; 
• contribution schedule;
• types of eligible expenditure;
• fee structure;
• reporting, audit, and evaluation; and
• cancellation.
Contract duration and contribution schedule are 
specified in the main part of the AA. In terms of con-
tract duration, there is no pre-defined World Bank 
standard. By now, all new TFs at the World Bank 
should have an end date. This is important because 
failure to specify what happens when the program 
comes to an end may lead to fragmentation, known 
as the problem of “dormant funds” (see Section 5.2).36 
German AAs last about four years on average, ranging 
from one year to seven years. In recent years, contract 
durations have become shorter.
Contract schedule: The basic choice that bargaining 
partners face is whether the donor contributes its 
funds at once or in several tranches. Among the Ger-
man stakeholders, BMZ makes most frequent use of 
tranching.37 In general, donors must be aware that the 
World Bank is obliged to make its own disbursements 
to grant recipients on the actual cash basis of commit-
ments (BOC), which implies that it cannot accumulate 
liabilities against future contributions as this would 
violate its fiduciary duties of care. This might lead to 
delays in implementation. 
Eligible expenditure: This is the single most import-
ant criterion in Annex 1 of the standard AA. It re-
fers to the types of costs that the World Bank is able 
36 What matters to the donor is the end disbursement date. 
After this date, no accounting entries can be posted into the 
TF account and all financial closure procedures at the grant 
level and the trustee level are completed. Only after the end 
disbursement date is the Bank able to ultimately eliminate 
the account from its books. (World Bank 2012c: 56). 
37 This is most likely because the BMZ TF funding source 
„Funds in Trust“ (FiT), see chapter 3.1, is usually allocated 
over three years.
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to charge against the TF. The World Bank can only 
disburse funds for activities that represent eligible 
expenses. Eligible cost categories are specified in the 
AA, Annex 1. Recipient-executed funds have eligible 
expenses mainly on goods and services. Bank-execut-
ed funds mainly cover staff costs, but there is large 
potential for negotiation. Only in the case of BETFs, 
the World Bank is liable to donors in that it must re-
fund donors if actual expenses were not permissible. 
Based on the analysis of German AAs, it seems that 
regular World Bank staff can always charge its direct 
costs (African Sustainable Development (AFRSD) is an 
exception as it does not allow for any staff costs to be 
levied). This also holds for direct costs for consultants 
(except for PSIA). Note that while donors determine 
the types of eligible expenditure, the World Bank 
always operates within its own operational rules re-
garding procurement and staffing (as stated in Annex 
2 of the AA). In particular, the World Bank does not al-
low earmarking on the nationality of its consultants. 
Fees belong to the most important governance clause 
from the perspective of the World Bank in Annex 2, 
which contains the “standard provisions”. Accord-
ing to its own operational policy OP 14.40, the World 
Bank only accepts TFs if they recover their full costs. 
In the early days, the World Bank did not charge fees 
but used the interest earned to pay for its manage-
ment services; later, the World Bank calculated fees 
according to the partial cost approach, which only 
takes into account the direct costs from providing 
donors the option to contribute non-core funds. 
Nowadays, given the significance of TFs in the over-
all budget of the World Bank, a full cost approach is 
warranted that charges fees for the services of central 
units as well (e.g., LEGCF, CTR, and CFR). The World 
Bank distinguishes between a) standardized fees, b) 
customized fees, and c) zero fees that only apply for 
debt service TFs and Carbon funds. The cost recovery 
principle is based on the size and type of the TF.
a) The standard fee (5% of contributions and one-
time USD 35,000 set up fee) is applicable to TFs es-
tablished as (i) co-financing of World Bank’s IDA/
IBRD operations below or equal to USD 30 million 
and ii) Bank-executed TFs regardless of size. 
b) The customized fee applies to all other TFs, 
which include i) co-financing greater than USD 
30 million, (ii) combination of Bank- and recipi-
ent-executed TFs (hybrids), and (iii) Financial In-
termediary Funds, regardless of size. Under this 
arrangement a fixed fee of up to 2% (based on 
size) is charged to defray the cost of administra-
tion, plus the estimated cost for the World Bank 
unit implementing the activities. These costs are 
charged as they are incurred up to the maximum 
amount or percentage specified in the administra-
tion agreement.38  
In practice, German AAs witness some heterogeneity 
in terms of fee structures, although most variation 
is due to TF size and the types of activities. Adminis-
trative fees vary from 0.2% up to 5%. The unweighted 
administrative fee average is 2.66%. If the adminis-
trative fee is small as a percentage, chargeable costs 
are higher, essentially to ensure that the TF covers 
its actual costs. In terms of costs, some TFs allow the 
World Bank to charge any amount up to the actually 
incurred costs, while others have an absolute ceiling 
on those costs, notably the older TFs.39 The newer TFs 
cover costs up to a percentage ceiling that varies be-
tween 1.5% and 10.7%.
Reporting: All projects at the World Bank are subject 
to substantive reporting, which is publicly accessi-
ble.40 TFs add an additional layer of reporting in that 
the World Bank provides donors with aggregate re-
ports on the overall achievements of the trust-funded 
program at parent level (unless it is a co-financing TF 
where there only is the project report). By Annex 2 
default, the TF Secretariat produces an annual report 
along with semi-annual progress reports, both of 
which are publicly available. To compile those reports, 
the TF Secretariat must have information on the suc-
cess of individual projects supported through the TF. 
Therefore, task team leaders are obliged to prepare 
Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) and Implemen-
tation Completion Reports (ICRs) in the case of RETFs 
as well as GRMs in the case of BETFs.41 For each TF 
38 World Bank (2012c): 18. According to our interviews with the 
legal department, the Bank is currently working on a further 
simplification of fees for cost recovery, which is planned to be 
in effect by July 2014.
39 E.g., USD 35,000 in the MDTF for the Second Emergency 
Demobilization and Reintegration Project in Rwanda, or 
USD 1.5 million in the MDTF for Transitional Demobilization 
and Reintegration Program.
40 For recipient-executed activities, task team leaders prepare 
a progress report (ISR) and a final report (ICR). Due every 
six months (ISRs) and at the end of the project (ICRs), those 
reports are based on core quantitative indicators. In contrast, 
results on Bank-executed activities are reported in a rather 
narrative fashion through the Grant Reporting and Mon-
itoring (GRM). Like ISR and ICR, though, a GRM must be 
approved by senior management.
41 Progress reports under BETFs are optional unless required 
by the TF manager. For free-standing BETFs housed within 
a VPU, the TTL prepares those reports only if required by the 
VPU (World Bank 2012c: 42). 
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with total contribution above USD 1 million, the TF 
manager also completes and submits an Implementa-
tion Completion Memorandum (ICM) after closure of 
the TF.42 According to TF managers, it may be difficult 
to consolidate the results from individual projects into 
a single report, given different sets of indicators used 
and different types of activities to be assessed. Results 
Frameworks (RF) associate individual TF objectives 
to measureable indicators. The TF Handbook states 
that TFs “should include a Results Framework”, which 
“outlines activities, outputs and outcomes, indicators 
to measure these dimensions, and intended plans and 
resources to monitor and evaluate these expected re-
sults”.43 Most German TFs do not have a RF fixed in 
the AA.44 However, there are two German TFs45 that 
include specific measures on agreed objectives both 
being relatively new TFs. 
Financial reports and audits: In addition to substan-
tial reporting, the World Bank provides donors with 
the opportunity to track the financial status of their 
TFs. The minimum standard on financial reporting 
consists of two elements. First, donors have secure ac-
cess to financial information in the holding currency 
of the TFs through the Client Connection database. 
Second, up to six months after the end of each fiscal 
year, World Bank management provides an assertion 
together with an external audit attestation that it has 
followed adequate fiduciary standards in financial re-
porting for TFs as a whole. The World Bank covers the 
costs of the single audit. Some TFs have stricter terms 
on financial reporting to donors, for example the Li-
beria Reconstruction TF (LRTF) that provides quar-
terly financial reports. In addition to the single audit, 
AAs provide for the possibility of a separate  
42 World Bank (2012c): 39-41.
43 World Bank (2012c): 41.
44 It is only recently that Results Frameworks (RFs) have become 
important, given higher pressure from donors. It is rarely 
included into AAs due to issues including (i) the difficulty 
of measuring impacts during life of a TF, and (ii) the need 
to amend the AA, should an indicator change in the course 
of TF life. Especially for programmatic TFs, it is difficult to 
establish a RF at the time of TF initiation, when activities 
under the TF are yet to be defined and funds to be allocated. 
However, RFs often exist outside the AA, e.g. for the Bangla-
desh Health Sector Reform TF, which has a very detailed RF. 
For programs they are usually included in annual reports, as 
is the case of ESMAP.
45 These are the Umbrella Facility for Gender Equality and the 
MDTF for Poverty and Social Impact Analysis.
audit of an individual TF. In this case, the World Bank 
and donor must agree on the scope and terms of refer-
ence of such audit. The costs of a separate audit must 
be borne by the requesting donor. 
Evaluation: According to the TF Handbook, TTLs are 
responsible to supervise projects and to monitor and 
evaluate the corresponding results. Notwithstanding 
internal supervision, donors can call for external eval-
uations at their own costs. This is stipulated in a stan-
dard clause in all AAs. In case of a MDTF, donors must 
agree on whether or not evaluations should be paid 
from TF resources and whether or not individual do-
nors have the right to impose individual evaluations.46
Cancellation is legally possible for both sides of the 
AA. Any party may cancel the AA upon three months 
prior to written notification. When this clause is in-
voked, funds uncommitted by the World Bank are 
returned to the donor according to its pro-rata share. 
As discussed later (see chapter 5), the donor also has 
the option to withdraw from the TF and transfer the 
balance into IDA.
In summary, the bargaining potential varies across 
the individual governance clauses, depending on 
whether or not there already are detailed operation-
al rules on the part of the World Bank. Based on our 
analysis of those operational procedures, as well as 
our analysis of German AAs, we have found that there 
seems to be little room for negotiation in areas such 
as staffing and procurement, reporting, and cancel-
lation. In the following, we present the principal bar-
gaining options on each of those specific conditions 
(see also annex 2).
46 World Bank (2012c).
 20
Table 2: Bargaining option in Administrative Agreements
Part of AA Negotiable Options
Main body
Establishes identity of the parties 
to the contract, their intent to  
establish a TF, and the contribution 
amount
Yes Mutual agreement, typically no additional AA negotiation  
required, LEGAL writes the text
Contribution schedule Yes* At once or in several tranches
Annex 1: TF Description
Objectives and activities Yes* Depending on TF purpose; some AAs include success criteria
Eligible expenditures Yes They are closely related to the types of activities financed and 
governed by World Bank procurement rules:
RETF: mainly goods and services; BETFs: mainly staff cost - 
direct and indirect cost options – see annex 2
Taxes No Standard clause
Program criteria Yes Conditional contributions (e.g. matching by World Bank)
Annex 2: Standard provisions 
Administration of the contri- 
butions
No Standard clause
Management of the contributions No Standard clause
Trust fund fee and cost No The cost recovery principle is based on the size and type of 
the TF; donor can check plausibility of calculation
Accounting and financial reporting No Standard clause
Progress reporting Yes Choose annual, semi-annual, or quarterly report; also infor-
mal agreement on specific aspects possible (in or outside reg-
ular reports)
Disbursement, cancellation, refund Yes Standard clause except disbursement end date: There is no 
pre-defined standard; but all contracts from now have a  
defined end-date 
Disclosure, Dispute resolution No Standard clause
Evaluation No Standard clause
Annex 3: Governance
Governance bodies Yes* Governance set-ups, involving up to three tiers; frequency and 
purpose of interaction of each governance body (e.g. Steering 
Committee, Management Committee etc.)**
Some additional options found: external team of experts; 
technical and financial advisory committees; representation 
of recipient governments and civil society.
*    Key negotiation areas. 
** In some rare cases it is also up for negotiation which donors may participate in the governance bodies. For example, in the TF 
Global Knowledge Program on Migration and Development only the largest donor may participate in the advisory council 
that gives overall strategic directions.
The bargaining options presented above apply in the 
case of a new TF being set up and negotiated. When 
joining an existing MDTF, each donor entering the TF
has to sign the exact initial AA that was drafted when 
the TF was set up. 
Source: joyn-coop based on interviews and analysis of Standard  A and German AAs.
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2.5 The trust fund reform process
Facilitated by a lenient internal control environ-
ment in the World Bank, the number of TFs grew 
tremendously in the early 2000s. This created con-
cerns about manageability in the World Bank.47 
Therefore, World Bank senior management started 
off an ambitious reform process in the mid-2000s. 
As a long-term objective, it aims at making TFs a 
financing instrument that follows the same oper-
ational rules as core funding. An important mile-
stone in this process had been the 2007 TF Man-
agement Framework, along with its updates in 2010 
and 2013 that focused on different areas of the re-
form process.48 
The reform agenda focuses on four pillars, each of 
them being addressed over different time periods. 
These are (i) strategic alignment with the World 
Bank’s portfolio, (ii) integration of TFs in business 
planning and budgeting process, (iii) cost recovery 
and efficiency, and (iv) oversight. The last pillar was 
added based on recommendations by the World 
Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group. Progress to 
date on those four pillars has been uneven, but the 
World Bank considers itself on track and seeks to 
move forward with its agenda. 
First, alignment of TFs with the core agenda of the 
World Bank is the most recent reform area. A num-
ber of measures contributed to greater alignment 
of TFs with core World Bank work. Since 2008, 
trust-funded activities have been integrated into 
country assistance strategies (CASs), thereby en-
suring alignment with country priorities and more 
comprehensive planning by country offices and 
regional Vice Presidential Units (VPU).49 To over-
come the ad-hoc fashion by which TFs were raised 
in the past, the World Bank more recently engaged 
on strategic alignment with donors and introduced 
Umbrella Facilities in 2011.50  In the future, the 
World Bank will base its decision whether to accept 
47 There also had been a corruption issue in a TF in the early 
2000s, which caused suspension of all TF contributions by 
some donors. This incident, which undermined donor trust 
in the Bank, paved the way for tighter fiduciary controls 
that are at least equally stringent as the rules and procedures 
governing the Bank’s own resources.
48 IEG (2011): xv.
49 World Bank (2013b): 10.
50 Umbrella Facilities are (mainly) large thematic TFs based on 
a World Bank sector strategy, without possibilities for donor 
earmarking. They have been initially suggested by IEG as a 
means to curb the proliferation of funds and to align them 
with Bank objectives.
TFs on the three criteria of relevance, alignment, 
and comparative advantage.51 
Second, the World Bank integrated TFs into its stan-
dard business processes. In the 1990s, task team 
leaders had considerable autonomy to agree with 
individual donors on TFs to support their non-core 
activities, and those TFs had been off the radar of 
many VPUs. Since the mid-2000s, TF require ap-
proval by the relevant director, or, in some cases, 
the vice president. By now, trust-funded projects 
also follow the same internal review process (except 
Board approval) and a reporting standard as least 
as high as core-funded projects. At the same time, 
the World Bank has sought to avoid unwarrantedly 
high transaction costs through the introduction of 
a small-grant procedure52 for RETFs in FY13, which 
covers about 70% of all RETFs. In the future, the 
World Bank will further develop its quarterly VPU 
fundraising projection, which enhances vice-presi-
dential control over TFs.53 
Third, the World Bank has tightened cost recovery. 
On the one hand, the World Bank streamlines its 
own operational procedures to increase efficiency, 
as indicated by the small-grants procedure and the 
integration of separate reporting and monitoring 
of TFs that will be completed by FY14. On the oth-
er hand, it further standardizes its policies vis-à-
vis donors. In particular, fee structures at least for 
BETFs are relatively standardized: a 5% fee that is 
shared between the managing unit (60%) and cen-
tral units (40%). In FY13, the World Bank revised its 
fees for fiduciary services for FIFs based on full cost 
recovery. The Bank also expects its cost recovery to 
improve due to the higher minimum size for new 
TFs of USD 2 million, effective July 1, 2013. Senior 
management further plans to raise the overall min-
imum size of MDTFs to USD 5 million. Most recent-
ly, the World Bank has also developed a life-cycle 
approach that states clear exit conditions. Standard-
ized closing procedures will be further developed 
to address the issue of “dormant funds”, which cur-
rently are at about USD 300 million and generate 
significant administrative costs.54 
51 World Bank (2013b): 10.
52 This is a simplified procedure for grants below USD 500.000 
that requires only the review by the World Bank sector man-
ager before the grant is cleared for implementation.
53 World Bank (2013b): 2, 10, 12, 17.
54 World Bank (2013b): 2, 16, 18, 19. 20.
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Fourth, albeit added only in 2007, oversight is the 
most dynamic area of reform. In late 2011, two 
chapters on TFs were added to the Quarterly Busi-
ness and Risk Review Report (QBRR) to the Board. 
Furthermore, better oversight has been made possi-
ble through better access to TF financial data, both 
internally through electronic accounting since the 
early 2000s, and publicly, through the AidFlows 
(www.aidflows.org) and fiftrustee ( fiftrustee.world-
bank.org) portals. According to senior management, 
high-level oversight will increase awareness of frag-
mentation issues and further contribute to a stricter 
control environment.55 
The ongoing reform process at the World Bank sets 
an important background condition for the evolv-
ing German engagement strategy on TFs (see chap-
ter 5). This is because the reform has two distinct 
sets of effects. On the one hand, the governability 
of TFs by World Bank staff tends to have a direct 
impact on core-funded operations. Moreover, the 
attractiveness of TFs in general may have an impact 
on the evolution of core funding. Hence, the reper-
cussions of TFs on core funding are relevant to do-
nors in their capacity as shareholders of the World 
Bank. On the other hand, TF reforms directly affect 
OECD/DAC countries in their capacity as donors to 
raise TFs with the World Bank. 
This donor-shareholder duality applies to every 
sovereign member country. We analyzed the TF re-
form positions of four countries, namely the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Swe-
den (see annex 3).56 In general, those donors official-
ly support the reform process at the World Bank in 
their capacity as shareholders and at the same time 
belong to its largest TF donors with relatively nu-
anced TF reform positions depending on their dom-
inant pattern of engagement. All four donors follow 
to some extent the corporate World Bank perspec-
tive on TFs, welcoming World Bank efforts on bet-
ter oversight, business process integration, and cost 
recovery. In principle, donors also encourage the 
World Bank to become more selective, as a means to 
increase its focus on results (e.g., DFID), or to main-
tain its flexibility (e.g., Switzerland). However,
55 Ibid.: 2, 20.
56 These countries represent varying TF policies and therefore 
seem particularly suitable for a comparison with Germany.
according to our interviews some donors57  doubt 
whether Umbrella Facilities (UFs) are an appropriate 
means to this end. 
UFs were suggested by IEG in its 2011 report as a 
radical solution to the proliferation of TFs at the 
World Bank. IEG recommended that the World 
Bank and the donors should agree on multi-donor 
multi-country Umbrellas supported by a World 
Bank strategy, while “phas[ing] out the other mul-
tiple-recipient-country funds […]”. IEG advocated 
UFs as a means to address “operational inefficiency, 
inadequate accountability for results, and lack of 
objective and transparent allocation criteria”.58 
However, it has become clear that this rather radi-
cal solution would be difficult to implement, given 
the skepticism among most World Bank operational 
units as well as donor countries. World Bank man-
agement therefore advocates Umbrella Principles 
as a compromise. Those principles follow the spirit 
of UFs while maintaining flexibility by allowing 
the co-existence of TFs even if they support similar 
themes. Umbrella Principles thereby respect the ex-
isting architecture of TFs at the World Bank, while 
standardizing governance in those TFs to the extent 
possible (see box 4).
57 For example UK and Sweden.
58 IEG (2011): xx.
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Box 4: The Umbrella Principles
Umbrella Principles (UPs) have evolved out of the discussions on the Umbrella Facilities (UFs) as a more flexible 
approach to apply principles as opposed to one predefined concept to TFs. Based on our interviews, we could 
identify seven UPs:
• Contributing to MDTFs rather than SDTFs: Under MDTFs as standard legal instrument, all donors  
are treated equally, thus, each donor signs up to the same AA with the World Bank;
• Supporting core activities: TFs should align with and complement the existing IBRD/IDA work program  
as endorsed by the relevant sector boards (i.e., the management committees);
• Harmonized replenishment: annual fundraising activities, to replace ad-hoc contributions from donors  
or fundraising by individual World Bank project managers;
• Light Governance: TFs should have the most cost-effective governance structure and rely on World Bank 
mechanisms to avoid institutional duplication; 
• Block grants: Given the high transaction costs under the competitive call-for-proposals mechanism,  
block grants are the preferred mode of allocating funds to individual projects. This puts the regional VPUs 
in the driver seat to decide on how to best allocate the available resources. Block grants also preclude the 
possibility for individual donors to earmark specific projects;
• Unified results reporting: All donors obtain a single report at the parent-TF level according to the  
TF Results Framework. With pooled funds, it is not possible to attribute specific results to individual  
donor contributions.
Source: joyn-coop based on interviews with CFPTO and IEG.

3 An analysis of the German engagement in 
World Bank trust funds
This chapter presents an in-depth analysis of the 
German TF portfolio and looks at the different de-
velopment institutions (BMZ, GIZ and KfW) with 
their key priorities and internal processes. More-
over, based on eight case studies, this chapter de-
scribes the experience of these institutions with 
setting up and managing TFs and provides also the 
related World Bank perspective. Finally, observa-
tions and key aspects for successful TF management 
are presented.
3.1 Trust fund portfolios of the German 
key development institutions
The German TF portfolio is shared between several 
institutions. By far the largest share is held by BMZ 
and its implementing agencies GIZ and KfW. A mi-
nor share is or was held by other ministries such as 
the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) or the Fed-
eral Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer 
Protection (BMELV). In addition, the Federal Foreign 
Office (FFO) provides TF funding via KfW. The fol-
lowing graph shows the allocation of TFs to the dif-
ferent German institutions. Annex 4 provides a list of 
the TF contributions per institution. 
In the following, we focus on BMZ, GIZ, and KfW, 
which hold the vast majority of the TF contributions. 
While BMZ holds roughly half of all TFs, KfW has the 
most important share in terms of contribution vol-
ume. The diagram on the left also shows the volume 
of TFs funded via the FiT, which is a specific funding 
line at the level of BMZ. This will be further explained 
in chapter 3.2. For all three institutions, number and 
volume of TFs have increased significantly over the 
last ten years (see diagram below) – in line with the 
overall increase of TFs at the World Bank.
As diagram 17 below shows, 70% of TFs have contribu-
tions below USD 5 million and 40% even below USD 2 
million (most of them by GIZ). In contrast to this, only 
12% of TFs in the overall World Bank portfolio have 
contributions lower than USD 2 million and only 33% 
have contributions lower than USD 5 million.59 
 
59 World Bank (2013b): 9.
Diagram 15: Active IBRD/IDA trust funds by institution 
Source: joyn-coop based on World Bank (2013a).
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Diagram 16: Development over time: German contributions to IBRD/IDA trust funds
Source: joyn-coop based on World Bank (2013a). 
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German TFs, especially the smaller ones, are scattered 
over a large variety of topics. The following diagram 
shows the current active TF portfolio of Germany by 
main topic distinguishing between RETFs and BETFs.60 
It can be concluded that there is no particular thematic 
focus apart from fragile states and climate protection. 
60 According to the BMZ Website (http://www.bmz.de/en/
what_we_do/issues/index.html), there are 16 main thematic 
areas. For the purposes of this study, we have slightly ad-
justed these main areas. We have replaced Human Rights by 
Gender and added the area of “Methods” to accommodate for 
TFs that primarily shape World Bank financing instruments 
such as Poverty and Social Impact Analysis or the Program 
for Results. Please see Annex 4 for a full list of the German TF 
contributions and how they were allocated to these areas.
This supports findings from our interviews that deci-
sions for TF contributions are not based on a common 
strategy or the aim to concentrate on certain topics.
This picture changes if German contributions to FIFs 
are taken into account (see box 5).
Diagram 18: Split among German main topics
Source: joyn-coop based on World Bank (2013a). 
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Box 5: German contribution to Financial Intermediary Funds
Germany currently contributes to twelve FIFs of which three did not receive any cash contributions during the 
last five years. All but one FIF are held by BMZ. See also Annex 5 for a list of FIFs. Protecting the climate is the 
most important topic with 85% of total contributions, most of the cash contributions during the last years, and 
seven related FIFs. In comparison to this, 46.5% of total contributions in the World Bank FIF portfolio and eight 
out 18 FIFs relate to climate change. German contribution as percentage of total is rather small (exceptions: 30% 
in the Special Climate Change Fund and 27% in the Clean Technology Fund). 
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Box 5 continued
Germany’s focus on climate change within their FIF contributions also somewhat impacts the main priorities 
described in diagram 18. If FIFs were added to the diagram, there would be a much stronger focus on climate 
protection than on fragile states.
Diagram 19: Key data for Financial Intermediary Funds with German contribution
Source: joyn-coop based on World Bank (2013a). 
Diagram 20: Split among German main topics - Financial Intermediary Funds included
Source: joyn-coop based on World Bank (2013a). 
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An analysis of Bank- versus recipient-executed TFs 
shows that Germany contributes to more than twice 
as many TFs primarily disbursing into BETF-child 
funds.61 However, in terms of contribution volume, 
RETFs are more prominent. BMZ and GIZ are more 
involved in BETFs wheras KfW is more involved in 
RETFs.
61 In our analysis, we consider TFs that only have BETF as 
disbursement category and those TFs with more than 50% of 
disbursements through BETF child funds to be BETFs. 
As described in chapter 2, much of the work done by 
networks is funded out of TFs. Therefore, we analyzed 
to what extent Germany is involved in TFs managed 
by networks versus regions. Related to this is the ques-
tion to what extent Germany can shape the work per-
formed by the networks. 
The result of the analysis is that BMZ is involved in 
a high number of TFs in networks with an average 
size of contributions of USD 10.3 million. However, in 
terms of overall contribution volume, Germany’s clear 
focus is on TF contributions in the regional World 
Diagram 21: German contributions to recipient-exectuted trust funds versus Bank-executed 
           trust funds
Source: joyn-coop based on World Bank (2013a).
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Diagram 22: German contributions to trust funds managed by a regional department versus  
           a network 
Source: joyn-coop based on World Bank (2013a).
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Bank departments. The Afghanistan TF (ARTF) alone 
accounts for about USD 460 million.
To round off the analysis, we compared Germany’s 
presence in knowledge-creating TFs versus imple-
menting TFs. Knowledge-creating TFs primarily sup-
port development and dissemination of innovation 
and knowledge whereas implementing TFs finance 
operational work in the countries and regions.62 In ad-
dition, there is a third category of TFs, where knowl-
edge creation and implementation is equally import-
ant. In terms of numbers, knowledge-creation and 
implementing TFs are equally represented. However, 
in terms of contribution volume, implementing TFs 
are far more important, even when ARTF is not con-
sidered. 
Knowledge-creation TFs have very low average contri-
butions and are primarily funded out of the FiT-bud-
get line (see 3.2 for explanation). I/K TFs are also most-
ly BMZ-funded, but are financed by other budget lines 
than FiT (climate change funds and core-funding to 
MAI, see 3.2)
62 To distinguish knowledge and implementation TFs, we 
examined where TFs are held (region or network), what 
types of disbursements prevail (RETF or BETF), and what the 
overall goal of a TF is. In Implementing TFs, we also included 
those TFs that supported knowledge-creation for use in 
the recipient countries only, e.g. development of country 
risk maps or country level evaluations that are not used for 
broader knowledge development through aggregation at the 
TF parent level.
The diagrams presented throughout this report show 
the differences among the TF contributions by BMZ, 
GIZ and KfW, but it should be noted that all contri-
butions to TFs of KfW and GIZ are made on behalf of 
BMZ and policy is decided at BMZ level. Nonetheless, 
each organization needs to be analyzed separately. 
First of all, contract negotiations and decisions about 
scope and design of TFs lie with the respective Ger-
man institution – for GIZ and KfW within their con-
tractual framework with BMZ. Second, each of the 
three players has different funding procedures and 
different internal processes that influence TF engage-
ment.
In the following section, each of the German institu-
tions and their main priorities and internal processes 
are described.
3.2 BMZ
TF characteristics: The BMZ TF portfolio is covering 
a large array of topics (12 different areas of develop-
ment cooperation). The contributions range from 
USD 125,000 to USD 121 million with an average 
size of TF contribution of USD 6.9 million. When 
TFs that are funded out of climate funding and MAI 
core funding (see below) are included, average size is 
USD 14.4 million.
Motivations: Funds are primarily provided with the 
following motivation to IBRD-TFs: (i) Support devel-
opment topics by putting them on the international 
agenda; (ii) Be part of a network of shared innova-
Diagram 23: German contributions to knowledge-creating (K), implementing (I) and hybrid (I/K)  
           trust funds
Source: joyn-coop based on World Bank (2013a).
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tion and know-how; and (iii) Funding to fragile and 
post-conflict states, where other means of bilateral aid 
are not possible.
Funding sources: The typical source of funding is the 
so-called budget item “Funds in Trust (FiT)”. FiT is a 
line item in the budget plan for development coopera-
tion (“Einzelplan 23”, 68 701, Nr. 14) that is earmarked 
for contributions to the UN and other International 
Organizations and INGOs. The budget item amounts 
to roughly EUR 35 million annually of which about 
10% actually go to TFs at the World Bank. According-
ly, only about EUR 3.5-4 million are made available to 
World Bank TFs annually and are spread across sever-
al TFs. However, as these yearly allocations are often 
made to the same TFs, the overall contribution per TF 
is still relatively sizeable (on average USD 7 million). 
More important in terms of volume are a few IBRD 
TFs that are funded from other budget lines: (i) cli-
mate related TFs can be funded out of 896 09 Multi-
lateral Aid for Global Environment Protection; (ii) TFs 
related to partnerships that are recognized as MAI 
can be funded out of the respective MAI core funding 
budget line.63 However, these cases remain exceptions. 
As shown, FiTs account for only one-third of the BMZ 
TF portfolio in terms of volume. Nevertheless, they 
are the standard instrument for BMZ and the follow-
ing section therefore focuses on the description of the 
associated processes. 
Project cycle: The responsibility for the allocation 
of the FiT-budget line lies with division 416 „United 
Nations“, which coordinates the allocation process of 
available funds with the different country and sector 
units. The allocation process follows the annual bud-
geting cycle where funds are agreed at the beginning 
of the year and are allocated throughout the year with 
a portion of the disbursements taking place before the 
end of the year.64 BMZ sector and country units can 
apply for funding to division 416. Typically, demand 
exceeds funds available. Based on the applications, 
division 416 then establishes a list of TF allocations to 
be signed off by the state secretary. Therefore, there 
is a certain degree of collective reflection on the TF 
allocation from the FiT title, which represents an ex-
63 This is the case for the TFs related to the Global Partnership 
for Education that are funded out of 68 701, Nr. 9. 
64 The yearly allocations are usually disbursed over a period 
of three years. Reason is that the FiT budget line funds are 
committed as so called „commitment authorization“ with 
limit of two years. Therefore, it is possible to disburse with-
in the actual year as well as in the subsequent two years (x, 
x+1, x+2). 
post appraisal of the proposed topics rather than an 
ex-ante prioritization approach. So far, there are only 
general criteria for the individual TF allocation deci-
sions such as development impact, political priority 
and predictability. However, there is no focusing on a 
limited number of themes or organizations. Presum-
ably, division 416 aims to satisfy the funding demand 
of many units, which would explain the high number 
of different TF contributions. Some changes are envis-
aged for the near future: Currently a strategy is being 
elaborated that should define strategic directions and 
long-term funding priorities among different MAIs 
and different TFs according to the German objectives 
for multilateral aid.65 However, it is still open to what 
extent priorities of the relevant institutional units will 
be taken into account (e.g. division 411 for the World 
Bank) and to what extent such a strategy might im-
pact allocation decisions via GIZ and KfW (see next 
chapters).
Once funds have been allocated, the responsibility for 
the different TFs fully rests with the respective unit. 
The units are concluding the respective AAs and are 
responsible for the funds monitoring based on World 
Bank reporting. As division 416 is only supervising 
the allocation of funds, there is no centralized control 
or overview concerning on-going TF contributions 
within BMZ. Division 411 as the responsible unit for 
all World Bank related matters is only involved at a 
late stage in the process, before the actual funds (“Bar-
mittel”) in the relevant budget year are transferred. 
External representation: The interaction with World 
Bank is managed directly by the units, usually with-
out involvement of the German Executive Director 
Office (GEDO). This holds especially true for the po-
litical representation in Steering Committees. On a 
technical level, the respective GIZ sector project often 
provides support and is interacting with World Bank.
3.3 GIZ
TF characteristics: The GIZ TF portfolio is also quite 
fragmented and covers 10 different areas of develop-
ment cooperation. The contributions range from USD 
87,50066 to USD 6.2 million with average size of TF 
contributions at only USD 1.2 million. 
65 a) Effective cooperation with multilateral organizations in 
efficient int. development architecture, b) Systematic and 
targeted agenda-setting at international level, c) Pro-devel-
opment interlocking of bilateral and multilateral aid.
66 First time contributions to the same TF even start with 
20,000 EUR.
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Motivations: As previously described, GIZ cannot 
independently decide on TF contributions but is com-
missioned by BMZ to implement projects of Technical 
Cooperation. When asked about reasons for contri-
butions to TFs, the following were mentioned by GIZ 
employees: (i) Complementarity of knowledge work 
by the World Bank to promote the achievement of GIZ 
project objectives; (ii) Fostering bi- and multilateral 
cooperation; (iii) Support of new instruments at the 
World Bank; (iv) Support of donor coordination and 
alignment.
Funding sources: TF contributions are usually made 
through the budget line “Technical Cooperation (TC)”, 
which is used to implement bilateral projects of devel-
opment cooperation (capacity building). In exception-
al cases, flow-backs from the European Development 
Fund (EDF) are reprogrammed for the budget line 
“Technical Cooperation” and spent under its rules.67 
TC-funds that are programmed for a specific project 
are usually committed for a multi year period and do 
not have to be spent during the fiscal year (except for 
funds originating from EDF).68 TC-funds are generally 
allocated across sectors and countries. Within these 
allocations, GIZ may propose to BMZ to use parts of 
the funding for TF contributions. This is usually done 
in the context of a larger GIZ-program and the TF 
must suit the overall bilateral TC program objectives. 
Most of the TFs are co-funded out of sector TC.69 Sec-
tor TC is usually implemented by sector projects and 
often used for knowledge-creating TFs. Country TC 
is implemented via projects at the country-level and 
thus typically via implementing TFs. The overall bud-
get for TC is much larger than the FiT budget. There-
fore, TC contributions to TFs can theoretically be rel-
atively large. However, in practice, this is not the case 
and the average amount is USD 1.2 million. 
Project cycle: Based on approval and commissioning 
by BMZ (following the submission of a program docu-
ment), the technical and content aspects of the TFs are 
negotiated by the respective GIZ sector and country 
unit. The AA itself is administered and concluded by 
the division Contracting, Procurement, Logistics (if 
necessary with assistance by the legal department), 
which is responsible for all financial aspects (e.g. ne-
gotiation of fee). Sector and country units are then 
67 Until two years ago, EDF flow-backs were administered  
by KfW.
68 However, GIZ is obliged not to overspend the overall annual 
budget line that exists for TC.
69 Out of the current 16 GIZ contributions, 13 seem to be fund-
ed by sector TC.
responsible for TF management, e.g. operational man-
agement, liaison with the World Bank. All financial 
aspects (e.g. control of use of funds), however, remain 
in responsibility of the division Contracting, Pro-
curement, Logistics that has access to the World Bank 
Client Connection database. In contrast to BMZ, GIZ 
has central access to information for financial and le-
gal aspects concerning its TFs. Nevertheless, funding 
decisions are again not based on a formal strategy but 
driven by the different sector and country units in co-
ordination with BMZ.  
External representation: GIZ is not only interacting 
with World Bank on a technical level, but usually rep-
resenting the German side in the Steering Committee 
(SC) – in case of sector TF in close collaboration with 
the commissioning units in BMZ. 
3.4 KfW
TF characteristics: The KfW TF portfolio is very fo-
cused with more than 90% of funding for fragile states 
and covering only four areas of development coopera-
tion. Even when excluding the ARTF, which makes up 
80% of KfW’s TF portfolio, 70% of funds are dedicated 
to fragile states. The average size of TF contributions is 
USD 11.6 million excluding ARTF (USD 47.8 million in-
cluding ARTF). Most of the TFs are implementing TFs.
Motivations: As is the case with GIZ, a TF contribution 
of KfW is subject to approval by BMZ (or the Federal 
Foreign Office). Accordingly, KfW is commissioned by 
BMZ to enter into contract negotiations with the World 
Bank. Key reason for KfW’s participation in TFs is their 
suitability as appropriate transitional financing modal-
ity in fragile contexts, where partner structures need 
support for successful project implementation. In addi-
tion, support to donor coordination and harmonization 
is a motivation, inter alia enabling large investments 
and visible reconstruction measures by the leverage ef-
fect of bundling donor funds.
Funding sources: The typical funding source is 
the budget line “Financial Cooperation (FC)” that 
is normally used to implement bilateral projects of 
development cooperation. Similar to TC, FC may be 
spent across several years and is generally allocated 
in intergovernmental negotiations. FC can only al-
located across countries and regions but not sectors. 
Accordingly, KfW contributions are typically made 
to implementing TFs (as shown in 3.1). In some cases, 
FC can be used for TF contributions as part of larger 
FC programs. In addition, KfW is channeling funds 
of the Federal Foreign Office into TFs and comple-
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menting budget funds with own funds raised on the 
capital market.
The project cycle is driven by the fact that KfW 
does not implement the projects itself. The project 
executing agency is an institution in the partner 
country. KfW appraises the institutions and projects 
on behalf of the German government to determine 
whether or not they are eligible for development 
support. Equally, TF contributions are appraised 
based on World Bank project documentation and 
on-site visits and proposed to BMZ in a program doc-
ument.70 Based on approval by BMZ, the responsible 
KfW project manager enters into the AA negotiations 
with the World Bank. In addition, a financing agree-
ment is usually negotiated with the project-execut-
70 It is also important to note that TF contributions are 
one form of the so called program-based approach 
(PBA) and as such need to be approved by the budget 
committee of the German Parliament.
ing agency in the partner country. TF management 
and supervision lies in the responsibility of the KfW 
project manager. There is no centralized oversight of 
TFs within KfW. 
External representation is usually handled by KfW 
on a technical level. 
The following table summarizes key differences be-
tween BMZ, GIZ and KfW in the sourcing, manage-
ment and supervision of TFs.
Table 3: Difference in sourcing, management and supervision of trust funds: BMZ, GIZ, KfW
Aspect BMZ GIZ KfW
Funding source FiT, Environment, MAI Core TC, EDF flow-backs FC, Foreign Ministry, own 
funds of KfW
Term Yearly funds Several years (mostly) FC - Several years; Foreign 
Ministry - yearly funds
Allocation of 
funds
House internal call for pro-
posals
Program document to BMZ / 
final decision by BMZ
Program document to BMZ or 
FFO / final decision by BMZ 
or FFO
Integration in 
German DC
TF contribution only without 
accompanying project
TF as part of larger GIZ pro-
gram
TF sometimes part of larger 
FC program
Management 
of TF
Only regional/sector unit that 
holds TF
Content: regional/sectoral 
unit, Legal Department, Fi-
nancial Department
Only unit in KfW responsible 
for TF contribution 
Access to Client 
Connection
Not known Yes Yes
Payments In tranches Usually in full Usually in tranches
Representation 
vis-à-vis World 
Bank
BMZ at a political level, GIZ 
at a technical level in case re-
lated TC program exists
GIZ/BMZ at a political level, 
GIZ at a technical level 
BMZ at a political level, KfW 
at a technical level
Average size of 
contribution
USD 6.9 million USD 1.2 million USD 11.6 million 
Source: joyn-coop based on interviews, see annex 1 for list of interviewees.
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3.5 Case study selection
We reviewed the involvement and experience of BMZ, 
GIZ and KfW in establishment and management 
of TFs in eight case studies. The following criteria 
formed the basis for selecting the case studies.
Table 4: Selection criteria for case studies
Selection criteria Rationale
SDTF/MDTF Include one SDTF to analyze difference to MDTFs
Execution as BETF or RETF Include both to assess differences (not necessarily equally) 
Stakeholders Equal representation of BMZ, GIZ, KfW
Financial importance Look both at financially very important and very small contributions a) in relation 
to total TF volume, b) in relation to German portfolio
Thematic Cluster Climate Change, Fragile States required as these are considered important
Strategic Alignment:  
Umbrella Facilities
To be included as a cornerstone of the TF reform agenda
Age Focus on more recent TFs because institutional history is more present and ex-
periences are more relevant for future TF contributions
Management Fee Different fee structures should be represented
Source: joyn-coop.
Based on these criteria, the following eight case studies were selected. 
Table 5: Short description of selected trust fund case studies
TF Nr. Trust Fund Abbr. Description of supported Programs
50900 
71398
 
1) World Bank Energy 
Sector Management 
Assistance Program 
SDTF
2) ESMAP MDTF
ESMAP Increase know-how and institutional capacity of developing countries 
to achieve environmentally sustainable energy solutions 
Includes research, analysis, knowledge products, advisory activities 
and grants for renewable energy solutions
53689 
70968
1) Education for All 
Fast Track Initiative 
Secretariat MDTF
2) EfA Fast Track Ini-
tiative Catalytic TF II
EfA Based on the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) - a partnership 
with developing and donor countries, int. agencies, private sector and 
civil society groups
GPE provides incentives, resources, and technical support for sound 
education plans in developing countries
71077
 
Carbon Fund of the 
Forest Carbon Part-
nership Facility 
FCPF FCPF supports developing countries in their efforts to reduce emis-
sions from deforestation and degradation (REDD+) 
Carbon Fund specifically purchases the emission reductions generat-
ed by CPF programs
71893 Umbrella Facility for 
Gender Equality 
UFGE Strengthens awareness, knowledge, and capacity for gender informed 
policy-making and increases the availability of gender relevant data 
and evidence
Consolidates fundraising for gender activities
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TF Nr. Trust Fund Abbr. Description of supported Programs
71382
 
Multi-Donor Fund for 
Poverty and Social 
Impact Analysis 
PSIA Instrument for partner governments and World Bank: ex ante analysis 
predicting impact prior to policy implementation to support World 
Bank’s policy dialogue, program lending and national policies. 
72062 Program-for-Results 
Support MDTF
PforR Development-financing instrument that links disbursements to 
achievement of results
Aims at helping partner countries improve design and implementa-
tion of their development programs 
71294 MDTF for Transitional 
Demobilization and 
Reintegration Pro-
gram in the Great 
Lakes Region
TDRP Supports countries in Great Lakes Region and beyond (South Sudan, 
Niger) in the implementation of demobilization and reintegration 
(D&R) programs of ex-combatants. 
German contribution exclusively flows to South Sudanese DDR pro-
gram (support to testing-phase) 
71778 Bangladesh Health 
Sector Development 
Program MDTF
HSDP Enables Government of Bangladesh to strengthen health systems and 
improve health services for the poor
Improves availability of generally-accessible, patient-oriented, af-
fordable and high-quality services for health, nutrition and family 
planning
Source: joyn-coop based on World Bank (2012d), World Bank (2013g), World Bank (2013h), World Bank (2013i).
Please see annex 6 for a summary on how cases 
match the selection criteria. In general, EfA, FCPF, 
TDRP and HSDP can be considered as TFs orient-
ed towards implementation in partner countries. 
Whereas ESMAP, UFGE, PSIA and PforR are more 
oriented towards knowledge-development with a 
strong network character. In addition, it is notewor-
thy that EfA and FCPF are partnerships where the 
related TFs play a subordinated role and all gover-
nance-settings are oriented towards the partner-
ship. 
3.6 Case study findings
In the following section, we present the key find-
ings of the case study analysis. We reviewed the 
cases according to three key questions: (i) TF setup: 
What led to the decision to engage in the TF and 
how did the German side coordinate with the World 
Bank? (ii) TF management: What were key learnings 
from the management of the TF and its governance 
setup? (iii) TF assessment: Is the TF contribution 
considered a success and why? 
3.6.1 Setting up a trust fund
In the interviews, we asked about how the process 
of setting up the TF was experienced and how the 
negotiations of the AA were conducted. Hence, TFs 
that were co-initiated by Germany need to be dis-
tinguished from existing MDTFs that Germany 
joined as an additional donor.
A) Experience with setting up a new TF
From a German perspective, there are a number of 
successful cases where Germany was the initiator of 
the TF. This worked particularly well where new tools 
and topics were introduced that presented an innova-
tive approach for both sides - and also other donors. 
Another success condition was that both sides brought 
something to the table – the World Bank its large-scale 
sector programs, which could serve as a testing ground, 
and Germany its knowledge of the specific topic and 
on the ground expertise. Also, a large initial funding 
amount played a role in some of the cases. The success 
cases were mostly also characterized by very good in-
formal relations between both sides. 
From the World Bank’s perspective, the German sec-
tor expertise is often highly appreciated. In one case, 
the World Bank counterparts pointed out that German 
specialists participated in the establishment of the 
baseline methodology for a TF. In another case, Germa-
ny was instrumental in bringing donors together in a 
MDTF.  
B) Experience with joining an existing TF
From the German perspective, the experience with 
joining an existing TF was mostly positive, even 
though German stakeholders had no opportunity 
to re-negotiate the TF again. In fact, governance ar-
rangements were already defined among the founding 
donors. However, the common perception is that the 
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World Bank is willing to accommodate specific re-
quirements to a certain extent. In one example, the 
World Bank set up a separate TF only for Germany 
and the EU as the EU had the requirement to invest 
only in TFs with World Bank as sole supervising au-
thority.71 This could not be guaranteed in the existing 
MDTF. Generally, the size of the contribution amount 
was not decisive for a smooth process. This again was 
facilitated by good informal communications. 
From a World Bank perspective, a minimum con-
tribution requirement to participate in the Steering 
Committee of a TF is preferred. Conversely, ”buying 
a seat at the table“ by contributing only a relatively 
small amount is not considered good practice. In one 
of our eight selected cases, a USD 1 million minimum 
was required to participate in the Steering Commit-
tee. A minimum contribution requirement currently 
is the exception, not the norm. If it exists, its threshold 
varies. 
C) Negotiations of the AA
From a German perspective, the World Bank seems 
to have more leverage in negotiations on the AA. Put 
differently, even when the German side proposed to 
modify the World Bank’s draft AA, the World Bank’s 
legal department did not accept the proposed chang-
es. In none of the eight cases reviewed, it was possi-
ble to introduce fundamental changes that would 
have reflected the status of discussions between the 
two sides. For example, in one case it was informal-
ly agreed that the German funds would be used only 
for a certain purpose in a regional MDTF. However, 
the World Bank refused to formalize this agreement 
in the AA, claiming that all AAs of the other donors 
would then need to be changed. Instead, the German 
counterpart had to seek email confirmation on all im-
portant points. Another issue mentioned regularly in 
the interviews was that the German counterparts nei-
ther knew what the standard AA should contain nor 
where to get assistance on this.
From the World Bank’s perspective, there is a stan-
dard AA. The latest version dates of 2012 and there 
is little room for negotiation in the primary section 
of the AA. Earmarking is not intended. However, if 
parties reach a joint understanding on the use of the 
funds, the World Bank will take this into account 
when disbursing funds. In one case, the TF manager 
mentioned that all German contributions were chan-
71 As opposed to handing on funds to other executing agencies, 
such as bilateral aid agencies in the field or other partners. 
neled into one child TF to enable a sort of earmarking. 
This was a feasible solution for a very well defined 
project under a MDTF.
3.6.2 Experience with management and  
governance of trust fund contributions 
In the interviews, we asked about the experience with 
the different governing bodies, the extent of German 
involvement and the possibility to set a “German 
Agenda”. We also asked about the experience with 
staff exchange and with reporting requirements.
A) Governing bodies
From the German perspective, there is no a priori 
preferred governance structure. Yet, as for the eight 
case studies Germany mostly engages in three-tier 
structures. Variations include presence of recipient 
countries, existence of independent expert commit-
tees and bank-internal technical teams for secretariat 
and work plan related functions. In general, gover-
nance bodies were more complex in case of partner-
ships as they included also recipients and civil society 
representatives. Overall, interviewees were satisfied 
with the way Germany was involved by the World 
Bank in the management of TFs. Only in one case, 
the German participation in TF decision making was 
only vaguely defined in the AA and no Steering Com-
mittee was put in place. However, in the majority of 
cases, governance settings are clear and Germany 
participates in TF decisions via the governance bod-
ies. Again, in all cases the importance of informal 
exchange was mentioned, both for preparing par-
ticipation in formal governance bodies (preparatory 
calls with participating members) and for “comple-
menting” participation in formal governance bodies. 
As one project manager put it: “I get all my important 
information by calling the TF manager, not from the 
Steering Committee.”
From the World Bank’s perspective, generally the 
World Bank promotes a light version of governance 
arrangements. This particularly holds for Umbrel-
la Facilities. The World Bank argues that in addition 
to the TF governance bodies there is always a World 
Bank-internal governance system for review and 
control. This usually includes peer reviews for sector 
expertise and oversight, management control and 
accounting control as well as other safeguards. There-
fore, there is never an absence of governance, even 
in a case in which it was not defined with the donor. 
Nevertheless, the specific governance system of a TF 
is negotiable and depends on the type of TF and its 
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size – particularly with regard to number of donors 
and additional partners in a global partnership – see 
chapter 2. 
B) Agenda setting: factors increasing leverage – in-
volvement and funding
From the German perspective, in many cases it was 
Germany that set the agenda or pushed certain topics 
that were considered important. In this regard, Ger-
man interviewees mentioned three success factors: 
involvement, funding, and donor coordination. In one 
case, GIZ was able to leverage its partner-orientation to 
truly enable the recipient countries to take ownership 
of the TF activities. Key to success was constant cam-
paigning and discussion in the Steering Committee 
meetings and beyond. It is important to note that in 
this case GIZ is a rather small contributor to the MDTF, 
but is perceived as very vocal as a sector project was 
set up solely to support the TF. In larger facilities, the 
amount of money seems to matter; one German inter-
viewee said that Germany was one of the important 
stakeholders primarily because of being among the top 
donors. However, others mentioned that a small donor 
can also take up a lot of air time in the meetings and 
hence push topics. 
In all cases the German side found the management 
of TFs very time-consuming. Even when the German 
participation is rather passive, the time requirements 
for follow-up and comments on all reports and deci-
sion-making documents are extensive. In one case, the 
MDTF governance bodies took decisions every year 
on its 32 work programs each accompanied with work 
plans and reporting. 
Earmarking, on the other hand, was in most cases not 
important for the German side. Most interviewees 
mentioned that this would not be in the best interest 
of the TF and would make harmonization more dif-
ficult. In any case, it is usually at best possible as “soft 
earmarking” (see footnote 29 for a definition of (soft) 
earmarking). 
From a World Bank perspective, German counter-
parts are perceived to participate more in collabora-
tion and technical inputs at the activity level rather 
than at the strategic level in Steering Committees. 
One interviewee concluded that “Germany does not 
want to be involved in agenda setting”.72 This was 
mentioned in the context of time investment and 
the extent to which German participants were vocal 
72 Source: interview.
in strategic level discussions, but also with regard to 
the amounts of German funds. Some TF managers 
observed a disconnect between the status of certain 
themes on the German development agenda versus 
the contribution amount and strategic involvement in 
corresponding thematic TFs. On the other hand, sev-
eral TF managers mentioned the good collaboration of 
World Bank and German counterparts on the activity 
and country level. 
In one case the TF manager mentioned that the more 
money donors put into the TF, the more openness 
there will be towards earmarking. An UF manager 
asserted that UFs were a means to establish a central 
overview of activities in a theme or sector and to align 
it with World Bank strategies, while reducing trans-
action cost and overhead. Should a donor wish to con-
tribute to a topic in a specific region or country, there 
are two options. The preferred option would be that a 
donor contributes to the UF and the specific country 
needs are included in the work program of the facility 
once their alignment has been confirmed by the sec-
tor board. Should this not be agreeable, the donor can 
provide funding through a regional MDTF or SDTF at 
the risk of fragmentation, loss of overview, and higher 
transaction cost from a World Bank point of view, but 
potentially higher influence of the individual donor.
Box 6: The “Malawi Public Finance and 
Economic Management Reform Program” 
(TF 71796)
The Malawi Public Finance and Economic Man-
agement Reform Program is a good example 
where German counterparts are leveraging their 
local expertise to influence the MDTF’s activities 
on the ground. The German TF Manager works 
closely with the Malawi Government on financial 
reform topics covered by the World Bank MDTF. 
With GIZ funding, work plans and activities are 
prepared with the Government and sometimes 
piloted. These plans and pilots are being taken up 
by the MDTF and implemented or scaled up. The 
German TF manager is in close contact with the 
World Bank counterpart. The close relationship 
with both Government and World Bank coun-
terparts allows the GIZ manager to leverage the 
MDTF funding to push the local work and agenda 
to a degree that would not be feasible solely with 
bilateral funding.
Source: interview.
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C) Staff exchange73
According to the German perspective, staff exchange 
is a rather popular tool. In four of eight cases, Germa-
ny funded a secondment to the World Bank TF Secre-
73 Also called „co-execution“ by the World Bank.
tariat or a Consultant to the recipient partner of the 
MDTF. Although according to World Bank policies a 
seconded person cannot be directly involved in deci-
sions on financing proposals from the donor that has 
seconded the staff member or deal with financing for 
Box 7: Results Framework
RFs are perceived as important but also challenging both on the German and the World Bank side. The following 
table summarizes the most prominent views.
Source: joyn-coop based on interviews.
Going forward, the following options seem most opportune for the German side: 
• Agree informally by when the RF will be established and how and it will be ensured that the latest  
version will be made accessible to all sides (e.g. through a link in Client Connection);
• Discuss the option of referencing the existence of an RF in the AA;
• Recognize that the RF is a living document and adaptation to changing circumstances are likely and  
desirable;
• Engage in informal consultations on RF standardization and reporting with CFPTO;
• Budget funding for follow-up evaluation of outcomes in the TF.
Source: joyn-coop based on interviews.
Table 6: German and World Bank perspectives on the Results Framework
Premise There should be a RF at the outset of  
each TF ensuring results orientation and  
it should be a binding reporting tool to 
ensure accountability
Each TF should have an RF but RF is a living 
document and methodological limitations 
should be recognized
World Bank is currently working on the stan-
dardization of RFs by type of TF, going about 
in the following order: 1) Co-financing and 
RETFs (through core-indicators and simpli-
fied core indicators) 2) BETFs and 3) Pro-
grammatic TFs and Global Partnerships
TF set-up phase 
- inclusion of 
RF in AA
Inclusion of the RF in the AA desirable: 
• Makes it a binding instrument for  
reporting
• Ensures that the RF is anchored  
and accessible
Inclusion of a RF in the AA not desirable: 
• Will require an amendment to the AA 
each time there is a change to RF
• Activities might not be known from the 
outset (programmatic TFs) and the es-
tablishment of meaningful indicators 
can be a methodological challenge at 
time AA is written
TF implementa-
tion phase
Only a number of TFs have RFs, which are 
held by the World Bank and sometimes 
updated without the knowledge of the 
donors
Even if not part of the AA, RFs usually exist 
and are shared in annual reports to the do-
nors
Methodological 
aspects
TFs should be measured like projects on 
the outcome level
• Given short lifecycle of TFs, outcomes 
are difficult to measure within TF  
lifetime
• Costs for evaluations outside the TF  
lifecycle are not borne by donors. 
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specific purposes defined by the donor,74 it was con-
sidered very helpful by the German side in all cases. 
This was mainly due to the direct communication 
channel to World Bank but also better insight into the 
daily work of the TF Secretariat. 
From a World Bank perspective, feedback on staff ex-
change was also positive in all cases. Know-how and 
additional human resources were highly appreciated. 
The World Bank also underlined that secondments 
strengthened communication with the donor.
D) Reporting requirements
From the German perspective, the degree of satis-
faction with narrative and financial reporting was 
mixed. Criticism centered on the lack of problem fo-
cus and impact orientation. While impact orientation 
is required in German reporting to BMZ, World Bank 
finds this difficult to implement because of the short 
life cycles of TFs. When interviewees were satisfied 
with the quality of the reports, it was often attributed 
to the experience and know-how of the TF manager or 
the extent to which donors can contribute. RFs were 
highly appreciated, however, the process of agreeing 
on them with World Bank was described as difficult 
(see box 7). 
From the World Bank’s perspective, it was clear that 
there is flexibility on reporting at the informal level. 
While there is (bi)annual standard reporting, World 
Bank counterparts will furnish information also 
with an adapted format to donors. If required, Ger-
man counterparts can ask for additional information. 
This can happen as part of a qualitative section in the 
reporting format at TF set-up or informally, when 
specific information is needed. German counterparts 
should keep in mind, however, that this does present a 
burden to the administrative team and should be lim-
ited to essential information required by the donor. 
74 This is the explanation from practice in the Global Part-
nership for Education (GPE). The wording of the staff rule 
is as follows: „In accordance with the relevant Staff Rule, 
it is the responsibility of the hiring manager to ensure 
that there are no conflicts of interest associated with the 
hiring of a specific individual. Specifically, staff financed 
by external funds (i) may not be involved in any way in the 
administration of the funds of the same member govern-
ment, foundation or NGO in which they were employed, 
for up to five (5) years after said employment, and (ii) may 
not use their employment with the Bank to gain special 
favors or benefits for the member government, foundation 
or NGO. Staff should also refer to Staff Manual General 
Obligations of Staff Members.“
3.6.3 Interviewee assessment of trust fund 
success 
Finally, we asked about a general assessment of TF 
success, first without indicating any criteria and in a 
second step according to the criteria of the Paris Dec-
laration (German perspective) and the World Bank 
internal criteria of additionality, relevance of TF ob-
jective and transaction costs (World Bank perspective, 
see also chapter 4 for an explanation of the criteria).
A) Overall assessment
From the German perspective, most cases were con-
sidered a success (some fully, some partly) and a cou-
ple are not far enough into implementation to draw a 
conclusion but experienced some hick-ups in the set-
up phase. This was partly attributed to the fact that 
the original motivation for participating in the TFs 
was achieved (e.g. benefiting from the network; World 
Bank instruments improved), partly that the TF’s ob-
jectives were achieved (e.g. improving education). An 
important success factor seems to be the quality of 
the TF manager and also the continuity of staff at the 
World Bank.
From the World Bank’s perspective, TFs were gener-
ally seen as a non-bureaucratic and additional tool to 
reach goals in knowledge creation and dissemination 
and in implementing pilots. It was also mentioned 
that some initiatives have grown so much and the TF 
has achieved agenda setting to a degree that govern-
ments and donors cannot afford not to be part of the 
initiative. However, there were also cases in which the 
sustainability of the work in the absence of TFs was 
questioned. In one case in particular it was mentioned 
that it is not clear if the type of analytical work would 
continue without a TF due to a flat budget for analyti-
cal work. Another issue mentioned was that while TFs 
are used for co-financing and to prepare lending work, 
for some topics, recipient countries do not want to use 
IDA anymore. This is because IDA operations require a 
lengthy preparation process, more scrutiny and might 
require the Government to pay interest. Donors there-
fore rather ask for TF grants, which are less bureau-
cratic and free of charge to the Government.
B) According to Paris Declaration and  
World Bank Criteria
From the German perspective, criteria of the Paris 
Declaration were mostly met. This is especially true 
for donor alignment and harmonization thanks to 
governing bodies unifying all donors and good infor-
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mal communication. Results are mixed for owner-
ship where it was sometimes criticized that recipients 
were not present in governing bodies or trust-funded 
activities were not sufficiently anchored in recipient 
countries. Yet, especially in case of RETFs recipients 
play an active role. For fragile states it was stressed 
that an exit strategy for the TF that clearly indicates 
how the recipient country could continue the activi-
ties after TF closure is important. As for results orien-
tation, responses were equally mixed mostly because 
of insufficient results monitoring (see box 7 on Results 
Framework). 
From the World Bank’s perspective, TFs can often 
help to reduce transaction cost, especially when they 
are used for co-financing where they do not finance 
stand-alone activities but there is administrative cost 
sharing with other sources of finance. World Bank 
interviewees felt that particularly for the donor, the 
transaction cost for TF is very low. Some projects rated 
government ownership as very high where no fund-
ing is allocated without a government plan (sector 
plan or budget creation by government). For other TFs 
the World Bank recognized that the German counter-
parts would have wished more ownership by the re-
cipients. TFs are seen as an effective tool for harmoni-
zation, especially where initiatives grow and more and 
more donors and governments are on board. Align-
ment is seen as a critical point in some TFs where 
there is general skepticism whether countries should 
engage in activities that are highly risky. Regarding 
results it was pointed out, that given the pilot charac-
ter of some TFs, the learning process in itself should 
be seen as an important result.
3.7 Summary of observations
Based on the case study analysis, a few aspects were 
identified that seem particularly important for 
smooth TF setup and for managing and achieving 
objectives such as agenda-setting. However, German 
and World Bank perspectives are not fully aligned on 
these aspects.
A) Experience with and knowledge about TFs
• The more experience World Bank counterparts 
had with TFs, the more responsive and transpar-
ent they were perceived by their German part-
ners;  
• Institutional history on individual TFs is im-
portant for smooth management, however dif-
ficult to preserve due to frequent job rotation on 
both sides;
• Knowing the standard template of AAs with ne-
gotiable and non-negotiable sections is helpful 
during the negotiation process to prevent “bat-
tles” that cannot be won by the German side;
• More information about the diverse options for 
governance setups of TFs would help determine 
the most appropriate model for each type of TF.
B) Size of contribution amount
• When initiating a new TF, the contribution 
amount plays an important role in Germany’s 
leverage on the scope of negotiations; 
• When joining an existing MDTF, the contri-
bution amount is not very important for agen-
da-setting according to German perspective;
• This is contradicted by some TF managers on the 
World Bank side, particularly in large programs 
for knowledge creation, where the funding 
amount gives the donor more weight in strategic 
discussions;
• As a result, German is not perceived as a donor 
leveraging TFs for agenda setting in knowl-
edge-creating networks but more effective at 
the country level interaction and influence on 
programs;
• Some TFs require a minimum contribution to 
“buy a seat at the table”. This might become 
more common, particularly for well-established 
TFs.
C) Human resources and expertise
• Human resources and time for participation in 
SC meetings are often seen as more important 
than contribution amount by the German side;
• According to World Bank officials, sufficient 
manpower and engagement to support strategic 
goals in SCs is important in addition to a high 
contribution amount;
• World Bank interviewees maintain that if Ger-
many was more vocal and would leverage fund-
ing more strategically in large programs, the in-
fluence could be much larger;
• In case of implementing TFs, technical expertise 
of German (local) teams can be leveraged for TF 
activities; 
• Staff exchange was in all cases appreciated by 
the World Bank and fostered informal commu-
nication, but it only had limited potential to 
push the own agenda.
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D) Informal communication and  
relationship building
• Good informal communication is key for access 
to information and agenda-setting;
• Decisions taken by the Steering Committee are 
to a large extent prepared and pre-empted by in-
formal discussions among donors and with the 
World Bank;
• From a German perspective, relationship build-
ing with other donors is also important in order 
to build strategic alliances during Steering Com-
mittee meetings;
• According to the World Bank, Germany is some-
times perceived as a quiet donor with less infor-
mal interaction, particularly on strategic topics, 
hence loosing influencing power;
• However, country level interaction with Ger-
man specialists is very much appreciated by the 
World Bank and can influence activities on the 
ground;
• Informal arrangements are often appreciated 
by World Bank counterparts as these give them 
with more flexibility; sometimes it can be even 
counterproductive to request formal arrange-
ments, e.g. inclusion of specific reporting re-
quirements into the AA, which are however fea-
sible at the informal level.

4 Summary assessments of the World Bank and 
German trust fund portfolios
Based on the aggregate analysis of the World Bank 
and German TF portfolio in chapter 2 and the in-
depth analysis of the German stakeholders and the 
case studies in chapter 3, this chapter provides a 
summary assessment of the World Bank TF portfo-
lio and of the German portfolio in particular. Based 
on this assessment, we point out the key challenges 
in the German TF portfolio that our recommenda-
tions will address in the following chapter. 
4.1 Assessment of the trust fund port- 
folio of the World Bank 
The effectiveness of TFs as a financing mechanism 
for World Bank activities is typically assessed in 
view of the appropriateness of TFs. The underly-
ing question is under what circumstances TFs add 
value as a distinct development financing vehicle. 
The criteria for measuring appropriateness of TFs 
include (A) additionality, (B) relevance of TF objec-
tives, and (C) distinctiveness of TF contributions.75 
These criteria have also been used in an evaluation 
by World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group 
(IEG) of the overall TF portfolio at the World Bank 
in 2011.76 The following assessment is based on this 
evaluation as well as on our interview findings. 
A) Additionality: This is measured as the degree to 
which TF resources add to the overall aid envelope 
that is available to recipient countries. IEG states 
that except for the United States, donors draw their 
budgets for TFs from their overall aid envelopes; 
hence, it is debatable whether TFs have mobilized 
new and additional aid. Yet, in a few cases, TFs have 
mobilized aid from non-ODA sources. While cred-
ible counterfactuals are difficult to establish, it 
seems that TFs tend to replace core-bi aid more than 
they replace core-multi aid.77 Our own interviews 
75 IEG (2011): 26-40. Additionality refers to TFs as a financing 
source which does not draw on other ODA sources, while 
relevance looks at the thematic focus of TFs and distinctive-
ness at the programmatic value add of TFs as an instrument 
that can be used for activities where other sources of funding 
can’t be.
76 It has to be noted that IEG only evaluated the appropriateness 
of the TF instrument and not the success of the trust-funded 
projects.
77 IEG (2011): xvi, 26.
suggest that especially donor countries with weak 
bilateral implementation capacity at recipient coun-
try level tend to channel bilateral aid through TFs 
at the World Bank to pool resources for a common 
purpose and to economize on their own adminis-
trative budgets (e.g., DFID).
B) Relevance: TFs are increasingly relevant for the 
World Bank, given their increasing alignment with 
its core agenda. In particular, most TFs support 
country priorities identified in the relevant CASs. 
Most of those funds support individual recipient 
countries. Other TFs are established as global pro-
grams which support multiple recipient countries 
and whose thematic priorities have become increas-
ingly salient for the World Bank.78
C) Distinctiveness: TFs make distinct contributions 
in three areas of activity: (i) country-level invest-
ments, to scale up existing operations such as in 
co-financing TFs, to assist fragile countries through 
MDTFs, or to promote the provision of global public 
goods at the country level through thematic TFs; 
(ii) technical assistance and knowledge generation, 
thereby adding value to Country Assistance Strat-
egies, typically through BETFs; and (iii) piloting of 
innovation, for which it would be difficult for the 
World Bank to mobilize core funding given its rel-
ative cost-intensity and its risks.79 In sum, IBRD/
IDA TFs in these three areas have expanded the 
scope of World Bank work and thereby contributed 
to organizational growth over the last two decades. 
In addition, the World Bank established FIFs as a 
new business line, adding a stable source of revenue 
from the provision of financial trustee services to 
those funding mechanisms (as well as partial imple-
mentation under FIFs). 
78 Ibid.: 27-29.
79 IEG (2011): 29-40.
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Table 7: Summary assessment according to IEG criteria
Overall World Bank portfolio German TF portfolio
Additionality
Global additionality questionable, crowding out rather 
of core-bi aid than core-multi aid
No additional funding 
Relevance
Increasingly relevant for IBRD/IDA due to increasing 
alignment with core agendas
Most relevant through its support of country TFs
Distinctiveness
Global programs (i.e., thematic funds) as new business, 
critical support at the country level (i.e., co-financing 
TFs and country-level MDTFs), piloting TFs (i.e., BETFs)
Most distinctive in country-level TFs; to a lesser degree, 
establishment of new instruments at the World Bank
Source: IEG (2011).
4.2 Evaluation of the German trust fund 
portfolio 
While these general findings also apply to the Ger-
man portfolio as part of the general TF portfolio at 
the World Bank, we specifically assess the German 
portfolio in this section. In order to do so, we assess 
the German engagement in view of the three guiding 
principles for German multilateral development pol-
icy that form the current strategic orientation for all 
forms of cooperation with MAIs.80 Their overall ob-
jective is to put the “BMZ on track towards cooperat-
ing more effectively in future with a smaller number 
of more efficient organizations, and conveying its 
interests and positions in a targeted and proactive 
manner in the international arena”.81
A) Effective cooperation with multilateral organi-
zations in an efficient international development 
architecture: In this regard, Germany seeks to curb 
fragmentation and achieve an improved division of 
labor between the multilateral and bilateral level. 
The German TF portfolio with its relatively small 
number of 49 TFs does not contribute to fragmen-
tation to a large extent. The overall number and 
contributions to TFs increased strongly over the last 
ten years, but this can be attributed to the overall 
increase in TFs. Especially when looking at the dif-
ferent types of TFs, Germany compares favorably 
to the World Bank average. It has a focus on MDTFs 
and is fully aligned with the World Banks alloca-
tion of funds to RETFs and BETFs. This is likely to 
result from Germany’s approach to refrain from ear-
marking. In addition, Germany is co-funding one of 
80 BMZ (2013a).
81 BMZ (2013a): 5.
the four umbrellas and is thus supporting a new TF 
tool that will further decrease fragmentation at the 
World Bank.
However, the German TF portfolio is spread over a 
large variety of topics, as shown in chapter 3. Closely 
related to this is the fact that Germany’s contribu-
tions are fragmented with 70% below USD 5 million. 
This certainly reduces efficiency, as transaction costs 
for small contributions are relatively higher for the 
World Bank compared to larger contributions. This 
also applies to the German side: even with a small 
contribution, a considerable time investment is re-
quired to successfully participate in TFs. In summa-
ry, there should be potential to reduce fragmentation 
in the German TF portfolio.
On a more general level, we find that effective coop-
eration is strained by the current relatively low level 
of knowledge about TFs and TF management among 
the German stakeholders. This leads to misunder-
standings and delays during the set-up of TFs and the 
sub-optimal use of (time)-resources during the man-
agement of TFs. 
B) Systematic and targeted agenda-setting at inter-
national level: In this regard, Germany aims at being 
considered an honest broker and being identified 
with selected themes.82  In the German TF portfo-
lio, the topic climate change clearly stands out as a 
German priority. The case interviews revealed that 
on this topic Germany is perceived as very knowl-
edgeable and vocal partner. However, with regard 
to much of the rest of the portfolio, Germany does 
not make effective use of knowledge-creating TFs. 
82 BMZ (2013a): 9.
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The analysis showed that Germany invests relatively 
small amounts of money in a large number of TFs. 
This means that Germany foregoes the opportunity 
to more effectively push its focus topics. This is ex-
acerbated by the finding that often Germany is not 
perceived as present in strategic level discussions, 
both on formal and informal levels. This is particu-
larly true for knowledge-creating TFs in large pro-
grams. There are two types of evidence for this ob-
servation. One is our quantitative analysis of average 
contribution amounts, which shows that sometimes 
funding is low in areas where Germany publicly an-
nounced its political interest. The second is that the 
participation is rather cautious in Steering Commit-
tees, while other donors are more vocal and clear 
about their objectives. There are TFs in which this 
is not the case and where German agenda-setting is 
strong. However, these are mostly country level TFs 
where activity and strategic levels are more closely 
interlinked. The rare exceptions to this rule are at 
the programmatic level. The perception of Germa-
ny as a quiet donor was not only mentioned in the 
case study interviews, but also by interviewees on 
the overall TF portfolio level. Germany has so far en-
gaged less than other donors in informal TF consul-
tations and showed less presence in discussions with 
CFPTO. The above leads us to conclude that there is a 
certain lack of engagement in TF strategic level dis-
cussions. 
C) Pro-development interlocking of bilateral and 
multilateral aid: In this regard, Germany seeks to 
enhance efficiency of its development cooperation 
by coordinating and interlocking bilateral and mul-
tilateral engagement to create a win-win situation 
for both sides.83  In the overall German TF portfolio, 
this objective is already partly achieved through 
Germany’s effective participation in implementing 
TFs. Here, Germany is effectively scaling bilateral 
activities. Cases like Malawi (see box 6) showed that 
TFs were leveraged to bring other donors on board to 
finance activities which were prepared by recipient 
governments with support of German bilateral aid 
or which directly complemented activities financed 
by Germany. In addition, the strong involvement in 
fragile states supports this view. TFs are being used 
in countries and regions that cannot be sufficiently 
served through the BMZ bilateral portfolio, either 
because there is no official development aid (Zimba-
bwe) or because partner structures are not yet fully 
restored after violent conflicts or weather-related 
disasters. 
83 BMZ (2013a): 10.
4.3 Summary of key challenges
In summary, we would like to highlight four key chal-
lenges, which we derive from our assessment and 
which we will address in the next chapter: A) Fragmen-
tation B) Lack of Engagement and C) Lack of strategic 
direction, D) Lack of centralized TF information.
A) Fragmentation: As the above analysis indicates, 
there is room for improvement with regard to fragmen-
tation, especially in view of limited funding for a high 
number of TFs and different topics.
B) Lack of engagement: Germany is not perceived as 
present on a strategic level. This is particularly true for 
knowledge-creating TFs and concerns both monetary 
as well as vocal engagement. 
C) Lack of strategic direction: Both fragmentation and 
lack of engagement may be related to our finding that 
there is no ex-ante collective decision-making process 
for TF contributions governed by a common strategy. 
This is especially true at the overall portfolio level – as 
there is no guiding principle or strategy in place for the 
combined allocation decision of all TF contributions 
(BMZ, GIZ and KfW). With regard to the individual 
institutions, lack of strategy applies to a different de-
gree. It is less important for KfW, given that its primary 
use of Financial Cooperation (FC) for TFs in support of 
fragile states represents a quasi-strategy. With regard 
to Technical Cooperation (TC) it seems that BMZ’s de-
cision making is driven by different strategies of the 
individual sector and regional regions. With regard to 
FiT, a collective decision-making is already in place to 
a certain extent due to the final approval by the state 
secretary. However, there is currently no ex-ante prior-
itization of certain topics in place for the FiT allocation, 
but the existing process is currently under discussion.
D) Lack of centralized TF information: The 49 TFs are 
managed by a several divisions in three different orga-
nizations. In addition, in all three organizations there 
is a relatively high frequency of internal job rotations. 
Therefore, TFs are frequently set up by persons with-
out previous TF experience. It may thus happen that 
several people are responsible for managing a TF over 
its lifecycle, making it difficult to retain related knowl-
edge. The lack of institutional history is so far not bal-
anced out by centralized information provided through 
a central TF unit responding to questions or a written 
guideline providing support. There is also no institu-
tionalized central overview of the status of the German 
TF portfolio held by either BMZ, GIZ or KfW.

5 Opportunities to further develop  
the German trust fund portfolio
In this chapter we present our recommendations ad-
dressing the challenges outlined above. The re-com-
mendations focus on the following three key aspects 
(i) potential consolidation of the German TF portfolio, 
(ii) more strategic and effective future contributions 
to TFs at the World Bank, and (iii) refining Germany’s 
position as a World Bank shareholder towards the TF 
reform agenda. 
5.1 Opportunities for consolidation
In order to clarify the consolidation opportunities, we 
briefly revisit the legal foundations for consolidation 
at the World Bank as well as on the German side. 
5.1.1 Legal foundations 
Requirements for consolidation at the World Bank 
We start off with some key terms needed to elaborate 
on the main aspects of consolidation.
• “Closing date84” specified in the sunset clause: 
Especially the earlier TFs do not have a pre-
defined end date or the end date lies far in the 
future. Without a closing date, the TTL needs 
to ask for the fund to legally close.85  If a closing 
date is defined, the TF legally closes within 30 
days after this date.86
• Status shows as “active” in the database: The Cli-
ent Connection database designates a TF as ac-
tive or legally closed. It is to be noted that due to 
system issues any MDTF that Germany officially 
exited would still be shown as active, as long as 
other donors are contributing and the closing 
84 Also called “end-disbursement date” in the AA.
85 The TTL initiates action for closure when the TF activities 
are completed. CTR cancels any unused funds, ensures the 
disposition of all cancelled funds in accordance with the 
legal agreements, and prepares any required final financial 
statements; see World Bank (2012c): 58.
86 At the disbursing account level, the closing date is set out in 
the Grant Agreement and should be no less than six months 
prior to the end-disbursement date in the AA. For BETFs, 
arrangements on closing dates and/or final dates of dis-
bursements are governed by the Administration Agreement 
between the Bank and donors. Normally there is a 4-month 
grace period between the closing date of the BETF and the 
end-disbursement date of the AA; see World Bank (2012c): 58.
date has not been reached. Therefore, a TF may 
be shown as active in the list of German contri-
butions only because the TF itself is still active, 
not because Germany is still participating.
• “Dormant” fund: TFs, which are legally open but 
where no activities are funded anymore are con-
sidered dormant. 
Now, the various options for withdrawing from a TF 
hinge upon the actual flows of funds as are depict-
ed in diagram 24. When a donor wants to exit a TF, it 
matters whether the donor has already paid its con-
tribution fully or partly, as well as whether the World 
Bank has already committed the funds to the recip-
ient. Usually before exiting a TF, the donor needs to 
fully pay his contribution and only then can be repaid 
its pro-rata share of the funds that have not yet been 
committed.
Another aspect to consider is that the closing proce-
dure can be particularly cumbersome for the World 
Bank in case of MDTFs. A MDTF can legally be closed 
only once the remaining balance of donor contribu-
tions is reimbursed to all the donors on a pro-rata ba-
sis. There are a number of TFs for which one or more 
contributing donors have changed the institutional 
structure of the contributing entity and the original 
donor account does not exist anymore. When the new 
entity does not have the right to receive funds, it stalls 
the process for all donors in the MDTF. The World 
Bank is aware of these cases and is looking for a legal 
and procedural solution for closing these TFs.87
87 Now it is possible to choose to roll remaining funds over 
into IDA. Old TFs did not have this option, which causes the 
stalling of the closing process.
Diagram 24: Flow of funds – donor –  
           trust fund – recipient
Source: joyn-coop.
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Donors generally have two options when exiting an 
active TF before it has been closed:
1. Cancellation of the AA by invoking the standard 
provisions on cancellation in order to receive its 
pro-rate share of uncommitted funds. The donors 
must notify the World Bank at least three months 
prior to cancellation. 
2. Send an Exit Letter (disseminated by the World 
Bank in April 2012). The standard provision of 
this letter is as follows: “The donor hereby waives 
any rights to receive (i) its pro-rata share of any 
remaining uncommitted balance of the TF as of 
the Cancellation Date; (ii) its pro-rata share of 
any remaining balance of the TF as of the final 
end-disbursement date; and (iii) any funds that 
the donor may be entitled to receive after the 
end-disbursement date of the TF. In addition, the 
donor hereby instructs the Bank to transfer to 
IDA […] any funds under (ii) and (iii) […]”. 
Usually, option 1 should suffice. An Exit Letter is only 
necessary a) when the donor does not want to receive 
any funds back but instead wants to roll funds over 
to IDA, and b) when TFs date from a time when there 
were no standard provisions on fund withdrawals in 
the AA. 
Requirements for consolidation in Germany 
There are no other German legal requirements for 
formally exiting active TFs (as described above by can-
cellation or withdrawal letter) other than what is stip-
ulated in the AA. The German budget law („Bunde-
shaushaltsordnung“) §44 can serve as a reason to exit 
TFs as it requires that allocations to institutions (“Zu-
wendungen”) are used in an earmarked way (“zweck-
entsprechend”).88 “Earmarked” in this sense means 
utilization for agreed upon purposes. This does not 
mean that earmarking for specific activities within 
the TF is required but merely that stipulated purposes 
of the TF are adhered to. Otherwise, Germany has the 
right to withdraw the funds.  
5.1.2 Potential for consolidation
The World Bank is currently updating its procedures 
to be able to close down some TFs where neither the 
donor nor the World Bank work on or monitors the 
underlying program anymore. It is foremost in this 
88 BMJ (2013).
context, that there is potential to consolidate the cur-
rent German TF portfolio.
In general, disbursements from the German portfolio 
are progressing in a timely fashion. CFPTO explains 
that this is due to the general reticence regarding ear-
marking in German contributions (particularly true 
since Germany is engaged mostly in MDTFs) and since 
the World Bank mechanisms can be considered most 
efficient for allocation of funds. For the World Bank 
it is hence easier to disburse. Nevertheless, a few TFs 
in the German portfolio can be considered inactive, 
either because they are beyond closing date or because 
they are dormant for other reasons. The following 
measures are therefore recommended:
1. Clean the databank from TFs that appear active 
in the databank although they have already been 
closed (bugs in the system):
2. Formally close the TFs that are beyond closing 
date and those that are without closing date but 
are actually dormant. In both cases, the World 
Bank will request administrative closure from its 
central units on behalf of the donor.
In the process of writing this study, the issue of dor-
mant funds has been addressed with CFPTO. As a re-
sult, seven TFs will likely be closed in the near future. 
There is no further need for action from the German 
side, except for possibly a follow-up with CFPTO on a 
few unresolved cases. The German TF portfolio is con-
sequently expected to shrink from 49 to 42 TFs (-15%). 
For the future, it is recommended that division 411 
regularly (maybe once a year) researches the Client 
Connection database for older TFs with no apparent 
activity (e.g. look at development of disbursement 
rate) and then enquires with CFPTO for clarification. 
This way, the German portfolio can be kept clear of 
dormant funds. It is important to note, that only when 
the TF is not dormant, Germany must pro-actively 
inform World Bank about its desire to exit a TF. This 
is usually handled between the person on the German 
side responsible for the TF and the World Bank (TF 
manager or TTL). 
Apart from this administrative consolidation, it is also 
possible to programmatically consolidate the German 
portfolio, for example by reducing the number of top-
ics. However, we are not recommending such consol-
idation in the ongoing TF contributions as there are 
apparently no cases of overlapping or redundant TFs. 
Furthermore, each individual TF would have to be 
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examined in order to make such a decision. Finally, it 
would have to be evaluated in each case whether the 
existence of specific additional benefits that are not 
evident from the outside would oppose consolidation 
(e.g., development or political rationale, complemen-
tarities with and leverage of German development 
cooperation projects, or access to an expert network). 
Instead, we recommend a new engagement policy, 
which would also lead to a programmatically consol-
idated TF portfolio going forward. This engagement 
policy is described in the following section.
5.2 Proposal for a trust fund engagement 
strategy
The future TF engagement strategy should result in 
an overarching approach regarding contribution and 
allocation decisions as well as a more effective and 
efficient engagement. In our recommendation, we 
therefore address both the macro level (“on which 
type of TFs should Germany concentrate and why?”), 
as well as the micro level (“how to manage the indi-
vidual TFs?”). 
5.2.1 Macro-level strategy (overall trust 
fund selection)
As described in chapter 3, there is so far no underlying 
strategic process for the overall decision in which TFs 
Germany should become involved. With regards to 
TC and FC, the sector units and regional units of BMZ 
take the decision. Regarding FiT, there is even an allo-
cation competition within BMZ between the different 
sector units and regional units. For FiT, a more strate-
gic approach is currently being developed. However, 
this budget line makes up just about 13% of the total 
German TF portfolio.89 Therefore, an overarching 
strategy is required. This strategy should allow a col-
lective decision-making process among the German 
stakeholders as well as joint planning of the different 
funding sources to achieve a more coherent approach 
to TF contributions.
For the collective decision-making process, the same 
objectives should apply that underpin Germany’s po-
sition toward multilateral aid:90 (i) Effective cooper-
ation with multilateral organizations in an efficient 
international development architecture; (ii) Systemat-
ic and targeted agenda-setting at international level; 
89 Looking just at the contributions directly held by BMZ, FiT 
accounts for about 1/3 of the BMZ TF portfolio in terms of 
volume.
90 BMZ (2013a).
and (iii) Pro-development interlocking of bilateral and 
multilateral aid. Nonetheless, the budgetary require-
ments for TC and FC (as a bilateral aid instrument) ap-
ply also to TFs.91 
Based on these objectives we propose a two-stage de-
cision-making process for the overall TF selection. 
1. With regard to (i) it should be assessed if TFs are 
indeed the right instrument for a particular top-
ic or country or if the objectives can be better 
achieved by participation in World Bank deci-
sion-making bodies as shareholder (e.g. through 
special themes in IDA). See also annex 7 for a gen-
eral discussion of arguments for and against TFs. 
2. With regard to (ii) and (iii), it should be assessed 
how Germany can best be involved in knowl-
edge-creating TFs and in implementing TFs. The 
TF strategy should allow an informed decision 
for both types of TF on the basis of the respec-
tive opportunities and corresponding German 
strengths. 
Germany’s portfolio of knowledge-creating TFs is 
currently too fragmented to really leverage its poten-
tial. Knowledge-creating TFs offer the opportunity 
to shape development topics and related instruments 
and to influence also the related World Bank develop-
ment networks. However, in order to allow for agenda 
setting, they require (i) a contribution amount suffi-
cient to give Germany a strong voice and backing in 
SC meetings and informal channels, (ii) broad political 
support within Germany underpinned with discus-
sions and meetings between the German government 
officials and the World Bank, and (iii) expertise for 
assuming thought leadership and act as a valued dis-
cussion partner (preferably not only BMZ experts but 
also academics whose publications are disseminated 
and used or who speak at the World Bank). We there-
fore recommend that Germany concentrates on se-
lected knowledge-creating TFs. The selection should 
be based on development policy priorities and areas of 
specific German expertise. 
With regard to implementing TFs, Germany is al-
ready leveraging its potential to a large extent. 
Nonetheless, there is room for improvement. Im-
plementing TFs offer the opportunity to leverage 
the country-level engagement of bilateral German 
91 See „Leitlinien für die bilaterale Finanzielle und Technische 
Zusammenarbeit mit Kooperationsländern der deutschen 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit“.
 50
development cooperation. However, complementary 
bilateral projects and specific country-level knowl-
edge are required to fully unfold this potential. As 
described earlier, implementing TFs are also used 
when “normal” development cooperation does not 
work (fragile states). We recommend, that Germany 
continues its strategy to support multiple imple-
menting TFs. The selection should however be more 
conscious so that TF selection is driven by the poten-
tial to leverage bilateral aid and increase interlocking 
of bi- and multilateral aid. 
In order to implement such an overarching strategy, 
we recommend a high-level workshop (every three 
years) to agree on the few knowledge-creating TFs or 
topics (perspective of eight to ten years) as well as on 
the overall (macro-level) TF strategy. Additionally, 
we recommend the preparation of a policy paper that 
sets out the strategic TF choices and requirements 
(e.g. also the various budgetary obligations of the dif-
ferent funding sources). This policy paper will serve 
to inform the different stakeholders in BMZ, GIZ and 
KfW and facilitate a collective TF decision process.
Furthermore, we recommend a strategic selection 
of the available German funding instruments, to 
use the most suitable for different types of TFs. For 
example, it is debatable whether FiT is the right in-
strument for a knowledge-creating TF given its lim-
ited volume. Only if used every year for the same 
two or three TFs (about USD 2 million annually), it 
would allow for a sufficiently important contribu-
tion amount over a longer period of time (for which 
an adequate agreement with the World Bank would 
need to be found, e.g. Letter of Intent indicating the 
long-term contribution amount). On the other hand, 
sector projects of Technical Cooperation may be 
suitable funding instruments as there is not per se 
a funding limit. Furthermore, the projects usually 
involve a significant degree of expertise and human 
resources that could also be invested into the TF. 
However, as described above, the TF-contribution 
must suit the overall bilateral TC program objective 
and can only be a subordinated element within the 
larger TC program.
A process should be implemented that brings to-
gether the input from all relevant divisions to assess 
which of German funding instruments should be se-
lected for the planned TF contributions. This process 
should ideally precede the annual budget planning 
process.92
92 The so called „Rahmenplanung“.
5.2.2 Micro-level strategy (better manage 
individual trust funds)
In order to achieve a more effective and efficient 
engagement on the level of each individual TF, Ger-
many should prioritize to overcome the lack of cen-
tralized information on World Bank TFs and insti-
tutional history of all German institutions. 
First and foremost, all information on existing TFs 
must be gathered, preferably at division 411 of BMZ. 
This is a necessary step to initiate an overarching 
internal dialogue and to monitor key indicators 
such as portfolio fragmentation. If this is not possi-
ble, we recommend to at least involve BMZ division 
411 more systematically in the information flow in 
order to enable it to better respond to German TF 
managers’ needs.
In addition, we recommend to compile a handbook 
for German TF managers that provides general TF 
information (e.g., description of different types) and 
that informs the TF manager about “do’s and don’ts” 
when joining and managing a TF.93 Such micro-level 
guidance would be an important complement to the 
macro-level oversight and coordination headed by 
division 411. We would also recommend to inform 
German TF managers specifically about their “bar-
gaining space” when setting up a TF. First of all, the 
managers should be informed about standard AAs 
and the negotiable parts (see table 2 in chapter 2.4). 
More importantly, however, the managers should 
learn about (in)formal options in coordinating with 
World Bank teams in order to achieve good results. 
In the following, as opposed to the formal options 
in table 2, we discuss the key aspects that we have 
identified as effective practices in dealing with the 
World Bank side. 
a. Governing bodies: As described in chapter 2, 
there are different governance structures de-
pending on the type of TF. TF Managers should 
be aware of the typical tasks of the bodies of 
the multi-tier governance structures in order 
to make an informed choice about which struc-
ture they want to advocate. The more expertise 
and personnel resources are available, the more 
Germany can push to be part of the Technical 
Committee (or the body that is responsible for 
93 However, the handbook would not cover TC and FC specific 
procedural guidelines as it is more efficient if these are di-
rectly provided by GIZ and KfW to their employees. 
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the work plan). It is also important to know that 
the governance structures have different cost 
implications. The more tiers, the more cost-
ly, and thus the higher the administration fee. 
For example, in order to facilitate participation 
of all donors in a Technical Committee, more 
preparation from the World Bank side will be 
necessary and travel costs will increase.
b. Payment schedule: Payment in full ensures 
quick disbursement, enabling the World Bank 
to immediately use the funds if there is demand 
from program countries. It also reduces trans-
action costs. On the other hand, a split into 
several tranches follows the idea of just-in-time 
provision of funds for specific purposes and 
leaves the donor with some leverage over the 
yet undisbursed tranches. 
c. Management fee: As described above, the man-
agement fee varies with the governance struc-
ture. The administration fee is fixed according 
to the standard rules. Although the fee varies 
considerably among the different German TF 
contributions, there is no flexibility from the 
World Bank side. As part of the reform agenda 
fees will be further streamlined. However, al-
ready now (with a differentiated fee structure) 
it is not useful to negotiate about the fee. 
d. Reporting: This is an important tool for the 
German side to be properly informed and to 
be able to inform others. Formally, timing and 
frequency of reporting is only negotiable to a 
limited extend. Also, the overall structure of 
reports is usually given. It is however possible 
to ask for specific content in a sub-chapter or in 
informal, personal communication. 
e. Results framework: This is equally an import-
ant tool for the German side. It will very like-
ly not be possible to make it part of the AA. 
However, it will be possible to claim it (if it is 
not existent at all). Normally, it is not possible 
to co-create the framework, but it is possible 
to review and comment on it. See chapter 5.4 
for strategic recommendations to make the RF 
more binding.  
f. Audits and evaluations: Audits and evaluations 
are very standardized and it will only be pos-
sible to negotiate changes if the donor bears 
the costs. However, we did not come across any 
problems related to audits and evaluations and 
would recommend that the German side ac-
cepts the World Bank standards. 
There are some additional aspects that may facilitate 
the management of TFs during their implementation 
phase: 
g. Communication: Both sides should aim at in-
creasing direct interaction on all levels (TF level, 
board and council meetings). In addition, we rec-
ommend increasing also informal communica-
tion as this is useful to tackle issues on which the 
AA does not leave room for negotiation. Informal 
communication is also necessary to set the agen-
da in TF governing bodies.
h. Coordination with other donors: Seeking strate-
gic alliances with other donors can help strength-
en the own position. This will be helpful to push 
through certain topics in Steering Committee 
meetings for which Germany would otherwise 
not have sufficient clout (e.g. because of a small 
contribution amount).
i. Role of GEDO: Usually, TF Management should 
be the responsibility of BMZ in conjunction with 
GIZ or by KfW. GEDO will normally not be in-
volved, but should be kept informed about the 
German engagement. GEDO itself sees its role 
more in helping with trouble shooting and in sup-
porting the normal ongoing policy dialogue and 
conveying perspectives of other donors and the 
World Bank on specific topics (could potentially 
increase bargaining power).
j. Allocation of resources: As described earlier, the 
contribution amount has some influence on how 
much voice a donor gets. However, it is import-
ant to have sufficient resources to be able to fol-
low-up on the TF developments, to use them for 
agenda-setting or to make sure they are coherent 
with bilateral aid (implementing TFs). Therefore, 
sufficient time-commitment should be ensured 
throughout the whole TF life cycle.
In addition to these policy-level recommendations, 
there are a few technical aspects that can also in-
crease the efficiency of the German TF engagement. 
These aspects relate primarily to the Client Connec-
tion database and should be raised by division 411 
with CFPTO.  
• Match project numbers of German agencies and 
TF numbers at the World Bank in the Client 
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Connection database to make it easier to identi-
fy the respective TFs;
• Ask the World Bank to improve the usability of 
the Client Connection database (e.g., indicate in 
the main list which German institution is con-
tribution partner). 
5.3 Proposal for a trust fund reform agenda 
position
Germany is not only a donor to IDA and TFs, but also 
a shareholder of the World Bank. This donor-share-
holder duality applies to every OECD/DAC country. 
As an important shareholder of the World Bank, 
Germany must play an active role in the TF reform 
debate that will shape the future set-up of the orga-
nization. It is in the interest of the shareholder to re-
duce any burden that may arise from special needs or 
wishes by donors. On the other hand, the donor has 
an interest to see its interests represented. Since Ger-
many has gradually increased its engagement in TFs 
at the World Bank, as a donor it should have an inter-
est in TF policies that reflect German development 
priorities. Box 8 summarizes the current German 
position on TF reforms, which is based on an internal 
document of the BMZ.94
The World Bank has structured its reform agenda 
along four distinct pillars (see chapter 2.5). Each of 
those pillars is relevant for making TFs an integral 
part of the World Bank. However, pillar 2 (budget in-
tegration and business process alignment of TFs) as 
well as pillar 4 (senior oversight) mainly reflect areas 
in which the World Bank must extend the scope of its 
own operational rules to TFs. Those pillars thus do 
not necessarily need active involvement of donors. 
Accordingly, our focus is on the two remaining pil-
lars, pillar 1 (alignment) and pillar 3 (cost recovery). 
For both pillars, we describe in the following section 
how Germany is affected in its capacity as sharehold-
er and donor, and how it can develop a consolidated 
position based on its current TF reform position (see 
box 8) and its experience to date. Thus, albeit limited 
in scope, our proposal for a TF reform position ad-
dresses the most critical areas around which future 
debates will most likely evolve.
94 BMZ (2013b).
Box 8: The current German position on trust fund reforms
Germany supports the TF reform process while expecting further clarification on selected issues from the World 
Bank. German priorities on alignment are as follows:
• Selectivity in establishing TFs while further consolidating the existing TF portfolio; 
• Support of UFs, provided that they offer sufficient flexibility to donors, for example by sub-thematic  
windows; 
• More clarity on the future criteria on which the World Bank bases its acceptance of TFs. In particular,  
selectivity could be based on a quantifiable measure of fragmentation, complemented by the key  
requirement of sustainable development. 
In addition, Germany has formulated the following positions on the principles of oversight, transparency, and 
cost effectiveness:
• Internal control environment: Welcomes the past reforms to better integrate TFs into the overall budget, 
to enhance senior control over TFs, and to apply core operational procedures to TFs, given that TFs have 
evolved into a mainstream instrument of funding;  
• External reporting standards: Pushes for widely accessible RFs to be included in the AAs or equivalently  
anchored in the documentation, flanked by annual consultations with donors; 
• Supports simplification efforts on fee structures and incentives for larger TF contributions. 
Source: BMZ (2013b).
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5.3.1 Alignment
The World Bank seeks to align TFs with its core 
agenda. Alignment is not an end in itself, but rath-
er a means to ensure the long-term viability of the 
World Bank by maintaining its focus on core issues 
and limiting its scope of activities. Alignment also 
promises to reduce fragmentation, notably through 
standardizing governance agreements and stream-
lining World Bank-internal operational procedures. 
Germany is affected by the reforms in the area of 
alignment because it is a donor to the UFGE, which 
is a testing laboratory for umbrellas in general. 
Moreover, Germany may need to develop a position 
on alignment because World Bank management has 
identified this issue as a key priority in the reform 
process.
On the one hand, Germany as a shareholder sup-
ports increased alignment, because it enables the 
World Bank to fulfill its core mandates. Acknowl-
edging the specific needs of other donors, Germa-
ny argues in favor of a balance between the rigid 
approach through UFs and the flexible approach 
through TFs, possibly moving towards applying 
Umbrella Principles (see box 4). Indeed, if UFs are 
too rigid in that they do not even allow for soft 
earmarking, individual donors may reject them al-
together and either pursue SDTFs or turn to other 
MAIs with more lenient rules. Moreover, the sector 
focus of UFs tends to neglect the partner country 
perspective. The World Bank has recently proposed 
country umbrellas, for example for Myanmar, to ad-
dress this challenge.
On the other hand, Germany as a donor has an in-
terest in opportunities for soft earmarking as well 
as strategic participation. First of all, Germany fa-
vors soft earmarking through windows in UFs. This 
would provide Germany with enough flexibility to 
support specific sub-themes under a broad umbrella. 
However, Germany may not want to vet individual 
project proposals because of limited processing ca-
pacities on its own. Secondly, German stakeholders 
have expressed their desire to actively participate 
in UFs, including the possibilities to co-determine 
the work plan of UFs. This somewhat contrasts with 
current practice where the relevant Sector Board has 
a veto right in that it can refuse to implement prior-
ities collectively agreed by donors in the boards of 
UFs.
As part of a consolidated reform position, Germany 
should take the following position:
• Support soft earmarking through windows in 
UFs, and lever its influence to ensure strategic 
participation in UFs;
• Oppose proposals allowing micro-manage-
ment on the part of donors;
• Convince the World Bank that donors should 
obtain a veto right vis-à-vis the Sector Board;
• Promote county-UFs or comparable instru-
ments as a means to ensure partner orientation 
and leeway for country-specific activities;
• Be mindful that the tension between align-
ment and creativity is adequately balanced, 
creating awareness that there can be “good 
fragmentation” if it benefits partner countries.
Another issue related to alignment refers to RFs. 
This is of particular interest for German stakehold-
ers because German aid is focused on effectiveness 
and impact. 
In supporting the position of the World Bank, Ger-
many as a shareholder wants to avoid too much 
burden for the World Bank in terms of reporting. 
Donors are too impatient, while the World Bank is 
able to report on results only after three years when 
individual trust-funded projects are completed. The 
pressure for immediate results is unhealthy because 
it forces the World Bank to focus on outputs rather 
than outcomes, which are more relevant to assess 
development impact. 
Yet, on the issue of Results Frameworks, Germany 
takes the perspective of the donor. Accordingly, 
German agencies prefer formal commitments over 
informal agreements. Unlike the World Bank, Ger-
many wishes to formalize RFs in the relevant AAs. 
As part of a consolidated reform position, Germany 
should
• Be adamant to include a reference on a RF in 
the respective AAs (without necessarily devel-
oping it in the AAs);
• Insist on transparency of RFs and support the 
establishment of common procedures to adapt 
such frameworks if necessary;
• Find ways to ensure sufficient resources for 
the World Bank to cover its costs due to the 
results focus of TFs (this is easier in UFs, which 
endure individual TFs as they sustain a secre-
tariat for monitoring and evaluation of com-
pleted projects).
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A final issue on alignment pertains to standardized 
governance clauses. The World Bank seeks to for-
malize its relationships with donors and thereby 
increase the hurdles for tailored agreements, which 
affects German contributions in selected areas. 
Germany as a shareholder supports the World Bank 
in its move towards light governance that limits 
donor influence. Germany as a donor may support 
this position as it is not as much adversely affected 
as other donors in terms of their preferences for ear-
marking. However, more clarity would be required 
on what “light governance” actually means and 
what it implies in terms of actual participation op-
tions for TFs.
5.3.2 Efficiency and costs
Under the third reform pillar, the World Bank seeks 
to increase efficiency and to reduce costs of man-
aging TFs. This pillar is relevant for Germany be-
cause its current allocation profile to TFs may pose 
too high transaction costs on the World Bank for 
two reasons. First, while Germany contributes to 
only a low number of TFs, many of its contributions 
are relatively small, which raises the issue of size 
fragmentation. Second, the German development 
system involves a high number of actors, thereby in-
creasing institutional fragmentation. 
As a shareholder, Germany urges the World Bank 
to evaluate fragmentation, particularly through a 
quantifiable measure of fragmentation. Such a mea-
sure could help identify the extent of fragmentation 
due to TFs in specific sectors and thereby help guide 
the roadmap for further consolidation at the World 
Bank. In general, Germany supports measures 
aimed at reducing transaction costs for the World 
Bank. This may include minimum size require-
ments, both to establish TFs and to contribute to 
existing TFs. Moreover, collective fundraising (both 
with other donors and among German agencies) 
could help reduce fragmentation and ad-hoc fund-
raising, while enhancing better knowledge transfer. 
As a donor, Germany has a more nuanced picture 
on fragmentation, acknowledging that there may be 
“good fragmentation” if TFs advance partner-coun-
try priorities and that different types of TFs have 
different potential for fragmentation.95 For example, 
MDTFs allow for pooling and risk-sharing, and they 
may even supersede bilateral efforts. In contrast, 
95 Barakat (2009), Guder (2009), Thalwitz (2013).
SDTFs, especially if they go beyond mere co-financ-
ing, increase fragmentation. With regard to thresh-
olds, German agencies expressed their wish to par-
ticipate in specific TFs irrespective of their size of 
contribution, arguing that the time devoted to the 
trust-funded program might be more important for 
overall success than money alone. Thresholds are 
also an obstacle because Germany may only have 
a limited budget reserved for TFs (through the FiT 
title). In addition, German agencies are opposed to 
centralized fundraising as this deprives them of the 
flexibility and spontaneity in cooperating with the 
World Bank, which precisely reflects a comparative 
advantage of TFs over alternative funding mecha-
nisms.
As part of a consolidated position, Germany should
• Achieve a compromise with the World Bank 
and other donors to establish a cumulative 
threshold for MDTFs (at the parent level of 
MDTFs) while abstaining from any threshold 
for individual contributions to MDTFs – par-
ticularly country level MDTFs as opposed to 
programs;
• Find an adequate balance between efficien-
cy (e.g., collective fundraising) and flexibility 
(e.g., decentralized fundraising by German 
implementing agencies) in the frequency of 
fundraising, given agreement on collective 
fundraising (e.g., semi-annual replenishment is 
preferable over annual fundraising) bearing in 
mind the German institutional structure and 
related requirements on fiscal years.
Aside from a substantive reform position, Germany 
may shape the reform agenda by more active en-
gagement. Accompanying the reform agenda falls 
under the responsibility of the BMZ World Bank 
division (411). There are multiple forums in which 
Germany could assume a more active role, including 
the Donor Forum, Donor Consultations, and The-
matic Groups.
To enable Germany to pursue its reform priorities 
more effectively, it should
• Become aware of its own engagement policy, 
especially in terms of priority themes and un-
derlying instruments to be used;
• Actively participate in the Donor Forum as 
a high-level forum for strategic dialogue on 
World Bank policies, while at the same time, 
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Germany should work in relevant thematic 
groups (for example on the results budget  
process);
• Deduce a TF reform position that supports 
those priorities, balancing the donor perspec-
tive and the shareholder perspective and  
cooperating with like-minded donors;
• Shape specific issues of key interest in the TF 
reform agenda, for example UFs. 
Furthermore, being part of the strategic dialogue 
certainly requires human resource capacities, but 
also better division of labor and coordination among 
German aid agencies. 
Table 8: Summary recommendations for a German position on the trust fund reform agenda
Issue Shareholder View Donor View Recommendations
Pillar I
Umbrella Facilities Greater alignment wel-
comed, but UFs too rigid 
and risk of losing part-
ner-country focus
Flexibility to support sub-
themes as well as oppor-
tunities for participation 
desirable
Find balance between 
alignment and flexibility; 
explore possibility of  
country umbrellas
Results frameworks (RFs) Aid effectiveness is  
important, but avoid  
too much burden on  
the World Bank
Formal commitment to 
RFs in the AA desired
Include reference on RF  
in AA; insist on trans- 
parency; cover future 
costs to monitor results
Pillar III
Cost recovery and  
efficiency
Fragmentation is bad, 
but must be quantified to 
guide selectivity; incen-
tives to reduce the prolif-
eration of TFs, collective 
fundraising and other pro-
cedures
“Good fragmentation“ if 
it benefits recipient coun-
tries; centralized fund-
raising reduces flexibility; 
thresholds may be arbi-
trary
Find compromise on 
thresholds; find a balance 
between flexibility and 
standardization on fund-
raising
Source: joyn-coop.

6 Conclusion and outlook
In this study, we have analyzed the German IBRD/
IDA TF portfolio at the World Bank as well as Ger-
man experiences with TF engagements at the World 
Bank. The German portfolio has grown dynamical-
ly over the last years, albeit from a small level. Giv-
en its strong advocacy for an efficient multilateral 
system not plagued by duplication and aid fragmen-
tation, Germany felt that it should gain a more com-
prehensive overview of its current TF portfolio and 
its own engagement policies before taking a stance 
on the ongoing reform debates. Moreover, TFs as a 
means to channel targeted development assistance 
and to shape multilateral priorities will grow in 
their overall importance in the multilateral aid ar-
chitecture. Our findings focus on four areas.
First, we analyzed the German portfolio with re-
gard to German development priorities and in 
comparison to the overall TF portfolio at the Bank. 
We found that the German portfolio covers near-
ly all main topics, with a focus on areas such as 
climate change, education, and fragile states. Yet, 
apart from those mentioned, it remains relatively 
small in many of the topics in terms of contribu-
tion amounts. In addition, Germany has a strong 
focus on TFs that typically support interventions at 
the country level or regional priorities, whereas in 
terms of amounts, Germany is rather under-repre-
sented in TFs aimed at creating knowledge and dis-
seminating new approaches for development.  
Fragmentation has been a particular area of inter-
est against which we assessed the German portfo-
lio. We found that fragmentation is rather low, at 
least in terms of the number of TFs (and especially 
SDTFs). Moreover, the few dormant funds in the 
German portfolio are being dissolved by the World 
Bank in the near future. However, fragmentation 
is high in terms of the broad range of themes sup-
ported through relatively small contributions. We 
therefore think that a more strategic allocation 
based on a coordinated approach among the Ger-
man development institutions, to be pursued in the 
future, will help mitigate the risk of fragmentation 
and its adverse consequences. 
Second, with respect to the overarching engage-
ment in TFs, German stakeholders perceived a lack 
of oversight and high-level guidance. Our analysis 
revealed that funding decisions are based on inde-
pendent decisions of the individual sector and re-
gional units within BMZ , rather than being shaped 
by an ex-ante allocation strategy. We therefore have 
recommended a collective decision-making process 
on TF engagements among the official German aid 
institutions. In addition, Germany should overcome 
the lack of centralized information on World Bank 
TFs and institutional history of all German actors.
Third, once the focus areas of TF support are deter-
mined, German stakeholders should bear in mind 
the good practices of TF management. The evi-
dence shows that Germany is more likely to shape 
the agenda if it makes a significant commitment 
in terms of both money and human resources, and 
if it coordinates with other donors. In particular, 
German stakeholders should not only participate in 
Steering Committees but also actively use informal 
forums as arenas of consensus formation.
Fourth, Germany should also become an even more 
vocal shareholder in the ongoing TF reform process 
at the World Bank. Key areas of the debate focus on 
the issue of alignment of TFs with the core agenda 
and cost recovery. As regards alignment, Germany, 
in consultation with other donors, must balance the 
need for alignment with the desire for flexibility. It 
should ask the Bank to further explore the possibil-
ity of country umbrellas in order to increase part-
ner-country focus. In terms of cost effectiveness, 
Germany should support measures to enhance cost 
recovery, while being aware of the challenges of 
further standardization, for example on collective 
fundraising. Germany should also continue to pro-
mote RFs, possibly through a reference in the AAs.
Germany is an important shareholder of IBRD/IDA 
based on its core contributions. Core resources - 
the capital shares at IBRD and the non-earmarked 
voluntary contributions to IDA - are important to 
enable the World Bank to fulfill its mandate. This 
especially applies to long-term activities that tran-
scend the immediate horizon of development proj-
ects. For example, measuring impact in the after-
math of projects requires sustainable institutional 
structures to collect the necessary data and to dis-
seminate knowledge long after individual projects 
and even programs close. Hence, donors and the 
World Bank must carefully monitor the further 
evolution of TFs in relation to core funding. Donors 
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should agree on maintaining an adequate balance 
between both types of funding, which gives them 
flexibility while not compromising the ability of 
the Bank to deliver high-quality development aid. 
Donors are in the driver seat in their capacity as 
shareholders at the Executive Board to set the right 
incentives for TFs being used for the right purposes. 
They also have the opportunity to push topics in 
IDA replenishments through thematic windows.
The TF reform is also interlinked with the corpo-
rate reform of the World Bank. While the tradi-
tional matrix structure consisting of regions and 
networks will evolve into a set of global practices, 
the exact parameters of the reform are still unclear. 
Against this background, it can only be speculated 
how the structure of TFs and their day-to-day man-
agement will be affected. Once the actual outcomes 
of the overall reform become apparent, the German 
TF agenda should be put in this context and nuanc-
es reconsidered. 
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Annex 1: List of interviewees
Name Affilia-
tion
Position & Unit Topic Date of 
Interview 
Abundo, Maria Lourdes World 
Bank
Program Officer, 
PREM Network
Case Study 
UFGE, PSIA
23.10.13
Boukerche, Sandrine World 
Bank
Carbon Finance Analyst,  
Carbon Finance Unit
Case Study 
CDCF
23.10.13
Bowyer-Walker, Nicolette World 
Bank
Operations Advisor,  
SARDE
Case Study 
Bangladesh 
HSDP
23.10.13
Brinkhaus, Michaela BMZ Officer for Primary Education,  
Division 201 - Education
Case Study 
Education 
for All
09.10.13
Christensen, Olav Rex World 
Bank
Senior Public Finance Specialist, Education  
Human Development Network
Case Study 
Education 
for All
22.10.13
Costa, Valerie de World 
Bank
Program Manager, infoDev TF Infodev 22.10.13
Dengg, Dr. Sören BMZ Head of Division, 
Division 411 - World Bank; IMF; Debt Issues
Strategy 07.11.13
Diekmann, Michèle KfW Senior Manager Policy and Communication, 
Key account for World Bank
Strategy 16.10.13
Djutovic-Alivodic, Sabina World 
Bank
Operations Analyst, CFPTO Strategy 23.09.13 
22.10.13
Dofel, Sook-Jung GIZ Project Leader 
Strengthening Public Financial and Economic 
Management in Malawi
Additional 
Short Case 
Study Malawi
11.10.13
Dorasil, Susanne BMZ Head of Division, 
Division 112 - Economic policy
Finance
Additional 
Short Case 
Study FIRST
10.10.13
Engel, Albert GIZ Deputy Director General,
Sectoral Department 
Strategy 10.10.13
Fass-Metz, Frank BMZ Head of Division, Division 312 - Climate  
policy and Climate Financing
Case Study 
FCPF
16.10.13
Folz, Dr. Rachel BMZ Desk Officer,  
Division 410 - Mult. Development policy; G7/
G8/G20
Strategy 20.09.13
Goltz, Nicolaus von der World 
Bank
Senior Operations Officer, 
Knowledge for Operations 
Strategy 23.10.13
Gürtner, Sabine GIZ Head of Program, Gender Equality and  
Women Rights, 
Division Good Governance and Human Rights 
Case-Study 
UFGE
04.11.13
Haase, Sven BMZ Assistant Desk Officer,  
Division 313  - Water, Energy, Urban  
Development, Geoscience sector
Case-Study 
ESMAP
09.10.13
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Name Affilia-
tion
Position & Unit Topic Date of 
Interview 
Hamacher, Winfried GIZ Head of Agency, 
GIZ Zimbabwe
Short Case 
Study Zim-
babwe
07.10.13
Haupt, Ulrike BMZ Head of Division, 
Division 311 - Environment and sustainable 
use of natural resources
Case Study 
FCPF
09.10.13
Hoven, Ingrid World 
Bank
Executive Director,
GEDO 
Strategy 
GEDO
24.10.13
Hustädt, Ernst GIZ Head of Division, Division Contracting,  
Procurement, Logistic
Strategy, Fi-
nancial issues
25.09.13
Illi, Holger World 
Bank
Senior Partnership Specialist, 
CFPTO
Strategy 24.10.13
Kasmann, Elke GIZ Project Leader, 
Division of Health,  
Education and Social Protection
Case Study 
PSIA
25.09.13
Kästle, Kathrin KfW Project Manager,  
Sector and Policy Division Peace and 
 Security
Case Study 
TDRP
23.10.13
Khanna, Rohit World 
Bank
Program Manager, ESMAP Case Study 
ESMAP
23.10.13
Kirky-Zaki, Jane World 
Bank
Senior Program Officer, 
CFPTO
Governance 
Questions
24.10.13
Klingberg, Michael BMZ Desk Officer,  
Division 411 - World Bank; IMF; debt issues
Strategy, 
Budgetary 
Questions
19.09.13
Knauder, Katrin KfW External Expert, 
Sector and Policy Division Peace and Security
Strategy 16.10.13
Koch, Michael World 
Bank
Director,  
CFPTO
Strategy, 
TF-Reform
25.09.13
Koppers, Dr. Simon BMZ Head of Division,  
Division 416 - United Nations
Strategy, 
Budgetary 
questions
02.10.13
Körberlein, Michael BMZ Desk Officer, 
Division 313 - Water, Energy, Urban Develop-
ment, Geoscience sector
Case Study 
ESMAP
09.10.13
Kroppen, Friedrich BMZ Desk Officer,
Division 416 - United Nations
Budgetary 
Questions
11.11.13
Kruse-Tietz, Lydia World 
Bank
TF Coordinator, Partnership Advisor,
SDN
Case Study 
ESMAP and 
FCPF
24.10.13
Lee, Henna World 
Bank
Resource Management Analyst,
InfoDev
InfoDev 22.10.13
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Name Affilia-
tion
Position & Unit Topic Date of 
Interview 
Liché, Berthold KfW Senior Project Manager, 
Sector Division Health and Social Security
HDSP 14.10.13
Lynch, Catherine World 
Bank
Urban Economist, 
Urban Development and Resilience Unit
Case Study 
PforR
24.10.13
Markov, Andrei World 
Bank
Senior Partnership Specialist, 
CFTPO
German TF 
portfolio, TF 
reform agenda
22.10.13
Möhring, Ute BMZ Desk Officer, 
Division 204 - Human rights; gender equality; 
culture and development
Case Study 
UFGE
09.10.13
Narayan, Ambar World 
Bank
Lead Economist, PREM Case Study 
PSIA
22.10.13
Nedolast, Sarah World 
Bank
Senior Program Coordinator,  
Gender and Development
Case Study 
UFGE
23.10.13 
08.11.13
Nkole, Helena World 
Bank
Senior Operations Officer, 
CFPTO
Results 
Framework
23.10.13
Palm, Reinhard BMZ Deputy Head of Division,  
Division 411 - World Bank; IMF; debt issues
Strategy 19.09.13
Paqué, Heike BMZ Desk Officer,  
Division 201 - Education 
Case Study 
EFA
09.10.13
Pardo, Maria Lourdes World 
Bank
Senior Counsel,  
LEGCF
Legal issues 24.10.13
Ressel, Dr. Gerhard BMZ Deputy Head of Division,  
Division 113 - Employment
TF Job mar-
kets
19.11.13
Röckel, Katja GIZ Head of Sector Project Development Eco-
nomics, Division Economics and Employment
Case Study 
PSIA, PforR
04.10.13
Schmitt, Dr. Sylvia GIZ Advisor Sector Program Education 
Division Education, Health and Social  
Protection
Case Study 
EFA
04.10.13
Schreiner, Gregor GIZ Head of Division, Division Finance Manage-
ment, Consulting and Training
Financial is-
sues
26.09.13
Schütt, Niels BMZ Desk Officer, 
Division 411 - World Bank Group; IMF, debt 
relief
Case Study 
PSIA, PforR
27.09.13
Stavrou, Stavros (Aki) World 
Bank
Senior Conflict & Development Specialist, 
TDRP
Case Study 
TF TDRP-
South Sudan
22.10.13
Steckhan, Uwe World 
Bank
Senior Operations Officer, Office of the  
Partnership Advisor
Case Study 
ESMAP and 
CARBON
24.10.13
Steinke, Marita BMZ Head of Division, Division 204 - Human rights; 
gender equality; culture and development
Case Study 
FCPF
09.10.13
Stensland, Heidi World 
Bank
Operations Officer, Donor Focal Point for 
Germany,
CFPTO
Strategy Ger-
man TF port-
folio
26.09.13 
22.10.13 
24.10.13
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Name Affilia-
tion
Position & Unit Topic Date of 
Interview 
Stiegler, Dr. Ursula GIZ Advisor,  
Division Economics and Employment
Case Study 
PSIA, PforR
04.10.13
Sydygalieva, Bermet World 
Bank
TF Coordinator, 
Human Development Network
Case Study 
EFA
22.10.13
Uhlenkamp, Bowen World 
Bank
Operations Officer,  
CFPTO
Strategy 24.10.13
Vinuya, Ferdinand World 
Bank
Operations Officer,
CFPTO
German TF 
portfolio, TF 
reform agenda
21.10.13 
24.10.13
Whitehouse, Simon World 
Bank
Acting Partnership Coordinator FCPF, 
Carbon Finance Unit
Case Study 
FCPF
23.10.13
Wyrwinski, Ralf BMZ Desk Officer,  
Division 203 - Human rights, gender equality, 
culture and development
Case Study 
UFGE
09.10.13
Zattler, Dr. Jürgen BMZ Deputy Director General, 
Directorate 41 – European and multilateral 
development policy 
Strategy 07.11.13
Zechter, Richard H. World 
Bank
Coordinator Carbon Partnership Facility,  
Carbon Finance Unit 
TF CDCF 23.10.13
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Annex 2: Analysis of German Administrative 
Agreements 
This document presents our analysis of Administra-
tive Agreements (AAs) on TFs at the World Bank. Fol-
lowing the typical structure of such AAs, this annex 
consists of three sections. Section 1 summarizes the 
program criteria and eligible expenditures, section 2 
addresses standard management provisions on TFs, 
and section 3 describes governance structures.
Our analysis is based on the standard template for 
new AAs, effective since FY12, as well as the full set 
of German AAs with the World Bank. For identical 
provisions across AAs, we infer that those provisions 
are generally not negotiable. Conversely, variable ele-
ments are subject to negotiation, which include eligi-
ble expenditures, fees, and governance issues. 
1. Program criteria
Types of activities
Types of activities depend on the purpose of the TF. 
AAs typically enlist recipient-executed activities as 
well as Bank-executed activities. Bank-executed ac-
tivities may either benefit program activities or cover 
Secretariat costs of the TF.  
A commonality for the activities supported through a 
TF is that World Bank rules apply with regard to pro-
curement, including the hiring of staff. Without ex-
ception, IBRD/IDA rules must be followed. The World 
Bank stipulates that none of the functions performed 
in relation to the TF constitute a waiver to its Articles 
of Agreement, and that IBRD/IDA rules govern TF 
management. 
Not all expenditure can be charged against a TF. Key 
distinctions can be made along both the type of ex-
penditures as well as their timing. Usually, TFs may 
cover activities conducted after the AA has come into 
effect. An exception is the SDTF on ESMAP, whose AA 
provides for the possibility of retrospective financing 
(with an explicit date being specified in the AA). As re-
gards the type of expenditures, there is variation with 
respect to both RETFs and BETFs. 
For recipient-executed activities, eligible expenditure 
is closely related to the objectives of the program, for 
example purchase of equipment. 
For Bank-executed activities, eligible expenditure 
may include 
• direct costs for regular staff; 
• indirect costs for regular staff and associated 
overheads;
• field assignment benefits;
• consultant fees;
• contractual services; 
• travel costs, conferences, workshops, and  
meetings;
• direct costs for temporary support staff, tempo-
rary staff, and extended-term consultants;
• indirect costs for those staff categories. 
The list of eligible World Bank expenditures varies 
across AAs. In particular, it may not be possible to 
charge staff costs for temporary staff. This has led TF 
managers to not hire temporary staff but rather to 
buy in external expertise through contracts. This is 
considered inefficient practice due to additional pa-
perwork and the problem that external consultants 
may not be subject to Bank-internal rules. Other AAs 
distinguish between regular staff and temporary staff: 
While indirect costs for regular staff is still eligible, 
such costs cannot be charged in case of co-terminous 
appointees (the co-terminous status, however, has 
been abolished as of FY13).96 Yet, the most restrictive 
AAs do not allow staff to charge working time against 
the TF at all.
Program criteria
As an optional element, the World Bank and the 
donor may agree that activities are financed in ac-
cordance with a set of pre-defined program criteria. 
This also includes conditional contributions. It rarely 
occurs that the donor conditions the payment sched-
ule upon achievement of certain objectives; an ex-
ception is PSIA, whose AA states concrete measures 
to verify TF progress together with the clause that 
future payments depend on their level of achieve-
ment.
96 The co-terminous status was a former staff category until 
June 30, 2013. It referred to staff members exclusively hired 
for trust-funded activities. 
 69
Another example of conditioning is the matching 
requirement in the PforR TF. Regional units must 
provide own funding at least as high as the respec-
tive grant from PforR. It could be argued whether 
this is not a World Bank-internal provision, but the 
fact that it occurred in the AA indicates a bargaining 
space for donors.
2. Standard provisions
Administration of contributions 
The World Bank manages all contributions in US 
Dollars, the holding currency of the TF (however, 
the contribution amount in the AA may be noted in 
EUR). This implies that the World Bank also produc-
es its financial reports on TFs in US Dollars. Anec-
dotal evidence shows that some donors have required 
reporting in their own currency, for example the Eu-
ropean Commission (EC). 
Without exception, contributions to a specific TF 
may be commingled with other TFs. However, TFs 
as a whole are separated from the core budget of the 
World Bank. The World Bank maintains separate 
records for each donor. In case of a multi-donor TF, 
there is only a single fund into which donor contri-
butions are pooled. This also implies that the World 
Bank reinvests any interest earned in a multi-donor 
TF into the program.
Sometimes, the World Bank has agreed on special 
provisions with individual donors, which has result-
ed in SDTFs. This is because some donors could oth-
erwise not have contributed to a TF due to their own 
domestic legal restrictions. For example, US laws re-
quire anti-terrorism screening when the World Bank 
sub-contracts third-party implementers, which may 
go beyond IBRD/IDA requirements. Also, EC rules do 
not allow financing taxes from donor contributions, 
which is inconsistent with a standard World Bank 
provision.97
Fees and costs
The World Bank offers two fee arrangements for TFs, 
standardized fees and customized fees. Standard-
ized fees apply in the case of MDTFs. The standard 
fee arrangement consists of a USD 35,000 set-up fee 
and a five percent administrative fee that is deduct-
97 If a recipient purchases services, the donor typically finances 
any value-added taxes on these services. Some donors, for 
example the EC, have excluded the financing of taxes.
ed from each contribution (WB 2012 Handbook: 
18). Possible deviations from this standard arrange-
ment must be collectively negotiated and apply to 
all donors equally. Customized fees are used for all 
other TFs and notably SDTFs, based on the principle 
of full cost recovery. The proportional fee deduct-
ed from each TF contribution may vary a lot across 
AAs. However, to ensure cost recovery, customized 
agreements entail a second fee pillar based on actual 
costs. This second fee element is typically ceiled, ei-
ther by a total amount (e.g., USD 1,412,168 in the case 
of ESMAP-MDTF) or by a percentage share (e.g., 3.8 
percent of total contributions in the BHSDP). In some 
cases, certain types of expenditures are restrict-
ed, as for example in the PSIA-MDTF, which limits 
Bank-executed expenditures to 20 percent. 
Financial reporting
The World Bank provides financial information to 
donors through the Client Connection database. 
Within six months after closure of the TF, the World 
Bank furnishes a financial statement on receipts, dis-
bursements, and fund balances. Within six months 
of the end of each World Bank fiscal year, the World 
Bank must provide an annual single audit report, 
which comprises a management assertion together 
with an external audit report on the adequacy of in-
ternal control over financial reporting and a finan-
cial statement for the TFs. The costs for the single 
audit are to be borne by the World Bank. Donors may 
obtain additional audits at their own cost, provided 
that donors and the World Bank have agreed on the 
necessity on such audits in prior consultations.
Progress reporting
The World Bank provides donors with annual prog-
ress reports on the progress of trust-funded activi-
ties, and a final report following six months after the 
closure of the TF. The frequency at which the World 
Bank provides progress reports is subject to negotia-
tion. The standard provision is annual reporting, but 
reports may be due every six months or even every 
three months upon request. Any donor may evaluate 
activities at its own cost at any time up to six months 
following the end date of the TF, given agreement be-
tween the World Bank and the donor on the scope of 
such a review. 
Disbursement – cancellation – refund 
The TF instrument terminates at the end date stip-
ulated in the AA or when the TF is fully depleted, 
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whichever of the two dates is earlier. In case the TF 
still possesses undisbursed resources after the clo-
sure data, the World Bank must seek approval from 
the donors if it wishes to disburse those funds on 
program activities. 
In terms of cancellation policies, both the World 
Bank and the donor may cancel the TF agreement 
upon three months prior written notification. The 
cancellation only applies to undisbursed funds, 
which allows the World Bank to fulfill its contractu-
al commitments it entered based on the expectation 
that funds will be available.
In case of single-donor funds, the AA specifies 
how any remaining balance will be used. In case of 
multi-donor TFs, donors receive their pro-rata share 
of undisbursed funds. 
Amendments to the AA including its annexes require 
an agreement between the World Bank and the do-
nor. In case of multi-donor TFs, which are constitut-
ed by a set of AAs between each individual donor and 
the World Bank, all donors must consent to a change 
in a single AA. 
3. Governance structures
Governance models vary across TFs, according to the 
purposes of the underlying programs. Donors and 
the World Bank may agree on one-tier TFs, two-tier 
TFs, and three-tier TFs. A one-tier TF is the simplest 
arrangement that merely co-finances project com-
ponents. The implementing World Bank unit also 
manages the TF contribution. A two-tier TF consists 
of a Secretariat and a Steering Committee, comprised 
by donor representatives and typically World Bank 
representatives. A three-layer structure would add to 
this a management committee among implementing 
agencies, which would only be appropriate for broad 
partnerships. 
The Steering Committee, which meets at least annu-
ally, often delegates certain functions to a TF Techni-
cal Committee that reviews project proposals and as-
sists the Steering Committee in its day-to-day work. 
Donors may negotiate to participate in the Technical 
Committee (as they did in the Governance Partner-
ship Facility) and thereby obtain decision-making 
power on project allocation. This would obviously 
make sense if they had specific sector expertise.
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Annex 3: A glance at the trust fund strategies  
of other donors
1. United Kingdom
1.1 Engagement strategy
There are three main reasons for the United Kingdom 
through its Department for International Develop-
ment (DFID) to engage in TFs at the World Bank. First, 
TFs enable DFID to deliver where it lacks capacity on 
its own,98 or to complement existing bilateral activi-
ties.99 TFs are an appropriate instrument where other 
procurement channels are forestalled. Second, the 
World Bank is able to deliver “value for money”, as re-
flect in its good ratings in a 2011 DFID evaluation on 
multilateral institutions. It has credibility with gov-
ernments and uses its entrusted resources in a cost-ef-
fective way. Third, TFs provide a space for a range of 
donors on shared priorities, such as fragile states, good 
governance, poverty reduction, and public health. 
Beyond those general motives, DFID has sometimes 
used TFs as a flexible instrument to meet its spending 
targets.
DFID uses a broad range of TF mechanisms that re-
flect its bilateral aid priorities. It is the largest donor 
of IBRD/IDA TFs to the World Bank. Together with 
IFC TFs, IBRD/IDA TFs constitute about 70 percent of 
its portfolio, only 30 percent are FIFs. British support 
within the IBRD/IDA TFs focuses on co-financing and 
country-specific RETFs, mainly in its bilateral focus 
countries in Africa (e.g., Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda), 
and South-East Asia (e.g. Cambodia, Indonesia, and 
Vietnam). In addition, UK uses BETFs to catalyze nov-
el approaches in good governance (e.g., GPF), security 
and justice (e.g., GRSF), health (e.g., PFED). DFID has a 
strong focus on results, which includes impact evalua-
tion and results measurement (e.g., GPOBA and SRTF). 
DFID scores average on its balance between MDTFs 
and SDTFs, using SDTFs only where it seeks to pilot 
innovative issues or where it assists a specific country 
through co-financing activities. DFID is a founding 
donor of many TFs, crowding in other donors later on. 
DFID is the central agency for official UK develop-
ment aid. It is a large institution with wide-spread 
98 Interview with ED office.
99 IEG (2011): 6.
country presence but implementation constraints 
and thus relies on consultants for aid implementa-
tion. Country teams and sector teams at headquarters 
manage their own budgets for which they seek the 
most efficient delivery channels. Based on this de-
centralized allocation modality, the UK argues that 
TFs do not compete with IDA.100 Since the financial 
crisis, the UK has massively cut social spending at 
home while ring-fencing the foreign aid budget. This 
increases pressure to show tangible results in develop-
ment cooperation. In its TFs, DFID has been pushing 
for results frameworks, while seeking more opera-
tional involvement as well. DFID is very clear on what 
it expects its TFs to do. For example, it agrees upfront 
on reporting standards.101 In some cases, DFID main-
tains an explicit stake in project selection through 
its membership in the Steering Committee (e.g., GPF 
and GPSA), while in other cases it is understood that 
World Bank teams try to accommodate specific pri-
orities of DFID when preparing pilot studies (e.g., 
PFED, GPOBA, or SRTF). Recently, however, the World 
Bank turned down requests to focus assistance on 
Nigeria,102 or on the 37 DFID priority countries in the 
CAF-TF.103 While World Bank staff acknowledges that 
its emphasis on results makes the World Bank itself 
more effective in its aid programs, DFID sometimes 
asks for results at a level of detail that World Bank sys-
tems are unable to capture. This strong results focus 
has already frightened off others to join multi-donor 
initiatives in which the UK plays a major role (e.g., Bel-
gium did not join the GPF). In addition, some TFs by 
DFID foresee co-execution, which entails secondment 
of consultants and joint missions with local DFID 
staff. Our own survey evidence shows that DFID only 
uses this option where it has relevant expertise by 
country or theme (e.g., GAFSP and SRTF). Day-to-day 
interaction between DFID and the World Bank can be 
intense, but it is perceived as valuable by World Bank 
staff, given the local contacts, expertise, and experi-
ence of DFID staff.104
100 Interviews with ED office and DEC staff member.
101 Interviews with ED office and HDN staff member.
102 Interviews at CFPTO.
103 Interview with GEDO.
104 Interview with HDN staff member.
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1.2 Trust fund reform process priorities
DFID says that TF reforms must be consistent with its 
priorities as a donor and its interests as shareholder of 
the World Bank. TFs are most appropriate where they 
imply added value, and the rules governing TFs should 
reflect their purpose as a time-delimited instrument. 
DFID therefore strongly supports sunset clauses, re-
sults frameworks, and the overall consolidation of 
its TF portfolio. Along with the ED office, DFID local 
offices are more skeptical of umbrella facilities. UFs 
neither provide enough flexibility for specific actions 
and tailored results, nor do they have an end date and 
thereby could hollow out IDA in the long run (SB).
The UK government has a strong priority on align-
ment (pillar 1). It wants the World Bank to be more se-
lective and wishes to see more evidence on the added 
value of BETFs, especially whether or not they dilute 
the focus of the World Bank (SB). To further align-
ment, DFID headquarters considers UFs to be very 
useful.
In the mid-2000s, DFID like other donors has con-
tributed to the mushrooming of TFs. DFID is fairly 
decentralized in that small teams manage their own 
budgets. This facilitated funding agreements with the 
World Bank, which has become even more decentral-
ized since the Wolfensohn era. DFID has welcomed 
the joint portfolio review with the World Bank, which 
increased transparency on existing TFs and developed 
potential for consolidation. Indeed, the number of its 
TFs declined from 220 to 175, which the World Bank 
considers a major success to be repeated with other 
donors. From an efficiency perspective, the UK has 
realized that micro-managing TFs is too costly for its 
own administrative budget. It therefore embraces the 
umbrella principles. Also, the UK believes it is import-
ant that the World Bank must balance its revenue and 
expenditure (pillar 3).105 
2. Netherlands
2.1 Engagement strategy
Dutch engagement with the World Bank evolved 
considerably over the last decade. Motives for en-
gagement shifted from an initial focus on shaping 
the work agenda of the World Bank to a more recent 
emphasis on enhancing the effectiveness of a narrow-
er portfolio of activities. However, the Netherlands 
105 Interview with ED office.
has constantly sought to pursue its bilateral priorities 
through TFs.106 
In the early 2000s, Dutch support through the 
Bank-Netherlands Partnership Program facilitated 
World Bank activities in areas such as poverty, gen-
der, sustainability, and anti-corruption policies.107 
Phased out in FY12, BNPP was a Dutch umbrella fund 
consisting of free-standing TFs for BETFs on innova-
tive approaches and a pass-through window to pro-
grammatic TFs, notably MDTFs. In addition, the NIPP 
consolidates project-specific TFs with IFC.108 Both 
the BNPP and NIPP have been successful from the 
Dutch perspective in that previously innovative de-
velopment themes have become mainstreamed in the 
World Bank.109
In the mid-2000s, the Netherlands intensified its en-
gagement with the World Bank through both scaling 
up IDA and supporting fragile states through TFs. 
Over FY00-11, half of the Dutch contributions ad-
dressed basic education and fragile states. In terms of 
country priorities, the Dutch portfolio mainly targets 
Indonesia and Ethiopia,110 which reinforces its bilat-
eral development cooperation that includes 36 coun-
tries.111  
More recently, the Netherlands has reconsidered its 
multilateral engagement as part of changing bilateral 
policies, by now focusing on the four themes fragile 
states, water, food security, and reproductive health.112 
The increased focus of the IBRD/IDA TFs portfolio is 
mainly due to cuts in the aid budget and the prioriti-
zation of private-sector development through IFC TFs 
by the conservative government. Yet, the Netherlands 
is still the second largest contributor to IBRD/IDA TFs 
after the UK, while making almost no use of FIFs.113
The Netherlands lacks an explicit strategy to guide its 
interaction with the World Bank. The foreign minis-
try and the finance ministry jointly coordinate over-
all World Bank policies. The TF portfolio is managed 
by the foreign affairs team at The Hague,114 but small-
106 Interviews with GEDO and CFPTO staff member.
107 Klugkist (2013): 6.
108 MOFA (2013): 42.
109 Klugkist (2013): 15.
110 Ibid.: 6.
111 DSW (2013).
112 Ibid.: 7 and interview with CFPTO staff member.
113 MOFA (2013): 95.
114 Ibid.: 50.
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er programs are run by the Dutch embassies.115 The 
governance relationship witnessed a major transition 
in the last decade, as evidenced by the BNPP. Initially, 
the Netherlands were deeply involved, even review-
ing project proposals. By now, it fully delegates all 
processes to the World Bank. This is due to own pro-
cessing constraints, but even more so due to the BNPP 
results framework (2007), annually updated in mutual 
strategic consultations. It includes indicators for the 
entire program and its individual windows. As a re-
sult, official involvement of Dutch staff has decreased, 
with exceptions in water and fragile states.116 Beyond 
the experience with BNPP, it is still true that the Neth-
erlands are among the more active donors in manag-
ing their TFs. A World Bank manager mentioned the 
Netherlands along with DFID and SIDA when it comes 
to participation in supervision missions.117
2.2 Trust fund reform process priorities
The Netherlands supports the TF reform process at 
the World Bank, including thematic umbrella facil-
ities and improved selectivity by the World Bank.118 
This ties in with its own objective of further increas-
ing the focus of its TF portfolio. Moreover, the Neth-
erlands work towards enhanced coordination of TF 
engagement by the foreign ministry of affairs.119
The Dutch position on the TF reform agenda must be 
seen in the light of its own changing bilateral priori-
ties. The Netherlands re-considers its balance between 
TFs and IDA in favor of the latter. The Netherlands 
seeks to pursue priorities through IDA, together with 
like-minded donors such as the United Kingdom, 
Germany (for example on the effective deployment of 
staff), and the Nordics.120
3. Switzerland
3.1 Engagement strategy
The Swiss Economic Cooperation Department (SECO) 
and the Swiss Development Cooperation Department 
(SDC), the two Swiss departments conducting devel-
opment activities, only have about 600 staff members. 
Given its capacity constraints in bilateral development 
cooperation, Switzerland uses TFs to expand its global 
115 DSW (2013).
116 Klugkist (2013): 19.
117 Interview with CFPVP.
118 Klugkist (2013): 21.
119 Ibid.
120 MOFA (2013): 37.
presence while at the same time being able to ensure 
visibility of its multilateral engagement. Switzerland 
appreciates the World Bank for its expertise, its rep-
utation, and its high efficiency. It focuses its support 
to the World Bank on IDA, whereas TFs only play a 
secondary role.121  Facing a decision between TFs and 
IDA, Switzerland engages in TFs only when showing 
the “Swissness” of a program is a priority, given that 
TFs ensure a higher visibility to domestic constituen-
cies than general contributions to IDA.122 
Switzerland currently does not have a headquar-
ter-level engagement strategy for TFs. Its TF portfolio 
reflects national development priorities for specif-
ic sectors and countries as well as its concern with 
keeping the World Bank an efficient development 
institution. First, Switzerland traditionally maintains 
strong bilateral relations with some middle-income 
countries, which are not eligible for IDA core support. 
TFs ensure that Swiss aid targets those countries, for 
example the Balkans, the Central Asian mountain 
republics, and a few Latin American countries. Re-
cently, the World Bank has approached Switzerland 
to finance the country umbrella fund for Myanmar. 
Second, Switzerland uses TFs to reinforce its sector 
priorities, such as water, energy, and peace building. 
It is involved in the respective sector programs such 
as WSP, CGIAR, ESMAP, and the SPBF. Third, togeth-
er with Germany and the Nordics, Switzerland seeks 
to strengthen the human rights dimension in World 
Bank projects.123 In general, however, Switzerland does 
not use TFs to advocate non-core issues at the World 
Bank. It also has never used TFs due to pressure to 
spend the budget at the end of the year.124 
To support the efficiency of World Bank operations, 
Switzerland focuses its TF engagement on MDTFs and 
FIFs. Its engagement in SDTFs is limited to BETFs for 
specific studies, for example related to its bilateral 
projects.125 Headquarters of both SECO and SDC seek 
to be involved in as many sector programs as possible, 
because they seek to be part of a larger multilateral 
effort and they hope to learn from World Bank ex-
pertise. For example, in the case of EITI, the offer by 
the World Bank for joint country missions has been 
actively used by Swiss experts in its priority countries. 
Switzerland has some country offices in four conti-
nents, but capacities in partner countries are even 
121 Interview with ED office.
122 Ibid.
123 Interview with OPCS staff member.
124 Interview with CFPTO staff member.
125 Interview with ED.
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more limited than at headquarters. At the same time, 
the Swiss foreign aid budget is relatively large. These 
two features jointly account for the engagement in the 
programmatic funds, which require less intensive co-
ordination with the World Bank than SDTFs.126
Switzerland is mentioned along with Germany as one 
of the most hands-off donors. It is a vocal stakehold-
er at the formal governing bodies but does not take a 
leadership role in the strategic management of TFs, 
given its own capacity constraints. As is welcomed by 
the World Bank, Switzerland does not micro-manage 
TFs.
3.2 Trust fund reform process priorities
TFs do not play an important role in the overall Swiss 
engagement with the World Bank. Switzerland - along 
with Germany – tends to be more reluctant on TFs 
than other donors. Therefore, it welcomes reform ef-
forts at the World Bank aimed at better TF manage-
ment. The Swiss ED office is an even more vital sup-
porter of the TF reform agenda than headquarters in 
Berne. 
Switzerland prioritizes strategic alignment of TFs – 
the first pillar of the reform agenda. TFs should be 
fully aligned with core World Bank mandates, even 
if this would imply the close-down of existing Swiss 
funds should the World Bank consider them to be 
misaligned. 
The next priority refers to measures to enhance the 
efficiency of TFs – the third pillar of the agenda. The 
ED office strongly advocates consolidation, while 
headquarters are more reluctant. Switzerland sees the 
TF reforms as a necessary instrument to maintain 
overall effectiveness. The high return on investment 
and the track record of results have been major moti-
vations for Switzerland to collaborate with the World 
Bank. Distinct measures welcomed by the Swiss ED to 
enhance efficiency include higher fees for TF manage-
ment.
With respect to strategic oversight, Switzerland favors 
stronger control of TFs by the Executive Board and 
senior management. Switzerland is particularly con-
cerned that the World Bank has become dependent 
on individual donors for certain knowledge products, 
for example the World Development Report, a third of 
which financed by DFID.127
126 Interview with IFC staff member, DEZA (2013).
127 Interviews with EAP staff member, CFPTO staff member.
4. Sweden
4.1 Engagement strategy
Sweden formulated spending targets on foreign aid 
already in the 1980s. However, bilateral aid has not 
been an option to manage the resource increase if 
administrative costs should remain under control. 
TFs at the World Bank therefore became a popu-
lar instrument because they allow Sweden to “get 
more money out with less own personnel”.128 TFs 
enable Sweden to reach a larger number of partner 
countries where it wishes to focus its engagement, 
to commit to funding for many years, and to share 
burdens with like-minded donors.129 Sweden fa-
vors core funding, but there are specific reasons for 
preferring TFs over core budget in three specific 
circumstances. First, Sweden engages in TFs to ad-
vocate non-core issues where the World Bank would 
otherwise not have been involved. Key examples of 
such issues include human rights, social account-
ability, gender, and the environment. These are 
high-priority issues, underpinned by the fact that 
Sweden even sends its own staff to the respective TF 
secretariats. Second, Sweden sees a distinct value of 
TFs as a vehicle to support important clusters of ac-
tivities, such as fragile states. Other priority themes 
are water, energy, and peace building. In contrast, 
Sweden does not have a strong focus on specific 
countries. In the Eurasian region, for example, it 
supports the Balkans and Central Asian countries 
along with Switzerland.130  
Sweden is comparable to DFID in that funding deci-
sions are fairly decentralized. Headquarters manag-
es the global agenda and sector-specific TFs. While 
the majority of funds co-finances activities arising 
from country demand, the SDTFs at headquarter 
level tend to originate from Swedish sector prior-
ities. In dealing with World Bank network units, 
headquarters occasionally have earmarked contri-
butions to programmatic funds by specific sub-sec-
tors.131 This creates a challenge for the World Bank 
as much as earmarking by specific countries in 
those TFs. Key concerns for Sweden when it comes 
to formal reporting are transparency and results 
frameworks. Particularly since the financial crisis, 
Sweden has become more operationally involved. 
128 Interviews with OPCS staff member and ED office.
129 Interview with ED office.
130 Interview with ECA staff member.
131 Interviews with AFR staff member and GEDO.
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The main reason is that SIDA must prove to the 
Swedish parliament how funds were used and 
whether they generated satisfactory results. Im-
pressed by domestic pressure to show “value for 
money”, Sweden demanded greater say on how the 
World Bank implements projects. While many do-
nors have the willingness to micro-manage TFs, 
World Bank staff asserts that Sweden is among 
the few donors with the capacity to do so, given 
its decentralized structure. According to one offi-
cial, SIDA sometimes insisted on participating in 
supervision missions and clearance of World Bank 
reports on substantive results and next steps.132 Like 
other donors that have come under pressure due to 
the financial crisis, Sweden has tightened its finan-
cial controls on TFs, while becoming less engaged in 
the strategic dialogue.133
4.2 Trust fund reform process priorities
Sweden generally supports the TF reform process. A 
key priority is consolidation. Consolidation is in the 
Swedish interest because the growing TF portfolio 
does not match up with its own limited administra-
tive capacities. Sweden seeks to consolidate its port-
folio in three ways. First, it closes down dormant 
funds, welcoming any action taken by the World 
Bank in this respect. Second, Sweden consolidates 
its portfolio along thematic lines, and thanks to 
more guidance from headquarters, the earlier trend 
to locally raise funds has been reversed in favor of 
a more centralized approach. Third, Sweden advo-
cates larger projects and replaces SDTFs by MDTFs 
wherever possible. However, there are issues with 
umbrella facilities that Sweden wants the World 
Bank to address more thoroughly. In particular, to 
the extent that the size of TFs increases through 
UFs, the question arises how the standard reporting 
will be able to address Swedish concerns.134 On the 
issue of business process integration (pillar 2), Swe-
den thinks that the World Bank should streamline 
its TF operations.
132 Interview with CFPVP staff member.
133 Interview with CFPTO staff member.
134 Ibid.
5. Comparative statistics
Source: Aidflows (2013).
Source: Aidflows (2013).
Source: Aidflows (2013).
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Annex 4: List of TF contributions per German 
institution 
TF-No. Trust Fund Title Program Main Topic Total  
Contribution 
in USD****
% of 
size 
of TF
BMZ
TF050576 Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund* 
(MDTF)
ARTF Fragile State 39,963,400 1
TF021945 Brazilian Rain Forest Trust Fund (MDTF) BRF Protecting the 
Climate
6,475,675 9
TF071077 Carbon Fund of the Forest Carbon  
Partnership Facility** (MDTF)
CARBON Protecting the 
Climate
121,193,677 30
TF023589 Cities Alliance MDTF CITIES Urban  
Development
1,779,101 6
TF054674 Cities Alliance MDTF*** CITIES Urban  
Development
3,762,895 6
TF072025 Debt Service MDTF for the Palestinian  
Authority
DS Development 
Financing
2,000,000 8
TFM53689 Education for All Fast Track Initiative  
Secretariat (MDTF) ***
FTI-S Education 125,608 0.5
TF070968 Education For All Fast Track Initiative Cata-
lytic Trust Fund II (MDTF)
EFAFTI Education 42,405,397 47
TF050900 Financing for of the Joint United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP)/World Bank 
Energy Sector Management Assistance  
Program (SDTF)
ESMAP Energy 20,101,302 100
TF071398 Energy Sector Management Assistance Pro-
gram (MDTF)
ESMAP Energy 4,023,045 4
TF020673 Financing for the Consultative Group to  
Assist the Poor MDTF***
CGAP Financial  
Sector
422,123 1
TF053676 Financing for the Consultative Group 
to Assist the Poor MDTF (Successor to 
TF020673)
CGAP Financial  
Sector
3,985,089 7
TF024570 General Support of Infodev’s Core Funding 
to Assist in Carrying out Infodev’s Global 
Activities (MDTF)
INFOD Business 644,910 6
TF022835 Germany Donor Funded Staffing Program 
(SDTF)
DFSP Methods 18,708,461 100
TF070880 Labor Markets, Job creation and Econom-
ic Growth: Scaling up Research, Capacity 
Building, and Action on the Ground Trust 
Fund (MDTF)
JOBCRT Business 2,144,930 33
* TF held by BMZ and KfW.       ** TF held by BMZ and BMU.       *** TF held by BMZ and GIZ.       **** As of October 2013.
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TF-No. Trust Fund Title Program Main Topic Total  
Contribution 
in USD****
% of 
size 
of TF
TF070611 Mainstreaming Disaster Reduction Initiative 
of the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction 
and Recovery (MDTF)
GFDRR Disaster  
Management
21,904,624 13
TF054838 MDTF for Aceh and North Sumatra ( MDT-
FANS)
ID-ACH Disaster  
Management
13,930,600 2
TF070711 MDTF for Low-Income Countries for the 
Financial Sector Reform and Strengthening 
Initiative (FIRST)
FIRST Financial  
Sector
4,972,005 5
TF070723 MDTF for Middle-Income Countries for the 
Financial Sector Reform and Strengthening 
Initiative (FIRST)
FIRST Financial  
Sector
3,720,920 10
TF071202 MDTF for the Debt Management Facility for 
Low Income Countries
DMF Development 
Financing
1,000,000 5
TF053509 MDTF for the Extractive Industries Trans-
parency Initiative (“EITI”) Implementation 
Support
EITI Raw Materials 2,676,158 5
TF070385 MDTF for the Information for Development 
Program
INFOD Business 1,630,520 14
TF053980 Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory  
Facility Trust Fund II (MDTF)
PPIAF Business 2,144,930 4
TF071076 Readiness Fund of the Forest Carbon  
Partnership Facility (MDTF)
FCPFR Protecting the 
Climate
5,2397,850 21
TF071021 State- and Peace- Building MDTF SPBF Fragile State 873,275 0.4
TF071893 Umbrella Facility for Gender Equality 
(UFGE) (MDTF) ***
GENTF Gender 338,682 1
GIZ
TFM53689 Education for All Fast Track Initiative Sec-
retariat MDTF***
FTI-S Education 194,000 0,5
TF020673 Financing for the Consultative Group to  
Assist the Poor MDTF***
CGAP Financial  
Sector
523,614 2
TF071953 Global Knowledge Program on Migration 
and Development (MDTF)
FS-DEC Migration 2,368,801 70
TF071796 Malawi Public Finance and Economic  
Management Reform Program (MDTF)
PFEMRP Good  
Governance
521,515 5
TF070891 MDTF for Development Marketplace for 
African Diaspora in Europe (D-MADE)
MDDMAD Business 87,504 9
TF055155 MDTF for Land Policies for Growth and 
Poverty Reduction
SPTF Good  
Governance
110,327 4
TF051459 MDTF for Program for Forests (PROFOR) PROFOR Protecting the 
Climate
1,189,898 3
TF070918 MDTF for Trade Development Facility LA-TDF Business 375,172 4
TF070941 MDTF to Support Analytical Work within 
the Context of the Zimbabwe IDA’s Interim 
Strategy Note FY08-09
ZWAMTF Fragile State 513,150 7
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TF-No. Trust Fund Title Program Main Topic Total  
Contribution 
in USD****
% of 
size 
of TF
TF071603 MDTF for Zimbabwe (Successor to 
TF070941)
ZWAMTF Fragile State 333,650 3
TF071382 MDTF for Poverty and Social Impact Anal-
ysis (PSIA)
PSIA Methods 2,781,023 14
TF072062 Program-for-Results Support MDTF PforR Methods 2,041,660 100
TF070668 Special Initiative of the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) Evaluation Office (MDTF)
EOSIC Protecting the 
Climate
157,426 11
TF054674 The Cities Alliance MDTF*** CITIES Urban Devel-
opment
510,560 1
TF071893 Umbrella Facility for Gender Equality 
(UFGE) (MDTF)***
GENTF Gender 6,119,347 16
TF071860 Wealth Accounting and Valuation of Eco-
system Services MDTF
WAVES Protecting the 
Climate
1,083,930 5
KfW
TF050576 Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund 
(MDTF)*
ARTF Fragile State 421,115,600 6
TF071778 Bangladesh Health Sector Development 
Program MDTF
FS-SAR Health 16,591,250 5
TF050998 Community Development Carbon Fund 
(MDTF)
CARBON Protecting the 
Climate
2,314,386 2
TF071654 Ethiopia Protection of Basic Services Social 
Accountability Program (MDTF)
EPBS Good  
Governance
10,402,700 46
TF071424 KP/FATA/Balochistan MDTF PKNW Fragile State 11,228,800 7
TF070859 Liberia Reconstruction Trust Fund (MDTF) LRTF Fragile State 47,294,500 27
TF054723 MDTF for Southern Sudan (MDTF-SS) MDTFSS Fragile state 12,027,000 2
TF071857 MDTF for the Africa Climate Change  
Program
AFRCC Protecting the 
Climate
397,470 13
TF070732 MDTF for the Protection of Basic Services 
Program Secretariat in Ethiopia
AFRHD Good  
Governance
146,960 7
TF071294 MDTF for Transitional Demobilization and 
Reintegration Program (TDRP) in the Great 
Lakes Region
TDRP Fragile State 2,651,711 8
TF071228 Second Emergency Demobilization and  
Reintegration Project in Rwanda (MDTF)
AFRSD Fragile State 1,445,000 20
BMU
TF071670 Partnership for Market Readiness MDTF PMR Protecting the 
Climate
6,508,500 6
TF071077 Carbon Fund of the Forest Carbon  
Partnership Facility**
CARBON Protecting the 
Climate
12,963,000 3
Source: World Bank (2013a), attribution to main areas by joyn-coop.
* TF held by BMZ and KfW.       ** TF held by BMZ and BMU.       *** TF held by BMZ and GIZ.       **** As of October 2013.
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Annex 5: List of Financial Intermediary Funds 
with German contribution
TF No. FIF Title Partner Sector Total Contribu-
tion in USD
% of total 
size of FIF
29840 GEF-Trust Fund BMZ Protecting the  
climate
1,665,112,798 13
69002 Special Climate Change Fund BMZ Protecting the  
climate
79,945,690 31
69004 TF for the Least Developed Countries 
Fund for Climate Change
BMZ Protecting the  
climate
54,618,650 1
69011 Clean Technology Fund BMZ Protecting the  
climate
615,000,000 27
69012 Strategic Climate Fund BMZ Protecting the  
climate
65,672,300 2
69013 Adaptation Fund BMZ Protecting the  
climate
13,883,000 4
69022 Green Climate Fund TF BMZ Protecting the  
climate
1,052,920 14
50676 GFATM BMZ Health 251,491,342 1
50169 African Program for Onchocerciasis 
Control (APOC) Phase II Contribution
BMZ Health 0 0
69020 Global Partnership for Education Fund BMZ Education 2.,103,000 0.2
69005 Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) MDTF
BMZ Agriculture 263,037 0
28981 HIPC - GERMANY - APEX (SDTF) BMZ Development  
Finance
186,495,809 100
Source: World Bank (2013a)
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Annex 6: Selection criteria for case studies
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Annex 7: Rationale and challenges of trust funds 
Rationale from the donor side (as contribu-
tor) for choosing TFs as a funding vehicle:
(i) Administrative advantages:
• Possible to expand global reach without increas-
ing own administrative costs
• Multilateral contributions possible outside the 
three year IDA cycle
• Flexible funding instrument especially in areas 
in which core funding cannot legally be used, 
for example fragile states and middle-income 
countries
• Provide donors with a means to enhance the vis-
ibility of their multilateral contribution and to 
show “value for money” to their taxpayers 
(ii) Agenda setting:
• Implementing TFs: enable donors to comple-
ment their own bilateral portfolio
• Knowledge creation TFs: enable donors to focus 
aid on emerging development issues
• Against the World Bank and its shareholder, do-
nors regain control over multilateral disburse-
ment through the possibility of prioritizing spe-
cific development issues over other broader, or 
pre-set goals when contributing135
Rationale from the World Bank / share- 
holder side for accepting TFs as trustee:
(i) Administrative advantages:
• TFs have been integrated in overall budget plan-
ning and overall strategic planning. They have 
thus become a long-term funding instrument at 
the World Bank 
(ii) Agenda setting:
• From a World Bank point of view, TFs are a 
means to pilot new or innovative approaches or 
new instruments at a smaller scale, for which 
neither the shareholders nor the recipients 
would use core funding
• It is also a means to be innovative on certain 
global public goods (e.g. climate change mitiga-
135 Sridhar and Woods (2012).
tion and resilience) and a broad range of know-
ledge products
Challenges and caveats of TFs from a  
donor (contributor) point of view: 
(i) Administrative implications
• Risk of fragmentation of own portfolio, imply-
ing the need for monitoring, and increased HR 
resources 
Challenges and caveats of TFs from a  
World Bank / shareholder point of view:
(i) Administrative burden: 
• Increased transaction costs due to separate 
fund-keeping and additional reporting Those 
costs vary across types of TFs, but they are al-
ways higher than for core funds 136
• When fees do not recover actual costs, includ-
ing overheads in central units, the World Bank 
would need to subsidize those overheads with its 
core funds
• In addition to financials, the World Bank faces 
an internal governance challenge: Especially 
in the earlier days, individual task team leaders 
could raise funds for non-core activities with do-
nors, hardly supervised by senior management 
and hardly controlled by formal governance 
bodies, undermining the focus of the World 
Bank
(ii) Undermining focus and strategy
• TFs may hollow out core funding
• The World Bank might adapt its core agenda to 
individual donor priorities 
• Become a mere implementer of bilateral priori-
ties and adopt an operational bias at the expense 
of global knowledge activities 137
• Scrambling for the available funding in an alto-
gether more competitive environment for MAIs 138
136 IEG (2011).
137 Browne and Weiss (2012).
138 Graham (2012), Mahn (2012), UNDP EO (2012).
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Annex 8: Datapool for graphs     of the present 
study
Diagram 1: Cash contributions to World Bank Trust Funds 
Cash Contributions, USD billion
Year IBRD/IDA FIFs IFC TF
2002 1.2 1.4 0
2003 1.2 2.6 0.1
2004 1.8 2.9 0.1
2005 2.0 2.5 0.2
2006 2.4 2.6 0.2
2007 3.7 3.3 0.3
2008 4.0 4.5 0.2
2009 3.6 4.5 0.3
2010 4.3 6.0 1.1
2011 3.9 6.1 0.3
2012 4.3 7.2 0.3
Source: World Bank (2013a), IEG (2011).
Diagram 3: Comparison TF-portfolio structure
Funds held in Trust, FY13, USD million
World Bank Germany
IBRD/IDA 10,020 956
FIFs 19,194 2,096
IFC 787 2
Source: World Bank (2013c), World Bank (2013d), World Bank (2012b).
Cash Contributions
World Bank, USD billion Germany, USD million
Year IBRD/IDA FIFs IFC TF IBRD/IDA FIFs IFC TF
2008 4.0 4.5 0.2 n/a n/a n/a
2009 3.6 4.5 0.3 105 373 2
2010 4.3 6.0 1.1 117 842 0
2011 3.9 6.1 0.3 169 337 0
2012 4.3 7.2 0.3 110 610 0
2013 n/a n/a n/a 161 443 1
Source: World Bank (2013c), World Bank (2013d), World Bank (2012b).  139
139 No figures available for diagrams 11 and 12.
139
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Diagram 6: Breakdown free-standing and programmatic TFs
Cash Contributions, FY13, USD million
World Bank Germany
Free-standing 792 19
Programmatic 2,658 167
Source: World Bank (2013e).
Number of active TFs
World Bank Germany
Year Programmatic Free-standing Programmatic Free-standing
2004 n/a n/a 12 6
2005 n/a n/a 16 8
2006 n/a n/a 22 8
2007 n/a n/a 23 6
2008 379 378 26 6
2009 410 351 30 5
2010 441 339 32 7
2011 447 301 34 6
2012 463 257 39 6
2013 453 232 44 5
Source: World Bank (2013e).
Diagram 7: Breakdown multi-donor and single-donor TFs
No. of active TF, FY13 Q2
World Bank Germany
SDTF 350 2
MDTF 356 47
Source: World Bank (2013a), World Bank (2013c).
No. of active TF for Top 5 donors, FY13
MDTF SDTF
USA 23 44
UK 657 75
Germany 47 2
Japan 130 141
France 41 2
Source: World Bank (2013a), World Bank (2013c).
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Diagram 8: Breakdown Recipient- and Bank-executed TFs
Disbursements, USD million
World Bank, FY08-13 Germany, FY08-13 Q2
BETF 2,897 63
RETF 17,530 348
Source: (2013a), World Bank (2013c), World Bank (2013g).
Diagram 9: Comparison by the top five sectors (as defined by World Bank)
Disbursements of RETFs, FY12, %
World Bank
Public Admin, Law 28
Education 19
Health & Social Services 16
Agriculture 9
Industry & Trade 8
Other 20
Source: World Bank (2013c).
Disbursements of RETFs, FY12, %
Germany Germany  
without ARTF
Public Admin, Law 45 13
Health & Social Services 13 20
Transportation 10 16
Education 8 13
Water, Sanit. & Flood Prot. 8 13
Other 16 25
Source: World Bank (2013g).
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Diagram 10: Comparison by region
Disbursements of RETFs, USD million
World Bank,  
FY08-13 Q2
Germany,  
FY09-13
Germany without ARTF, 
FY09-13
Africa (AF) 5,513 44.5 44.5
East Asia and Pacific (EAP) 3,289 10.4 10.4
Europe and Central Asia (ECA) 1,104 9.0 9.0
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) 938 6.6 6.6
Middle East and North Africa (MNA) 2,115 0.3 0.3
South Asia (SA) 4,043 253.2 43.2
Global 528 1.2 1.2
Source: World Bank (2013c), World Bank (2013g).
Diagram 15: Active IBRD/IDA TFs by institution
Active TFs, FY13
Volume, USD million Number 140
BMZ 251.7 26
 - of which FiT 122.3 n/a
GIZ 18.9 12
KfW 525.6 10
BMU 19.4 1
Source: World Bank (2013a).
Diagram 16: Development over time: German contributions to IBRD/IDA TFs
German contributions to IBRD/IDA TFs
No. of active TFs per institution Cash contributions to TFs by institution,  
USD million
Year BMZ GIZ KfW Other 141 BMZ GIZ KfW Other
2004 14 5 6 1 3.7 2.5 2.2 1.2
2005 17 6 7 1 22.1 4.9 2.3 1.3
2006 20 7 8 2 15.2 1.8 11.9 0.5
2007 18 7 9 2 13.2 6.2 45.7 1.2
2008 21 10 8 1 9.9 3.2 58.8 0.7
2009 21 12 7 1 15.9 1.7 66.6 0
2010 22 13 8 1 31.9 2.3 53.0 0
2011 23 13 9 1 47.5 0.3 107.4 13,3
2012 26 12 10 2 32.4 1.04 82.3 6,5
2013 26 16 11 2 50.4 13.25 103.7 0
Source: World Bank (2013a).
140 There are 49 TFs with German contributions and 55 active TF contributions. Six TFs are hence held by two German institutions. 
Here, all of these six TFs are allocated to BMZ.
141 Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Consumer Protection, not allocated; up from 2009 only Ministry of Environment (BMU).
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Diagram 17: Volume and number of TFs by size of contribution
Size of contribution, FY13, USD million 
Volume Number of TFs
Size BMZ GIZ KfW BMZ GIZ KfW
>20  298 0  468 6 0 2
10-20 33 0  50 2 0 4
5-10 6 6 0 1  1 0
2-5  30 5 5 9  2 2
<2 7 6 2 8  12 3
Source: World Bank (2013a).
Diagram 18: Split among German main topics
Number of active TFs, FY13 Volume in active TFs, FY13,  
USD million
BETF RETF BETF RETF
Fragile states/ disaster management 4 8 25.4 547.8
Protecting the climate 9 1 178.7 6.5
Business 4 2 8.7 0.5
Financial sector 5 0 13.6 0
Good governance 2 2 257.3 10.9
Education 2 1 319.6 42.3
Methods 3 0 23.5 0
Urban development 2 1 4.3 1.8
Development financing 1 1 1.0 2.0
Energy 2 0 22.7 0
Gender 2 0 6.5 0
Health 0 1 0 16.6
Raw materials 1 0 2.7 0
Migration 1 0 2.4 0
Source: World Bank (2013a).
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Diagram 19: Key data for FIFs with German contribution
Key data
Total contribution, FY13, 
USD million
No. of FIFs, FY13 Cash Contributions,  
FY09-13, USD million 
Protecting the Climate 2,495 7 1,225
Health 252 2 0
Education 2 1 1
Agriculture 0.2 1 0
Development finance 187 1 83
Source: World Bank (2013a).
Diagram 20: Split among German main topics - FIFs included
Number of active TFs per institution, FY13 Volume in active TFs,  FY13, USD million
BMZ GIZ KfW BMU FIF BMZ GIZ KfW BMU FIF
Fragile states/ 
disaster mgt
4 2 6 0 0 76.7 0.8 495.8 0 0
Protecting the 
climate
3 3 2 2 7 180.1 2.4 2.7 19.5 2495.3
Business 4 2 0 0 0 8.7 0.5 0 0 0
Financial sector 4 1 0 0 0 13.1 0.5 0 0 0
Good governance 0 2 2 0 0 0 0.6 10.6 0 0
Education 2 1 0 0 1 42.4 0.2 0 0 2.1
Methods 1 2 0 0 0 18.7 4.8 0 0 0
Urban develop-
ment
2 1 0 0 0 5.5 0.5 0 0 0
Development fi-
nancing
2 0 0 0 1 3.0 0 0 0 186.5
Energy 2 0 0 0 0 22.8 0 0 0 0
Gender 1 1 0 0 0 0.3 6.1 0 0 0
Health 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 16.6 0 251.5
Raw materials 1 0 0 0 0 2.7 0 0 0 0
Migration 0 1 0 0 0 0 2.4 0 0 0
Source: World Bank (2013a).
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Diagram 21: German contributions to RETF versus BETF
Active TFs, FY13
Number Volume, USD million
Type BMZ GIZ KfW BMZ GIZ KfW
RETF 19 12 4 266.6 15.8 5.5
BETF 7 3 7 107.3 0.9 520.1
Source: World Bank (2013a).
Diagram 22: German contributions to TFs managed by a regional department versus a network
Active TFs, FY13
Number Volume, USD million
Type BMZ GIZ KfW BMZ GIZ KfW
Network 19 11 5 339.4 13.3 36.5
Region 7 4 6 34.5 3.6 489.1
Source: World Bank (2013a).
Diagram 23: German contributions to knowledge-creating (K), implementing (I) and hybrid (I/K) TFs
Active TFs, FY13
Number Volume, USD million
Type BMZ GIZ KfW BMZ GIZ KfW
K 14 10 0 65.3 15.9 0
I 7 5 11 92.1 2.8 525.6
I/K 5 1 0 216.6 0.2 0
Source: World Bank (2013a).
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